CITATION: R. v. McPolin, 2026 ONSC 3493

COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-11404579

DATE: 2026/06/15

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

– and –

Justin McPolin

The Defendant

Anya Kortenaar and Emilie Farrell, Counsel for the Crown

Mark Ertel and Michelle O’Doherty, Counsel for the Accused

HEARD: March 19-20, 2026

SENTENCING DECISION

(Oral Reasons Given on April 9, 2026)

CORTHORN J.

Introduction

1In March 2026, Justin McPolin plead guilty to two of the five offences with which he was charged in 2022. The two offences to which Mr. McPolin plead guilty are, colloquially known as,

a) possession of a firearm, knowing its possession is unauthorized, contrary to s. 92 of the Criminal Code; R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (“Code”), and

b) possession of a firearm contrary to an order (i.e., a s. 109 order), contrary to s. 117.01(1) of the Code.

2Mr. McPolin is one of three individuals charged with various firearm-related and other offences based on video and audio recordings of events that occurred at BH Floors, in Ottawa, Ontario, on December 16, 2021. By the date on which Mr. McPolin plead guilty, the other two individuals, James Kongkhaw and David Lafontaine, had each plead guilty to several offences, including one or more firearm-related offences.

3The submissions as to sentence for Mr. McPolin were made on March 19 and 20, 2026. During the sentencing portion of the proceeding, the video and audio recording of the December 16, 2021 events was played for the court. The recording captured events that transpired during an 18-minute period from approximately 5:24 p.m. to 5:42 p.m. on that date.

4The documents filed by the Crown include copies of Mr. McPolin’s criminal record; the occurrence report underlying Mr. McPolin’s 2010 convictions; Mr. McPolin’s current release conditions; and an Agreed Statements of Facts related to the guilty pleas entered by each of Messrs. Kongkhaw and Lafontaine.

5On Mr. McPolin’s behalf, three letters of support are filed. The letters are from Mr. McPolin’s brother and daughter and from the mother of Mr. McPolin’s child.

The Offences

6An Agreed Statement of Facts was filed when Mr. McPolin plead guilty. That Agreed Statement of Facts is before the court for the sentencing portion of the proceeding.

7I will not review the Agreed Statement of Facts in its entirety. For the moment, I will summarize Mr. McPolin’s conduct. The summary constitutes findings of fact upon which I rely to determine an appropriate sentence.

8Separate and apart from the observations made of the events at BH Floors, Mr. McPolin was seen traveling by train from Toronto to Ottawa on December 16, 2021. Mr. McPolin brought a black duffel bag with him.

9During the 18-minute period at BH Floors, depicted in the recording,

• Mr. McPolin enters Mr. Kongkhaw’s private office carrying two items – a handgun wrapped in gray cloth and a black duffel bag;

• Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lafontaine handles the gun and points it at an inanimate object;

• Messrs. Kongkhaw, McPolin, and Lafontaine discuss and handle two handguns;

• Mr. Kongkhaw describes his acquisition and plans for the sale of one of the guns;

• At Mr. Kongkhaw’s request, Mr. McPolin grabs one of the handguns (a Glock 17) and passes it to Mr. Kongkhaw;

• Mr. Kongkhaw places one of the handguns in Mr. McPolin’s black duffel bag; and

• Eight minutes later, Mr. McPolin leaves the private office with the black duffel bag on his shoulder.

10Mr. McPolin admits that, on December 16, 2021, he possessed a handgun contrary to a s. 109 order to which he was subject at the time.

The Offender

11Mr. McPolin was born in July 1976. There is minimal information before the court about his background to and including his early adult years.

12From the letter of support provided by Mr. McPolin’s brother, we know that, as boys, they were both involved in competitive sports. Mr. McPolin was a skilled hockey player, reaching the OHL and the minor league level of professional hockey. The brother describes their family life as close-knit and grounded. The brother describes their parents as “present, engaged, and unconditionally loving”.

