David McKercher

Edward McGrath sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the tertiary ground.

He was charged with 23 offences, including discharging a firearm over a complainant's head while on probation and a s. 109 order, and drug trafficking.

The applicant proposed an improved bail plan with two sureties and addiction treatment.

The court found the addition of a new surety who would supervise the applicant at work constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, despite the strong bail plan and capable sureties, the court concluded that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the charges, the strength of the Crown's case, and the applicant's breach of existing orders.

The original detention order was upheld.

The accused sisters were charged with importing opium, conspiracy to import opium, and possession for the purpose of trafficking following a controlled delivery of a package containing opium to one of their apartments.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including intercepted text messages and a pattern of receiving packages from foreign locations.

The court found that while it was highly probable the accused were involved in illicit activities, the circumstantial evidence left reasonable doubt regarding their agreement to import the specific packages and their knowledge of the contents.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

The defendants, Gerald Lougheed Jr. and Patricia Sorbara, were charged with corruptly promising employment or appointment to Andrew Olivier to induce him to withdraw his candidacy or refrain from becoming a candidate in the Sudbury by-election, contrary to section 96.1(e) of the Election Act.

Sorbara was also charged with agreeing to employ two of Glenn Thibeault's staff to induce Thibeault to become a candidate.

Following a directed verdict application at the end of the Crown's case, the court found that Olivier was not a "candidate" under the Election Act as he was only seeking the Liberal Party nomination, not running in an election to the Legislative Assembly.

The court also found that once Thibeault committed to running, it became impossible for Olivier to become the Liberal candidate, and therefore the defendants could not be convicted of inducing him to refrain from becoming one.

Regarding the Thibeault count, the court found that the agreement to employ campaign staff did not constitute bribery as defined in the Act and did not offend the Act's purpose of ensuring fair elections.

Directed verdicts of acquittal were entered for both defendants on all counts.

The Crown applied under Criminal Code forfeiture provisions seeking an order that $39,680 seized from a residence be forfeited as proceeds of crime following the respondent’s conviction for offences connected to a drug trafficking organization.

The respondent argued the funds belonged to his parents, who were innocent third parties, and sought the return of the money to them.

The court held that although circumstantial evidence could support an inference that the funds were proceeds of crime, credible testimony from the respondent’s parents provided an equally plausible explanation that the money represented long-term household savings.

The Crown therefore failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the funds were proceeds of crime.

The court found the parents were lawful owners and innocent of complicity and ordered the funds returned to them under s. 462.41(3) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied for severance from two co‑accused in a terrorism conspiracy prosecution so that he could be tried separately in provincial court rather than jointly before a superior court jury.

The court considered the discretion to order separate trials under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the factors governing severance where multiple accused are charged.

The evidence against the co‑accused involved extensive wiretaps, surveillance, and complex terrorism‑related allegations expected to require months of trial time, while the case against the applicant relied primarily on a single intercepted conversation and limited corroborative evidence.

The court found that a joint trial would create significant prejudice due to the disparity in the evidence and the risk that the jury would improperly associate the applicant with highly prejudicial evidence admissible only against the co‑accused.

Severance was therefore necessary in the interests of justice to ensure a fair trial.

The accused applied for leave to cross-examine the police affiant and sub-affiants who swore the Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a drug trafficking investigation.

The defence argued that police unlawfully entered a secured apartment building hallway without permission and failed to adequately disclose this warrantless entry in the ITO.

The Crown contended that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the building’s common areas and that the issue was irrelevant.

The court held that reasonable expectations of privacy in apartment building hallways must be determined contextually and that possible police trespass and non-disclosure could be relevant to assessing the validity of the authorization.

Leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants was granted.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on drug trafficking charges, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by failing to read the entirety of the mode of trial election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The application was brought nearly six months after the committal, well past the 30-day limit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that despite the judge's omission of certain words from s. 536(2), there was substantial compliance with the provision.

The record demonstrated the applicant fully understood his options, had planned for a preliminary inquiry, and explicitly elected trial by judge alone in the Superior Court.