Moiz Murtaza Karimjee

The applicant, Brandon Cain, sought a review of a detention order.

The court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, allowing for a de novo bail review hearing under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

Considering the elevated risk of infection in the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC), the applicant's prior liver injury, and a strengthened bail plan including a GPS monitoring bracelet and a surety, the court was satisfied that both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention could be overcome.

Despite the serious nature of the charges (violent assault, firearm offences, forcible confinement) and a prior breach of release conditions, the court granted the applicant's release on strict house arrest conditions.

The applicant, who had pled guilty to multiple counts of fraud and received a 360-day sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the assignment of counsel for his summary conviction appeal, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed regarding the start date of his sentence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no arguable issue as the sentencing judge had clearly explained the sentence and the applicant, a seasoned offender, raised no concerns.

The court also noted the applicant was capable of representing himself.

A Crown motion to summarily dismiss the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

On a mandatory 90-day detention review, the accused sought release to his mother on a surety release with strict conditions in relation to serious charges including trafficking in persons, forcible confinement, sexual assault, and related offences.

Applying the Supreme Court's framework for s. 525 reviews, the court conducted a full bail analysis and considered both the proportionality of continued detention and the grounds in s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the proposed surety lacked credibility and had previously failed to report a breach, the Crown's case appeared strong despite the complainant's death, and the accused's in-custody assault on a co-accused raised public safety and administration of justice concerns.

Continued detention was ordered.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the Ontario Court of Justice under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The respondent was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample, and the trial was scheduled in a 'reservoir court' resulting in a total delay of 19.5 months.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in calculating defence delay and discrete events.

The Superior Court found that while the trial judge erred in not attributing a 31-day period as defence delay, she correctly declined to deduct a 45-day period where the Crown offered earlier dates only after the Charter application was filed.

The net delay of 18.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, applied for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with his appeal.

The court found that while the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel, he failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal regarding alleged misapprehension of evidence and trial judge bias.

The application was dismissed as the applicant was also deemed capable of representing himself.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter and in excluding breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2).

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) due to a four-minute delay in making an ASD demand and a six-minute delay in reading rights to counsel.

The Superior Court upheld the s. 10(b) breach finding but concluded the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) analysis by failing to assess the specific impact of the ss. 8 and 9 breaches on the respondent's Charter-protected interests, instead relying solely on the cumulative effect of multiple breaches.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a limited trial on the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent and a friend had assaulted the victim under the mistaken belief that the victim was breaking into vehicles.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge misapprehended the victim's brain injury, improperly treated the respondent's 911 call as mitigating, and erred in applying the principle of proportionality.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's factual findings or application of principles, and concluding the sentence was within the judge's discretion and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Court of Justice's decision to confirm the revocation of his firearms license by a Chief Firearms Officer.

The revocation was based on five incidents, including two from his youth (one involving a diversion program) and three from adulthood.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard of review, upheld the lower court's decision.

The court found that even if the youth diversion record was inadmissible under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the remaining adult incidents were sufficient to support the reasonableness of the revocation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the court suggested a remedial program for future license restoration.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood ("Over 80"), asserting breaches of his ss. 8 and 10(b) Charter rights and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of the section 8 Charter right regarding the "forthwith" Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, and either no breach or only a technical breach of the section 10(b) right to counsel, which would not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the trial judge's reasons sufficient regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest"as soon as practicable" breath testing, and the destruction of dash-pad notes.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against Mr. Mansour for drug-impaired driving, based on an alleged breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, specifically regarding time attributed to defence counsel changes and certiorari proceedings.

The Superior Court, applying new guidance from R. v. Tsega, found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by incorrectly calculating defence delay and by including the entire period of reasonable certiorari proceedings in the Jordan delay calculation.

The court re-calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling, thus allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

Edward McGrath sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the tertiary ground.

He was charged with 23 offences, including discharging a firearm over a complainant's head while on probation and a s. 109 order, and drug trafficking.

The applicant proposed an improved bail plan with two sureties and addiction treatment.

The court found the addition of a new surety who would supervise the applicant at work constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, despite the strong bail plan and capable sureties, the court concluded that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the charges, the strength of the Crown's case, and the applicant's breach of existing orders.

The original detention order was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for being in care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony that he exited his vehicle to drink wine in his garage before police arrived.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to consider independent corroborative evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge was alive to the independent evidence and reasonably concluded it was insufficient to rebut the presumption of care and control, especially given the appellant's lack of credibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Appellant, Bernard Momprevil, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and appealed his conviction and sentence for breach of probation.

The court considered the factors for granting an extension, including bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and the merit of the proposed appeal.

The Appellant failed to provide evidence of a bona fide intention or explain the significant delay in filing the appeal, and the court found no appreciable promise of success on the merits.

Furthermore, the Appellant had already benefited from the original judgment, which involved the withdrawal of more serious charges and his release from custody.

The court also affirmed the validity of the guilty plea, finding it to be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, as the Appellant actively participated in discussions, understood the consequences, and was not subjected to pressure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Abdulahi Quadri, appealed a suspended sentence imposed for knowingly using a forged document, arguing he should have received a conditional discharge due to potential immigration consequences.

The sentencing judge had disbelieved the appellant's explanation and considered the offence serious, especially given a prior conditional discharge.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a sentencing judge is not compelled to adjust a sentence to avoid collateral immigration consequences if it would render the sentence inappropriate, and that the judge's weighing of sentencing factors is entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing that the police officer's traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the stop was a lawful random compliance check under the Highway Traffic Act, despite the officer's attention being drawn to the vehicle by a lawful U-turn.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that random stops do not require pre-determined criteria and are lawful provided they are not pretense stops for unrelated or discriminatory purposes.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering death threats against his wife.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis by compartmentalizing the evidence and applying uneven scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainant's.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or application of the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of 56 months from the date charges were laid exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court deducted 559 days of appellate delay related to a Crown certiorari application and appeal, as well as periods of defence delay and waiver.

The net delay was calculated at 28.5 months, which fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to meet its onus to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable, noting that the defence's conduct contributed to the delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and failing to comply with court orders, arguing the trial judge's findings regarding harassing phone calls were unreasonable, that she failed to consider his defence of honest but mistaken belief regarding letters sent from jail, and that her reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, that her findings on intent precluded the mistaken belief defence, and that her reasons sufficiently explained her decision.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fleeing the scene of an accident.

At trial, the only evidence identifying her as the driver was her confession to the arresting officer.

The Crown did not hold a voir dire to prove the voluntariness of the confession, and the defense moved for a non-suit after the Crown closed its case.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, relying on evidence from a pre-trial application that was not blended into the trial.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that admitting the confession without a voir dire was a fundamental error and that the conviction was unreasonable without admissible evidence identifying the appellant as the driver.

An acquittal was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 19-minute delay between his detention by a transit officer and the administration of an approved screening device (ASD) test by a dispatched police officer violated the immediacy requirement of s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code and his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was reasonably necessary given the unusual circumstance that transit officers do not carry ASDs.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside and would not have done so even if properly advised.