13There is no information about Mr. McPolin’s level of education. The only information about Mr. McPolin’s employment history is that, prior to his arrest in 2022, he worked as a personal trainer.

14Mr. McPolin has a daughter who will complete high school in a few months. This fall, she will pursue post-secondary education at the University of Toronto. Although the offences to which Mr. McPolin plead guilty stem from events in Ottawa, it appears that in the last decade or so he built a life in the Greater Toronto Area (“the GTA”). Mr. McPolin’s connections to the GTA include ownership of residential property in the area. Mr. McPolin resided in the GTA while released on bail. His daughter lives in the GTA.

15At the conclusion of sentencing submissions, Mr. McPolin spoke directly to the court. He expressed remorse for his conduct on December 16, 2021. He very much wishes to remain a part of his daughter’s life and to support her as she pursues post-secondary education.

16A pre-sentence report was not requested.

Positions of the Crown and Defence

17The Crown requested that Mr. McPolin receive a sentence of two years imprisonment on the s. 92 offence plus a one-year, consecutive sentence on the s. 117.01 offence. The Crown applies a credit of three months for pre-sentence custody. The effective sentence requested is two years and nine months remaining to be served.

18The Crown requests that a DNA order be made; that a weapons prohibition be ordered, pursuant to s. 109, for life; and that Mr. McPolin be prohibited from communicating with Mr. Kongkhaw, Mr. Kongkhaw’s spouse, and Mr. Lafontaine.

19Defence counsel submits that an appropriate sentence is a conditional sentence, of 18 months (reduced by 3 months for pre-sentence custody), with conditions as the court considers reasonable to give effect to the principles of general and specific deterrence.

20Regarding the interplay between the sentences for each offence, defence counsel submits that, even if the sentences imposed for the two offences are consecutive, in all of the circumstances the sentence to be served falls below two years.

21In the alternative, defence counsel asks the court to treat the conviction on s. 117.01 as an aggravating factor when imposing a sentence on the s. 92 offence.

22Before moving on to my analysis of the submissions, I will review the purpose and principles of sentencing.

The Purpose, Principles, and Objectives of Sentencing

23Section 718 of the Code defines the fundamental purpose of sentencing as, “to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions…”.

24Other principles prescribed by the Code and relevant to the imposition of the sentence in this case include,

• the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence (s. 718.1);

• aggravating and mitigating factors shall be considered (s. 718.2(a));

• the sentence imposed should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (s. 718.2(b)); and

• the offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances (s. 718(2)(d)).

25I turn next to the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

• Aggravating Factors

26The following aggravating factors are relevant to the imposition of a sentence.

27First, I consider Mr. McPolin’s criminal record. It is not lengthy and it is somewhat dated. Regardless, Mr. McPolin’s criminal record is noteworthy for the following reasons.

28First, Mr. McPolin was convicted for a series of offences related to a violent incident in which he participated, in 2006, when in his early thirties. A firearm was involved. The conviction entered in March 2026 on the s. 92 offence is Mr. McPolin’s second conviction on a firearm-related offence.

29Second, the record includes one entry that is indicative of a lack of respect for court orders. In 2008, Mr. McPolin was convicted on the offence of escape from lawful custody (s. 145 (1)(a)).

30Third, prior to the events of December 16, 2021, on two occasions Mr. McPolin received a sentence that included a firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109. The Crown highlights that the first such prohibition, imposed in December 2008, includes a lifetime prohibition against possession of restricted firearms. The firearm of which Mr. McPolin had possession on December 16, 2021, is a restricted firearm.

31Mr. McPolin received a second firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109 in December 2010.

32I note that the offences for which Mr. McPolin was convicted in 2010 were related to the violent incident in 2006. That incident occurred before Mr. McPolin received the first of the two firearms prohibitions orders (i.e., in 2008).

33In any event, by December 2021, when Mr. McPolin is found in possession of a restricted firearm, he is in disregard of the 2008 and 2010 s. 109 orders.

