Allyson Fox

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its motion regarding the character of a debt.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the motion judge's order was not a final order because it did not resolve the substantive dispute between the parties, leaving the issue open to be pursued before the Bankruptcy Court.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for default judgment seeking possession of a property and payment of a mortgage debt.

The defendant failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The court found that the deemed admissions established liability and that the contractual compound interest rate of 4.82% was enforceable.

The court granted default judgment for the outstanding balance plus interest, a writ of possession, and costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Following the sale of a mortgaged property, surplus proceeds were interpleaded.

Several execution creditors sought distribution of the funds based on writs existing at the time of the sale.

The respondent ex-spouse brought a motion seeking priority for a family law support order obtained five years after the sale, and to set aside one of the execution creditor's default judgments.

The court dismissed the ex-spouse's motions, holding she lacked standing to collaterally attack the default judgment and that under the Creditors' Relief Act, 2010, a support order made after the creation of the fund cannot take priority over executions existing at the date of sale.

The court granted a motion by one bank to renew its writ nunc pro tunc and ordered the funds distributed among the execution creditors.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment holding him personally liable on an unsecured line of credit, arguing that the facility was entered on behalf of several corporations and that the trial judge committed multiple factual processing errors.

The Court of Appeal applied the palpable and overriding error standard and held that, although the trial judge failed to address some evidence concerning the rarity of such unsecured personal lending and the borrower's recorded net worth, those errors were not sufficiently significant to vitiate the core factual finding.

The court accepted that the documentary record, account statements, banking records, and post-agreement conduct amply supported the conclusion that the facility was a personal line of credit.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

The Bank of Montreal brought an action to collect moneys due under a line of credit agreement.

The only issue was whether the defendant, Joseph Ieradi, entered into the agreement personally or on behalf of his corporations.

The court found that the agreement was personal, not corporate, and that the defendant was personally liable for the debt, despite the absence of the original written agreement.

The court relied on secondary evidence and the parties' conduct to reach its conclusion.

This decision addresses two issues in the context of a long-running guardianship and estate dispute: (1) the standing of Indu and Meenu Shewa to participate in the passing of accounts of Sundri Shewa’s property, and (2) the disclosure of medical information regarding Sundri Shewa’s capacity.

The court grants standing to Indu and Meenu, finding their rights and interests may be directly affected by the outcome, and sets out a careful process for the disclosure of sensitive medical records, balancing the need for evidence with privacy concerns.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank's claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the bank discovered the claim when she first missed minimum monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations, meaning the limitation period only began to run when the bank cancelled the accounts and demanded full repayment.

As the action was commenced within two years of the earliest cancellation date, the appeal was dismissed.

The Bank of Montreal, a creditor, sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property by Roufat Iskenderov to Elena Lazareva.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The appellants appealed, arguing the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period from the date of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to fraudulent conveyance actions, not the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court found its previous decision in Anisman (ONCA) was wrongly decided due to a lack of historical context.

The discoverability issue was ordered to be tried together with the fraudulent conveyance claim.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action and a subsequent motion to restore it to the trial list.

The defendants sought fees and disbursements.

The court applied Rule 57 criteria, noting the serious allegations made by the plaintiff, numerous delays caused by the plaintiff's handling of the case, and the plaintiff's rejection of multiple settlement offers.

The court found the defendants' requested costs reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay specific amounts to the Bank of Montreal and York Regional Police, in addition to previously awarded motion costs.

The Bank of Montreal (BMO) brought a motion for judgment against Volodymyr Garasymovych for credit card and personal line of credit debts, following his default.

BMO also sought a declaration that these debts arose from fraudulent misrepresentations and would therefore survive bankruptcy under section 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court granted BMO the monetary judgment for the outstanding debts, finding the facts deemed admitted by default sufficient for this claim.

However, the court dismissed BMO's claim for a declaration of fraud, ruling that BMO failed to provide clear and conclusive evidence to prove the elements of civil fraud.

The evidence presented, primarily BMO's proprietary software screenshots, was deemed inadmissible as business records due to lack of proper proof and also suffered from issues related to the best evidence rule and ambiguity.

The applicant title insurance company sought an order to rectify title due to an error in a 2016 mortgage where the wrong institution was named as mortgagee.

The borrower had subsequently transferred the property to himself and his spouse, and later passed away.

