Timothy D. Ray

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing Charter challenges related to arbitrary detention, failure to promptly inform of the reasons for detention, and admission of breath test evidence.

The appellant contended that the police officer lacked reasonable grounds for the initial traffic stop and that questioning about alcohol consumption occurred without proper notice of a change in the purpose of detention.

The court held that the trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference, including the finding that the officer had grounds to conduct a Highway Traffic Act stop and that the appellant had been informed of the reason for the stop.

The court also found no legal requirement that the officer explicitly advise that the investigation had shifted to a criminal matter before asking about alcohol consumption.

The trial judge’s analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter was upheld and the breathalyzer evidence was properly admitted.

Following a jury conviction on six counts including sexual exploitation of a young person, sexual assault, and assault involving members of the offender’s family, the court imposed sentence.

The offender repeatedly sexually abused his step‑daughter over several years and sexually assaulted his spouse, while also exercising coercive and violent control over the household.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, the victim’s age, repeated conduct, grooming, and significant psychological harm to family members.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence and the range identified in comparable appellate authorities, the court imposed a global custodial sentence.

The Kienapple principle required a conditional stay of one sexual assault conviction as duplicative of the sexual exploitation count.

Following settlement of a serious personal injury action at the defendant's policy limits, the parties asked the court to fix costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs sought substantially higher costs based in part on a percentage-of-recovery approach, while the defendant argued for a lower figure based on estimated hours and disputed disbursements.

The court held the settlement agreement required a Rule 57 partial indemnity assessment rather than a percentage-of-settlement methodology.

Applying those factors, the court fixed fees at $70,000 and accepted the defendant's position on disbursements in the absence of reply submissions, assessing total costs at $87,075 plus HST.

In a criminal jury trial, the court considered whether an accused who was not in custody and posed no security risk should nonetheless be required to sit in the prisoner's dock.

The court held that the location of the accused during trial is a matter within the trial judge's discretion.

It found no added prejudice from use of the prisoner's dock, particularly where the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence and told that the dock is where an accused sits whether or not in custody.

The accused was ordered to sit in the prisoner's dock.

Sentencing following convictions arising from a traffic stop that led to the seizure of more than three kilograms of marijuana and $71,150 in cash, with the offender acting as a courier.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a custodial sentence of nine months followed by twelve months' probation.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale drug trafficking while recognizing the offender's first-offender status and strong rehabilitation prospects.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and forfeiture order were imposed, but no DNA order was made.

The applicants sought a declaration that their insurer had a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from a video posted online.

They argued that, as employees of the named insured organization, the claim potentially fell within the commercial liability policy covering personal injury and advertising injury.

The court held that the duty to defend must be determined primarily from the Statement of Claim and that extrinsic evidence may only be considered in limited circumstances to clarify the substance of the pleadings.

The pleadings alleged only that the applicants posted a defamatory video and contained no facts suggesting the conduct occurred in the course of employment with the insured organization.

As there was no “mere possibility” that the claim fell within policy coverage, the insurer had no duty to defend.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel and a conditional stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24(1) of the Charter on the basis that he could not afford counsel and required representation to make full answer and defence in a complex criminal prosecution involving 21 counts, including criminal organization and drug trafficking offences.

The court accepted that the charges were serious and involved some complexity but found significant deficiencies in the evidentiary record supporting the claim of financial inability.

Evidence suggested the accused had assets, income, and potential access to seized funds, and had prioritized maintaining property interests over funding his defence.

The court held the accused had not demonstrated he exhausted all reasonable avenues to retain counsel.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

A child protection proceeding concerning a newborn apprehended shortly after birth due to concerns about the mother's substance use, mental health, and ability to parent a special-needs infant.

The applicant society sought a declaration that the child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

Expert psychiatric evidence concluded the mother lacked parenting capacity and would require years of intensive treatment and counselling before being able to parent safely.

The court found the child remained in need of protection and that the mother had not addressed the underlying concerns despite significant services offered.

Considering the statutory best interests factors, the court concluded that Crown wardship without access was necessary to ensure stability and permanency.

The offender was sentenced for multiple offences arising from a domestic confrontation and subsequent police pursuit, including assaults on three complainants (one causing bodily harm and permanent injury), breaches of release conditions, dangerous driving, failure to stop for police, assaulting a police officer with a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while over the legal alcohol limit.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly for intimate partner violence and the deliberate ramming of police vehicles during a high‑risk pursuit.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s guilty pleas to several counts, lack of a prior criminal record, expressions of remorse, and positive rehabilitative efforts following arrest.

Applying the totality principle, the court structured consecutive and concurrent sentences across multiple counts.

The global sentence was set at 30 months’ imprisonment, reduced to 27 months after credit for pre‑trial custody.

The offender pleaded guilty to producing cannabis under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to theft of electricity under the Criminal Code arising from a residential marijuana grow operation containing 536 plants and a hydro bypass.

The offender was a first-time offender assessed as low risk with strong family support and significant medical issues following car accidents.

The court considered the usual custodial range of nine to fifteen months for such offences but balanced general deterrence with substantial mitigating circumstances including the guilty plea and personal circumstances.

Although the court viewed a conditional sentence as conceptually appropriate, it concluded that general deterrence required a custodial sentence.