34The Crown relies on s. 725(1)(c) and asks the court to conclude that the “facts forming part of the circumstances of the offence […] could constitute the basis for a separate charge.” The Crown submits that the events depicted in the video and audio recording could constitute the basis for separate charges under s. 100 (possession of a firearm for the purpose of transferring it, whether or not for consideration) and/or s. 21(1)(b) (aiding Mr. Kongkhaw in the commission of the offence of firearms trafficking).

35I am not prepared to “consider”, within the meaning of s. 725(1)(c), whether the events depicted in the video and audio recording could constitute the basis for a separate charge under s. 100. I am not prepared to do so because Mr. McPolin was charged with that offence (Count No. 19 in the October 30, 2023 Indictment). Mr. McPolin plead guilty to Count Nos. 18 and 20 in that Indictment. When the plea was entered, the Crown understood that there would not be a conviction on Count Nos. 1, 19 and 21.

36Regarding s. 21(1)(b) – aiding in the commission of the offence of firearms trafficking – defence counsel refers the court to Count No. 1 (conspiracy to commit the indictable offence of firearms trafficking contrary to s. 99(1)). Defence counsel also points to the high burden the Crown has to meet for reliance on s. 725(1)(c).

37I differentiate between conspiracy to commit an offence and aiding in the commission of an offence. The fact that Mr. McPolin was charged with and did not plead guilty to an offence pursuant to s. 99(1), does not preclude consideration of an offence pursuant to s. 21. That said, I agree with defence counsel that the Crown does not meet the high bar required for consideration of an offence under s. 21.

38I am not satisfied that the facts support a conclusion, including one based on inferences, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. McPolin had the requisite mens rea or carried out the actus reus for aiding in the offence of firearms trafficking. There is no evidence and there are no admissions as to what Mr. McPolin was doing before he entered Mr. Kongkhaw’s private office. There is also no evidence as to what Mr. McPolin did, including with the black duffel bag, after he left the office.

39The audio portion of the 18-minute recording is less than stellar. Some portions of the audio are indecipherable; during other portions, it is difficult to tell which of the three men is speaking.

40I accept the Crown’s submissions that the clear portions of the audio support a conclusion that Mr. McPolin has some knowledge of firearms and about the trafficking of firearms. Such a conclusion is not, however, sufficient, in the absence of additional findings about Mr. McPolin’s presence in the office that day, to support reliance on s. 725(1)(c) and s. 21.

41I turn next to the mitigating factors.

• Mitigating Factors

42Defence counsel asks the court to consider, as a mitigating factor, the circumstances in December 2022, at the time of and following Mr. McPolin’s arrest on the subject offences. Mr. McPolin was removed from his family at a time when he was caring for his ailing father. Both of Mr. McPolin’s parents died during Mr. McPolin’s first 60 days of post-arrest, pre-trial detention.

43Mr. McPolin was arrested approximately one year after committing the subject offences. I am sympathetic to the losses suffered by Mr. McPolin. I am not convinced, however, that the unfortunate timing of the arrest constitutes a mitigating factor.

44Defence counsel asks the court to consider the importance to Kaleena Krosinska, Mr. McPolin’s daughter, of the role her father plays in her life. As I said during oral submissions, Ms. Krosinska’s letter is, in and of itself, compelling.

45When the contents of Ms. Krosinska’s letter are considered together with the information as to Mr. McPolin’s bail condition, an explanation is lacking as to why Mr. McPolin and his daughter did not spend more time together from early 2023 to the present. It was possible for Mr. McPolin to spend time with his daughter both at his residential address and in the community, the latter in the presence of one of Mr. McPolin’s sureties. Each of Mr. McPolin’s sureties is related to Ms. Krosinska.

46I understand that Ms. Krosinska feels a sense of loss regarding her relationship with her father. The reasons for their lack of meaningful time together are not, however, adequately explained in the record before this court.

47I accept as a mitigating factor that Mr. McPolin (a) has been under house arrest for three-plus years awaiting trial; and (b) did not breach any of his bail conditions in that period. Those conditions were particularly strict during Mr. McPolin’s first year on bail.

