Julien R. Lalande

The applicant sought an order under s. 490(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to extend detention of seized cash, cryptocurrency tokens, digital devices, and financial records in an ongoing pre-charge financial-crime investigation.

The respondent conceded that an extension was warranted but asked for a 30-day period, relying on fairness concerns tied to sealed warrants and limited access to underlying materials.

The court held the inquiry is narrow and directed to the nature and needs of the investigation, not broader review of police conduct, disclosure timing, or investigative pace.

Given the scale of multilingual documentary and digital evidence and anticipated tracing steps, the court found a further nine months justified despite reaching the statutory maximum pre-proceeding detention period under s. 490(3).

The detention order was extended for all seized items.

Accused charged with causing a disturbance and assaulting a peace officer sought a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter on the basis that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The overall delay was 718 days.

After deducting 99 days of defence-caused delay attributable to failure to retain counsel, obtaining instructions, counsel unavailability for judicial pre-trial, and a partial attribution of unavailability for continuation dates, the net delay was 619 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 71 days.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances, as the case was routine and straightforward, lacking the hallmarks of complexity, and the Crown had not developed a concrete plan to minimize delay occasioned by any alleged administrative complexity.

The accused was charged with one count of assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code, arising from an incident in the complainant's home on June 9, 2023.

The central issues were credibility and whether the Crown proved an intentional application of force.

The court found that while the accused's evidence left doubt as to whether he intentionally applied force, the Crown proved the assault on the basis of recklessness.

The accused lunged at the complainant during an argument and reached with force at her chest while attempting to retrieve his phone, causing bruising and pain.

The court found the accused's conduct reckless and not justified by defence of property.

The accused was convicted of assault.

This Ontario Court of Justice decision addresses the application of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the context of impaired driving charges.

The accused, Jacques Joseph-Nicolas, challenged the admissibility of breath sample evidence on the basis that the demand for the sample was not made immediately upon formation of reasonable suspicion, and that his right to counsel was violated due to language barriers and inadequate access to his preferred francophone lawyer.

The court found that while the breath demand was timely under section 320.27(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, the police failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his right to counsel in light of his limited English proficiency and francophone background.

The failure to provide adequate language assistance and to facilitate meaningful access to the accused’s chosen lawyer constituted a breach of section 10(b).

Applying the section 24(2) exclusion analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused of the alcohol concentration charge, while acquitting on the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence.

Mr. Flaro was convicted of 11 firearms-related offences, including possession of a loaded, restricted handgun.

He was found with multiple firearms in a detached garage, which he claimed were for protection against debt collectors.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (illegal possession, loaded firearms, drug use, children nearby, school proximity, dissuading police call) and mitigating factors (pro-social upbringing, work history, family support, acceptance of responsibility, insight).

The judge determined the offences fell into the "true crime" spectrum, warranting a sentence in the 3-5 year range.

Due to an unusual situation regarding presentence custody and a conditional sentence order breach, which unintentionally disadvantaged the offender, the judge applied principles of totality and restraint to temper the sentence.

This judgment concerns the trial of two co-accused, Jordan Lazore and Brandon Laffin, jointly charged with firearms trafficking and importation, and Mr. Lazore also with careless storage of ammunition.

The Crown alleged the accused transported guns into Canada and transferred them to other individuals.

The court found the identity of both accused established by overwhelming evidence.

Regarding the trafficking charges, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and intended to transfer the firearms, establishing a clear chain of continuity for the seized weapons.

However, the court acquitted the accused of the importation charges due to an 82-minute gap in surveillance after they crossed the border, which created a reasonable doubt as to when and where the firearms were acquired, preventing the inference that they were imported from New York.

The conspiracy to traffic charge was also acquitted due to insufficient proof of a prior agreement.

The careless storage charge was acquitted at the Crown's request.

This criminal retrial addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning an alleged sexual assault incident, where the accused had previously obtained a 'functional acquittal' on the mental element of sexual assault for that specific incident, though convicted on other factual bases within the same charge.

The defence invoked autrefois acquit and issue estoppel to bar the Crown from re-litigating the incident.

The court held that neither doctrine applied; autrefois acquit required a formal acquittal, which was absent, and issue estoppel was inapplicable because the matter was a retrial of the same charge, meaning no 'final determination' had been made on the issue, as per R. v. Cowan.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence's marginal probative value for narrative or explaining the complainant's state of mind did not outweigh its significant prejudicial effect, which included risks of moral prejudice and diverting the trial's focus.

The court emphasized that the proposed evidence was not required for narrative purposes and that the complainant's reaction (remaining silent and motionless) did not require explanation, as such reactions are not unusual in sexual assault cases.