Moiz Murtaza Karimjee

The appellant appealed convictions for breaching a recognizance contrary to s. 145 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the identification evidence was unreliable and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The convictions arose after police officers arrested an individual outside an apartment and later discovered he had provided a false identity.

The trial judge relied primarily on the arresting officer’s observations and subsequent recognition of the accused from a photograph, with limited confirmatory evidence from another officer.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge properly applied the governing principles regarding eyewitness identification and the standard for unreasonable verdicts.

The appellate court concluded that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the convictions and that no reversible error occurred.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon and mischief under the Criminal Code following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal argued that the trial judge improperly rejected the appellant’s evidence and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn when assessing credibility.

The Crown conceded that the rule had been misapplied and that the error likely affected the credibility assessment of both the complainant and the accused.

The court held that the misapplication could have affected the outcome because the accused needed only to raise a reasonable doubt.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered, after which the Crown directed that the charges be stayed under s. 579.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a guilty plea to sexual assault in which the trial judge granted the accused an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred by emphasizing rehabilitation and failing to properly consider denunciation and deterrence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a victim impact statement and regional sexual assault statistics.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence and denied the application, finding the material was available at the time of sentencing and unlikely to affect the outcome.

On the merits, the court held the sentencing judge had considered the relevant principles and that the sentence, though unusual, was not demonstrably unfit.

Deference to the sentencing judge was warranted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for breach of probation under s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code for failing to attend and actively participate in counselling as directed by a probation officer.

The appellant argued that the evidence did not establish the requisite mens rea because he never expressly refused to attend counselling and was advised he could apply to vary the probation condition.

The court reviewed the standard of appellate intervention and found the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence.

The trial judge reasonably inferred intent from the appellant’s repeated failure to take any steps to attend the required program despite multiple reminders and written instructions.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed her conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired, contrary to section 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

She was found asleep in her car with keys in the ignition after a tire blowout, having called a tow truck.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of intent to drive and had de facto care and control, concluding there was a realistic risk of danger.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal conclusions regarding intent to drive and realistic risk of danger.