48I also accept as a mitigating factor Mr. McPolin’s guilty plea.

49Last, I accept as a mitigating factor Mr. McPolin’s expression, however succinct, of remorse for his conduct. I have no doubt that he is genuine in his desire, as expressed to the court, to support his academically-accomplished daughter while she completes high school and begins her university studies.

Analysis

a) Offences Involving Firearms

50In the 21st century, this court and other courts across the country, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have on numerous occasions remarked on the danger which guns pose to the public. The first sentence of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 reads as follows: “Gun related crime poses grave danger to Canadians.”

51In R. v. Leclair, 2025 ONCJ 174, Pratt J., sitting in Windsor, Ontario, makes the following observations at para. 15: “Offences involving firearms are treated very seriously by Parliament. The toll taken on Canadian society by gun crime is as clear as it is heartbreaking. Those who choose to engage in criminal activity using firearms will be treated harshly by the courts. Society demands nothing less.”

52The toll on society of which Pratt J. speaks is reflected in the Ottawa Police Service Guns and Gangs statistics included at Tab 8 of the Crown’s Book of Materials. Those statistics reveal a 75 percent decrease in the number of shootings and a 44 per cent increase in the number of crime guns seized, both year-to-date, from 2025 to 2026.

53The case authorities from all levels of courts make it clear that when determining a sentence with respect to a firearms offence, the emphasis is on the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence: see, for example, Nur, at para. 42.

54In the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, at paras. 51-53, Doherty J.A. reviews the range of offenders caught by s. 95 of the Code. Although the decision relates to the offence of possession of a loaded firearm, the range or spectrum described applies equally to offenders, like Mr. McPolin, who are caught by s. 92. Doherty J.A. describes a range that extends from the regulatory end to the true crime end of the spectrum.

b) The Request for a Conditional Sentence

55Section 742.1 prescribes when a conditional sentence may be imposed. First, a conditional sentence is only available, as a possible sentence, if the sentence imposed is less than two years. Second, the criteria listed in ss. 742.1(a)–(d) must be met.

56The matter before this court does not fall within any of the exclusionary provisions of ss. 742.1(b)-(d). Therefore, if the sentence imposed is less than two years, the only relevant criteria is s. 742.1(a) – the court must be “satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2”.

57Collectively, the parties rely on more than 40 decisions in their respective written and oral submissions. In only two of those decisions is a conditional sentence imposed for a firearms offence. Not surprisingly, Mr. McPolin relies on those two decisions in support of his request for a conditional sentence.

58The first, in time, of the decisions is R. v. Wetelainen, 2019 ONSC 869. The more recent decision is that of Pratt J. in Leclair, previously cited.

59The circumstances of the offences in each of Wetelainen and Leclair are distinguishable as between the two decisions and from the circumstances underpinning Mr. McPolin’s conviction. The multiple subject offences in Wetelainen include ss. 92, 99 and 117.01; and in Leclair are limited to ss. 92 and 95.

60Defence counsel describes the subject offences in those decisions as more serious than Mr. McPolin’s possession, for a matter of minutes at most, of an unloaded firearm. In my view, any distinctions that might be made between the circumstances of Mr. McPolin’s possession of a firearm and the subject offences in Wetelainen and Leclair, are outweighed by the significant distinction between the offenders in those two matters and Mr. McPolin.

61For example, in Leclair, the offender had a very difficult upbringing; had no prior criminal record; was the father of seven children; resided with two of his children; was involved in family litigation in an effort to have “custody” (as it was called at the time) of the five other children; acknowledged to the court the danger presented by the situation involving the firearm; was involved in charitable activities; and was the subject of a positive pre-sentence report. With the exception of the positive relationship that Mr. McPolin has with his daughter, not one of those factors is applicable in the matter before this court.