A six‑month jail sentence was imposed with a ten‑year weapons prohibition and no DNA order.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

The defence sought exclusion of evidence seized from a vehicle, alleging a breach of s. 8 of the Charter due to an unlawful traffic stop and search.

The court found significant credibility concerns with the arresting officer, including prior professional misconduct involving dishonesty and evasive testimony.

However, corroborating evidence from a second officer supported the account that the accused ran a red light, providing reasonable and probable grounds for the stop and subsequent arrest.

The search of the vehicle incident to arrest was therefore lawful and the seized drugs and cash were admissible.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim relating to alleged failure to enforce a subdivision agreement against neighbouring property owners who had deposited fill.

The court considered the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the discoverability principles.

The court held that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim by 2007 and therefore the 2012 action was commenced well outside the limitation period.

The court also found that the municipality owed no duty to the plaintiff to commence proceedings against the neighbouring property owners and had reasonably exercised its discretion in declining to do so.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under the Criminal Code following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W(D) framework, failed to properly consider reasonable doubt, and improperly relied on a common-sense inference relating to bolus drinking.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge misdirected himself by relying on the inference from R. v. Paszczenko in circumstances involving alleged post‑driving alcohol consumption.

This misdirection affected the assessment of the accused’s evidence and credibility.

As the evidence was not overwhelming, the error could not be cured under the curative proviso.

The applicant sought an order quashing a municipal property standards by-law, alleging it was ultra vires because it was enacted before a required official plan amendment and asserting procedural improprieties in its administration.

The court held that a municipal by-law may only be quashed for illegality or bad faith under the Municipal Act.

Although the official plan amendment came into effect after the by-law’s adoption, the Planning Act permits by-laws passed before an amendment takes effect if they will conform once the amendment is effective.

The court found the statutory saving provision applied and that the by-law was deemed to conform with the official plan when the amendment came into force.

No evidence of bad faith was established.

A housing co‑operative applied for an order confirming termination of the respondents’ occupancy and for a writ of possession after persistent arrears and breaches of multiple performance agreements.

The respondents argued that a later performance agreement cancelled the eviction decision and raised hardship concerns relating to their family circumstances.

The court applied a reasonableness standard to the co‑operative board’s decision and held that the board reasonably determined the performance agreement required immediate payment of arrears and therefore never came into force when payment was delayed.

Given the respondents’ ongoing arrears and breaches, the board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

No basis for judicial intervention on hardship grounds was established.

A pharmacist who was an employee, shareholder, and pharmacy manager sued her employer following the sale of the business and termination of her employment.

The court considered whether a May 30, 2011 settlement agreement resolving employment issues was enforceable and whether the plaintiff was required to sign a broader non‑competition and non‑solicitation agreement demanded by the defendant.

The court held that the May 30, 2011 agreement was enforceable and that the defendant breached it by failing to make agreed payments.

The plaintiff’s refusal to sign the expanded restrictive covenants did not constitute repudiation because those terms were not contemplated in the agreement.

The court awarded common law reasonable notice damages and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim.

Following a multi-count criminal trial involving assault allegations and a police pursuit, the accused was found guilty of several offences arising from a violent altercation with three complainants and subsequent driving conduct while evading police.

The court accepted the complainants’ evidence that the accused punched them during a confrontation at a residence, including causing bodily harm to one complainant whose injuries included a broken nose requiring medical treatment and resulting in permanent loss of smell.

The accused was also convicted of multiple offences related to a high-speed police chase, including dangerous driving, failure to stop for police, assaulting a police officer with a motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The court rejected the accused’s version of events regarding the assaults and found his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care expected of drivers.

Some counts were stayed, dismissed, or resulted in acquittals where the Crown failed to prove essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent brought motions seeking to dismiss an order permitting the assessment of a law firm's accounts, arguing there was no evidence of a retainer and that the assessment process was unavailable because some work involved a patent agent.

The court held the respondent failed to establish that no retainer existed and found the documentary evidence ambiguous without supporting evidence from the respondent’s principal.

The court further held that services performed by a patent agent under the supervision of a law firm may fall within assessable legal services.

The applicant’s motion to amend the respondent’s name in the order due to misnomer was granted.

The respondent’s motions were dismissed.

Following an eight‑day trial in which the plaintiff’s action was dismissed, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs after an earlier settlement offer to dismiss the claim without costs.

The plaintiff argued that costs should remain on a partial indemnity scale and challenged both the proportionality of counsel time and several disbursements.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, including the magnitude of the claim, the complexity of the litigation, the importance of the issues to other generators, and the relative financial positions of the parties.

The judge concluded that the amounts sought were excessive and that the unsuccessful party should not bear the full scope of the defendant’s litigation resources.

Total costs were fixed at $250,000 inclusive of HST.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the accused’s constitutional application challenging the validity of ss. 4(1) and 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the former Medical Marihuana Access Regulations.

The accused sought declarations that the provisions were unconstitutional and a stay of proceedings related to charges of possession and production of marijuana plants.

The court found the proposed evidentiary record consisted largely of anecdotal evidence and replicated materials previously rejected in earlier litigation.

It further held the accused lacked standing to challenge the replaced regulatory scheme and failed to demonstrate a constitutional infirmity linked to the charges.

The court concluded the application had no merit and no likelihood of success.