Natalie Ellen Nolan

The Crown applied for an extension of time to hold a prima facie hearing for an accused found unfit to stand trial due to advanced dementia.

The hearing was delayed past the two-year statutory deadline due to an administrative error in classifying the disposition and subsequent delays in scheduling.

The court granted the extension, finding that despite the unwarranted delay, the serious nature of the sexual assault allegations and the lack of significant practical prejudice to the accused made the extension necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The appellant, Amy Cox, appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible by reason of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) made by Justice Kinsella.

The appeal focused on alleged procedural unfairness in the NCRMD process and the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons.

The Superior Court found that, although there was evidence to support the NCRMD finding, the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons explaining why the evidence justified the verdict.

As a result, the appeal was allowed, the verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the Respondent for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: wrongful admission and use of section 276 evidence (prior sexual activity), erroneous reliance on "implied consent" misapplication of the "de minimis" principle, and failure to apply or provide sufficient reasons regarding the decision in R. v. Chase concerning the sexual purpose of the touching.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence, it was not material to the acquittal, which was based on reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault.

The court also clarified that implied consent does not apply to sexual assault and upheld the trial judge's reasoning on the de minimis principle and the application of Chase.

The defendant, charged with aggravated assault, sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, justifying the subtraction of a period of delay.

However, the court found that the primary cause of the delay was the state's failure to provide timely and complete disclosure, not the pandemic.

Following the principles from R. v. Silva and R. v. Ravikumaran, the court determined that the Crown failed to demonstrate that the delay was caused by COVID-19 or that it took reasonable steps to mitigate the disclosure issues.

Consequently, the court refused to subtract the pandemic period from the delay calculation and stayed the proceedings.