62In Wetelainen, the offender was, like Mr. McPolin, the subject of a s. 109 order when the subject offences were committed. That is where the similarities between the two offenders end. Mr. Wetelainen is Indigenous; experienced racism at school; suffered physical and sexual abuse from one of his mother’s boyfriends; suffered from addiction issues; and had, subsequent to his arrest, made progress in addressing his addiction issues. Both pre-sentence and Gladue reports were before the court. Mr. Leclair’s criminal record was not extensive and he had never before received a custodial sentence.

63I am not satisfied that the decisions in Wetelainen and Leclair offer much, in terms of precedential value, to support the imposition of a conditional sentence – if the sentence, when determined, falls below two years.

c) An Appropriate Sentence

64Given the request for the imposition of a conditional sentence, I first consider whether a sentence of less than two years is appropriate. Only if a sentence of that duration is appropriate, will I then consider the criterion stipulated in s. 742(1)(a).

i) Section 92

65The Crown and defence counsel agree that the circumstances of the offence do not fall at the regulatory end of the spectrum. They disagree as to whether the circumstances of the offence fall within the true crime end of the spectrum. For the following reasons, I find that the circumstances of the offence fall within, but not at the highest portion of the true crime end of the spectrum.

66First, where on the spectrum the circumstances fall is not determined by the amount of time Mr. McPolin possessed the firearm. The transitory possession – a matter of minutes – does not negate the possibility that the circumstances of the offence fall somewhere in the true crime range.

67Second, it is not for this court to opine on the conduct of Messrs. Kongkhaw and Lafontaine. That said, Mr. McPolin’s involvement in the events depicted in the 18-minute recording supports a finding that he is the least-engaged of the three men, as to the provenance of and plans for the firearm he possessed.

68Mr. McPolin was, however, by no means uninvolved or disengaged. I find that Mr. McPolin was present in the private office for a sufficient amount of time with one or both of Messrs. Kongkhaw and Lafontaine. Mr. McPolin heard a sufficient amount of the discussion captured on audio to understand generally the firearms trafficking context of what was occurring.

69Third, I agree with defence counsel that Mr. McPolin’s knowledge of guns, apparent from the audio recording, does not, on its own, support a finding that Mr. McPolin was more deeply involved than as depicted in the recording.

70The Crown asks the court to draw an inference and find that when Mr. McPolin exited the office carrying the black duffel bag, he knew that an unloaded, restricted firearm was in the bag. I am not convinced that Mr. McPolin’s knowledge or lack of knowledge as to what was in the duffel bag is significant. There is no evidence, and nothing to support an inference, as to what happened to the bag once Mr. McPolin left the office. Did he leave the bag at BH Floors, give the bag to someone else, or carry it out of the building?

71Even without a finding as to what was done with the bag, I am satisfied that Mr. McPolin’s conduct as depicted in the video, with the context provided by the audio, is sufficient to place the circumstances of the offence in the true crime end of the spectrum.

72Through his involvement in the violent incident in 2006, Mr. McPolin is aware of the danger to the public that handguns pose. I note, also, that on December 16, 2021, Mr. McPolin participated in a discussion about what happened and what to do when gunshots are fired. It matters not that it is challenging to determine precisely who said what during that discussion. Mr. McPolin was present for, heard, and participated, at least to some extent, in the discussion.

73In summary, Mr. McPolin is not a neophyte when it comes to the dangers that firearms pose. The case authorities before the court speak of the message that must be sent – as a matter of general deterrence and denunciation – when imposing a sentence in firearms cases. Added to the general deterrence is the specific deterrence required to address Mr. McPolin’s recidivism related to firearms, including in the face of two s. 109 orders.

74Mr. McPolin’s prior incarceration and terms of probation did not deter him from the assaultive behaviour that led to a conviction in early 2021. The terms of probation in place, following that conviction, did not deter Mr. McPolin from the conduct depicted in the 18-minute recording of the events on December 16, 2021. Even more to the point, two s. 109 orders were not sufficient to deter Mr. McPolin from possessing a restricted firearm – regardless of the duration or circumstances of that possession.

