Peter Edgar Chisholm

The Applicant sought an order barring the Crown from prosecuting him for an allegation of choking, arguing that the charge formed part of a prior resolution and that prosecution would amount to double jeopardy under sections 725(1) and 725(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the choking allegation was not part of the previous proceedings and could be prosecuted.

The court found that the choking allegation was not previously adjudicated or considered, and therefore, the Crown was not barred from proceeding.

The application was dismissed.

This criminal retrial addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning an alleged sexual assault incident, where the accused had previously obtained a 'functional acquittal' on the mental element of sexual assault for that specific incident, though convicted on other factual bases within the same charge.

The defence invoked autrefois acquit and issue estoppel to bar the Crown from re-litigating the incident.

The court held that neither doctrine applied; autrefois acquit required a formal acquittal, which was absent, and issue estoppel was inapplicable because the matter was a retrial of the same charge, meaning no 'final determination' had been made on the issue, as per R. v. Cowan.

The appellant, a teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation and assault involving multiple students.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge adequately analyzed the potential for inadvertent tainting of witness evidence due to extensive discussions among complainants and other witnesses.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge acknowledged the risk, his reasons lacked sufficient analysis and articulation of how he concluded the evidence was reliable despite the "extreme danger" of tainting.

The court emphasized that inadvertent tainting affects reliability, not just credibility, and requires a clear explanation of how the concern was resolved.

The respondent parents in a child protection proceeding brought motions seeking a defined access schedule and the removal of the children's aid society's discretion regarding access.

The children had been apprehended twice, and two of the parents were facing criminal charges related to the care of the children.

The court ordered that access proceed according to a defined schedule but preserved the society's discretion to vary the schedule when necessary to promote the children's best interests, protection, and well-being.

Following a five-day child protection trial where the court's judgment mirrored the respondent mother's formal offer to settle, the mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society.

The court noted that an award of costs against a Children's Aid Society should be the exception, not the rule, to avoid deterring child welfare professionals from protecting children.

Finding that the Society did not act unreasonably or in bad faith but rather out of an abundance of caution, the court declined to award costs.

The applicant children's aid society brought an urgent motion to stay a decision of the Child and Family Services Review Board pending judicial review.

The Board had ordered the immediate removal of a two-year-old child from his current foster family to be placed for adoption with a previous foster family.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test modified for the child protection context, the Divisional Court found that the society raised serious questions regarding procedural fairness, and that the immediate removal of the child posed a significant risk of irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo in the child's best interests.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of a decision refusing to quash a notice of hearing regarding a misconduct complaint.

The applicant argued that because the chief of police's delegate initially found the complaint unsubstantiated, he was functus officio and could not subsequently issue a notice of hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the initial decision was an investigative, administrative screening function, not a final adjudicative decision, and therefore the doctrine of functus officio did not apply.

The applicants sought judicial review to set aside a settlement reached by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in a subrogated action against the respondent.

The Board, acting as dominus litis, settled the action for $130,000 after considering an independent legal opinion and the applicants' position.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's decision to compromise the lawsuit was reasonable, dismissing the application.