The court found a compelling case for an equitable mortgage but declined to order rectification without hearing from others who may have acquired an interest in the land.

The court authorized the registration of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff bank's fraudulent conveyance action as statute-barred, and alternatively to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) for delay.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court held that the applicable limitation period for an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property is the ten-year period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, not the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

As the action was commenced within ten years, the summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The court also declined to discharge the CPL or dismiss the action for delay, finding that both parties contributed to the delay and the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the action were dismissed.

The plaintiff's motion to extend time was granted.

The Bank of Montreal sought to set aside a property transfer from Samira Bibi to her mother, Hanifan Bibi, as a fraudulent conveyance and unlawful preference under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The court found that the transfer was made with intent to defeat creditors, that the mother was complicit, and that the consideration was inadequate.

The transfer was set aside.

The plaintiffs, Tony’s Touch Plumbing Ltd. and Level V Design & Build Inc., brought construction lien claims against the defendant, Hatcho Nersesian, for unpaid plumbing, HVAC, and project management services and materials supplied for a new home construction.

Mr. Nersesian disputed the claims, alleging overcharging, deficient work, and incomplete work, and brought counterclaims for backcharges and exaggerated lien claims under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that Mr. Nersesian breached his contracts with Tony’s by imposing unreasonable deadlines and terminating the contract without allowing an opportunity to complete work or rectify deficiencies.

The court also found that Level V was entitled to a project management fee for the initial "weather tight" stage and a commission on trades it introduced thereafter, but not a full project management fee for the entire project due to lack of evidence of services.

Mr. Nersesian's counterclaims for backcharges and section 35 damages against both plaintiffs were dismissed due to failure to mitigate and lack of evidence of damages.

Following the dismissal of the tenants' appeals from Landlord and Tenant Board orders terminating their tenancies, the successful landlord sought costs.

The landlord claimed $6,257.85 from each appellant on a partial indemnity basis.

Taking into account the appellants' expectations and the significant overlap of work on each appeal, the Divisional Court fixed costs at $3,500 against each tenant individually, all inclusive.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Divisional Court order dismissing their appeals from Landlord and Tenant Board decisions that terminated their tenancies.

The moving parties were tenants in a rental property subject to demolition and redevelopment.

The responding party provided them with temporary relocation units at reduced rent pending completion of replacement units, with the understanding they would vacate once the replacement building was ready.

The moving parties refused to vacate and sought relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious question to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the respondent.

The court also applied the clean hands doctrine, noting the moving parties had acted in bad faith by refusing to honor their relocation agreement.

The appellants, residential tenants, appealed orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancies and denying relief from eviction.

The tenants had been temporarily relocated to other units owned by the landlord during the redevelopment of their original building, pursuant to a s. 37 Planning Act agreement.

When the new building was ready, the tenants refused to vacate the temporary units.

The Board found this substantially interfered with the landlord's lawful rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness, the eviction notices were valid, and the Board reasonably concluded that the agreement to terminate the temporary tenancies did not violate s. 37(5) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The plaintiff, Amanda Valentine, obtained a jury verdict in a motor vehicle action, exceeding her Rule 49 offers.

The defendant, Sebastian Rodriguez-Elizalde, admitted liability but made no monetary settlement offers, forcing a trial.

The court determined the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs to the date of her second Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as the judgment was more favorable than her offer.

The court rejected the plaintiff's request for a remedial costs penalty under the Insurance Act, finding the insurer did not breach its duty to settle expeditiously or participate in mediation, despite its "hardball" approach.

The court fixed total costs, including reduced disbursements, at $172,000.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the quantum of costs.

The appellant was awarded agreed-upon costs of $12,860.70 for the original motion and $20,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

A solicitor sought an order to discharge a mortgage and rectify the Land Titles Parcel Register following a property sale.

An earlier mortgage, inadvertently deleted from title, complicated the transaction.

The solicitor relied on the Parcel Register and a payout statement from the mortgagee, which was mistakenly applied to the deleted mortgage, leaving the intended mortgage undischarged.

The court applied the doctrine of estoppel, finding that the mortgagee's representation in the payout statement, coupled with the solicitor's reasonable reliance, warranted the discharge of the mortgage and rectification of the register.

Concurrently, the mortgagee's cross-motion for judgment against the vendor on the underlying debt was granted, as the vendor was aware of the outstanding obligation and could not reasonably claim estoppel regarding the debt itself.