75There is minimal evidence before the court about Mr. McPolin’s potential for rehabilitation.

76I am mindful of the concept of parity in sentencing. I am aware of the sentences imposed for Mr. Lafontaine and requested for Mr. Kongkhaw. I appreciate that they are each different from Mr. McPolin as offenders. In addition, their respective pleas of guilty involve Agreed Statements of Facts that differ from the one before this court. Last, I am mindful that, for both Messrs. Kongkhaw and Lafontaine, a joint submission was made on sentencing.

77I find that the two years imprisonment requested by the Crown on the s. 92 conviction is an appropriate sentence.

ii) Section 117.01

78On this offence, the Crown asks the court to impose a one-year term of imprisonment, consecutive to the sentence imposed for the s. 92 offence. As noted earlier, defence counsel’s submissions on the appropriate sentence for this offence are in the alternative.

79First, defence counsel submits that the conviction under s. 117.01 could be treated as an aggravating factor when determining the appropriate sentence for the s. 92 conviction. When I reviewed the aggravating factors in this case, I did not include the conviction on the s. 117.01 offence. I reject the first of defence counsel’s alternative submissions.

80In R. v. Claros, 2019 ONCA 626, at para. 51, Paciocco J.A. explains that “the breach of a prohibition order is different behaviour than the associate offences, engaging different interests”. In the same paragraph, Paciocco J.A. addresses circumstances in which an offender breaches a prohibition order twice in close succession. Paciocco J.A. therein highlights that the principle which calls for the sentences for such offences to be served consecutively “is intended to ensure that disregard of firearm prohibition orders, imposed in the interest of public safety, does not go unpunished.”

81Mr. McPolin is convicted of one of the two counts with which he was charged under s. 117.01 related to the events on December 16, 2021. He is not being sentenced for convictions on two counts under that section.

82Regardless, I take into consideration, Mr. McPolin’s disregard, as already described, of a court order, of the terms of his probation, and of the relevant s. 109 order. I also take into consideration the principles of totality and parity, the latter as relates to Mr. Lafontaine’s sentence and the joint submission on Mr. Kongkhaw’s as yet undetermined sentence. For each of Mr. Lafontaine and Mr. Kongkhaw, the joint submission includes a sentence of one year on the s. 117.01 offence concurrent to their four-year (imposed) and six-year (proposed) sentences on other offences.

83I find that an appropriate sentence for Mr. McPolin on the s. 117.01 offence is six months, consecutive to the two-year sentence imposed for s. 92.

Credit

84Mr. McPolin served 59 days of pre-trial incarceration. Applying a 1.5 rate when crediting him, results in an entitlement to 90 days of credit.

85Mr. McPolin was alone in a cell for all but a handful of those 59 days. During his pre-trial incarceration, he experienced lockdown for seven full days, for two mornings, and during twelve evenings. There is no evidence as to how Mr. McPolin specifically was affected by the lockdowns.

86I find it appropriate to give Mr. McPolin credit for 90 days of pre-trial incarceration.

Summary

87With the total sentence exceeding two years, it is not open to the court to consider a conditional sentence.

88The following sentence is imposed: (a) on the offence pursuant to s. 92 of the Code, two years imprisonment; and (b) on the offence pursuant to s. 117.01 of the Code, six months imprisonment less 3 months of presentence custody. The net effect is that Mr. McPolin has two years and three months remaining to serve.

89In addition, the following ancillary orders shall issue:

• DNA order (secondary);

• Section 109 weapons prohibition order (life); and

• Section 743.21 non-communication order (James Kongkhaw; David Lafontaine; and Alice Kongkhaw).

Date: June 15, 2026

Justice Sylvia Corthorn

CITATION: R. v. McPolin, 2026 ONSC 3493

COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-11404579

DATE: 2026/06/15

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

His Majesty the King

– and –

Justin McPolin

The Defendant

SENTENCING DECISION

(Oral reasons given on april 9, 2026)