Moiz Murtaza Karimjee

The applicant, Brandon Cain, sought a review of a detention order.

The court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, allowing for a de novo bail review hearing under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

Considering the elevated risk of infection in the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC), the applicant's prior liver injury, and a strengthened bail plan including a GPS monitoring bracelet and a surety, the court was satisfied that both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention could be overcome.

Despite the serious nature of the charges (violent assault, firearm offences, forcible confinement) and a prior breach of release conditions, the court granted the applicant's release on strict house arrest conditions.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Court of Justice's decision to confirm the revocation of his firearms license by a Chief Firearms Officer.

The revocation was based on five incidents, including two from his youth (one involving a diversion program) and three from adulthood.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard of review, upheld the lower court's decision.

The court found that even if the youth diversion record was inadmissible under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the remaining adult incidents were sufficient to support the reasonableness of the revocation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the court suggested a remedial program for future license restoration.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against Mr. Mansour for drug-impaired driving, based on an alleged breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, specifically regarding time attributed to defence counsel changes and certiorari proceedings.

The Superior Court, applying new guidance from R. v. Tsega, found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by incorrectly calculating defence delay and by including the entire period of reasonable certiorari proceedings in the Jordan delay calculation.

The court re-calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling, thus allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood ("Over 80"), asserting breaches of his ss. 8 and 10(b) Charter rights and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of the section 8 Charter right regarding the "forthwith" Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, and either no breach or only a technical breach of the section 10(b) right to counsel, which would not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the trial judge's reasons sufficient regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, "as soon as practicable" breath testing, and the destruction of dash-pad notes.

Edward McGrath sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the tertiary ground.

He was charged with 23 offences, including discharging a firearm over a complainant's head while on probation and a s. 109 order, and drug trafficking.

The applicant proposed an improved bail plan with two sureties and addiction treatment.

The court found the addition of a new surety who would supervise the applicant at work constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, despite the strong bail plan and capable sureties, the court concluded that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the charges, the strength of the Crown's case, and the applicant's breach of existing orders.

The original detention order was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for being in care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony that he exited his vehicle to drink wine in his garage before police arrived.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to consider independent corroborative evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge was alive to the independent evidence and reasonably concluded it was insufficient to rebut the presumption of care and control, especially given the appellant's lack of credibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Appellant, Bernard Momprevil, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and appealed his conviction and sentence for breach of probation.

The court considered the factors for granting an extension, including bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and the merit of the proposed appeal.

The Appellant failed to provide evidence of a bona fide intention or explain the significant delay in filing the appeal, and the court found no appreciable promise of success on the merits.

Furthermore, the Appellant had already benefited from the original judgment, which involved the withdrawal of more serious charges and his release from custody.

The court also affirmed the validity of the guilty plea, finding it to be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, as the Appellant actively participated in discussions, understood the consequences, and was not subjected to pressure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Abdulahi Quadri, appealed a suspended sentence imposed for knowingly using a forged document, arguing he should have received a conditional discharge due to potential immigration consequences.

The sentencing judge had disbelieved the appellant's explanation and considered the offence serious, especially given a prior conditional discharge.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a sentencing judge is not compelled to adjust a sentence to avoid collateral immigration consequences if it would render the sentence inappropriate, and that the judge's weighing of sentencing factors is entitled to deference.

A young person pleaded guilty to five offences including inciting hatred against identifiable groups, mischief related to religious properties, uttering threats, possession of weapons, and failure to comply with a youth sentence.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence under section 64(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court rejected the application, finding that while the presumption of reduced moral culpability was rebutted due to the planned nature of the offences and the offender's near-adult age, a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the young person accountable.

The court emphasized the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration, noting the positive progress made by the offender while in custody and the availability of intensive counselling and support services within the youth justice system.

The appellant, John Morrison, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm on two grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's interventions during cross-examination of a vulnerable witness and her comment about 'setting up an appeal,' concluding that an informed person would not find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Regarding the misapprehension of evidence concerning a defence witness's criminal record, the court found it was a factual error that did not impact the substantive issues or result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with a high blood alcohol content.

The trial judge rejected his defence that he intended only to sleep in the vehicle, finding he failed to rebut the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge also found a realistic risk of danger even without an intention to drive.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's factual findings and application of the law, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown sought an order compelling the Defence to file a Notice of Constitutional Question to challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The Defence argued that a prior Superior Court decision (R. v. M.(L.), 2016 ONSC 7082) had already declared the provision unconstitutional and of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, making a new constitutional question unnecessary.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that a declaration of invalidity by a Superior Court judge with inherent jurisdiction renders the law null and void *in rem*, binding on the Crown until overturned on appeal, and thus the constitutionality of the provision was no longer "in question."

The appellant, Nabil Benhsaien, sought a funding order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue an appeal from convictions for mischief and an indecent act.

The Crown moved to strike the appeal for lack of perfection.

The court denied the funding application, finding the appellant capable of self-representation and the appeal lacking merit.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's motion to strike the appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving over 80 mg of alcohol.

The trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the common sense inference against bolus drinking and the practical evidentiary burden on the respondent when breath samples were taken more than two hours after the alleged offence, despite finding no evidence of bolus drinking.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The Crown applied for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the accused on a sexual assault count.

The preliminary inquiry judge had found insufficient evidence to establish that the offence, which involved anal intercourse, was initiated in Ontario and completed in Quebec, thereby denying Ontario jurisdiction.

The Superior Court, applying the standard of review for non-committal orders, determined that the preliminary inquiry judge's decision was based on an insufficiency of evidence, not a jurisdictional error.

As such, the decision was not susceptible to judicial review, and the Crown's application was dismissed.

The Applicant sought certiorari to quash a stay of proceedings entered by the Attorney General in relation to private charges she proposed, and to return the matter for a pre-enquete hearing.

The core issue was whether the Attorney General could intervene and direct a stay under s. 504 of the Criminal Code prior to a pre-enquete.

The court dismissed the application, affirming the Attorney General's broad prosecutorial discretion to stay proceedings at any time after an information has been laid, provided there is no flagrant impropriety or abuse of process.

The appellant appealed the cumulative sentence of almost 18 months imposed for criminal harassment and two counts of breaching court orders, arguing it was harsh, excessive, and an error in principle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's sentence.

The court found the trial judge properly applied sentencing principles, considered aggravating factors such as domestic violence, pre-planning, and lack of remorse, and was entitled to deference in her assessment of the appellant's rehabilitation potential and the fitness of the consecutive sentences.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction alleging that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact, misapplied the credibility framework from R. v. W. (D.), and failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended his videotaped police statement regarding whether he had been making out with the complainant.

The court held that the trial judge accurately reflected the appellant’s evidence as clarified during cross-examination and therefore did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court further held that there was no meaningful inconsistency in the complainant’s testimony and that the trial judge properly applied the R. v. W. (D.) framework.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” as required for the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay and improperly reversed the burden of proof.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that police acted promptly in the circumstances, including delays caused by right-to-counsel consultations and the breath technician processing another detainee.

The appeal court found no error of law and upheld the application of the presumption of identity.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code arising from allegations that he struck his spouse while driving.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, that the trial judge improperly dismissed defence evidence, misapprehended evidence, and failed to provide coherent reasons.

The court held that credibility determinations are primarily matters for the trier of fact and found no error in law or manifest error in the appreciation of the evidence.

Independent eyewitness testimony and corroborative observations by police supported the conviction.

The court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient for appellate review.