Peter Edgar Chisholm

The accused faced charges of attempting to choke, assault, mischief, and criminal harassment involving a former partner and children.

The court acquitted the accused on the assault, choking, and harassment charges due to reliability issues, inconsistencies in the evidence, and concerns about witness contamination.

The accused was found guilty of mischief under $5,000 for damaging a bedroom door, which was supported by independent photographic evidence.

The Applicant sought an order barring the Crown from prosecuting him for an allegation of choking, arguing that the charge formed part of a prior resolution and that prosecution would amount to double jeopardy under sections 725(1) and 725(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the choking allegation was not part of the previous proceedings and could be prosecuted.

The court found that the choking allegation was not previously adjudicated or considered, and therefore, the Crown was not barred from proceeding.

The application was dismissed.

This criminal retrial addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning an alleged sexual assault incident, where the accused had previously obtained a 'functional acquittal' on the mental element of sexual assault for that specific incident, though convicted on other factual bases within the same charge.

The defence invoked autrefois acquit and issue estoppel to bar the Crown from re-litigating the incident.

The court held that neither doctrine applied; autrefois acquit required a formal acquittal, which was absent, and issue estoppel was inapplicable because the matter was a retrial of the same charge, meaning no 'final determination' had been made on the issue, as per R. v. Cowan.

The appellant, a teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation and assault involving multiple students.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge adequately analyzed the potential for inadvertent tainting of witness evidence due to extensive discussions among complainants and other witnesses.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge acknowledged the risk, his reasons lacked sufficient analysis and articulation of how he concluded the evidence was reliable despite the "extreme danger" of tainting.

The court emphasized that inadvertent tainting affects reliability, not just credibility, and requires a clear explanation of how the concern was resolved.

The respondent parents in a child protection proceeding brought motions seeking a defined access schedule and the removal of the children's aid society's discretion regarding access.

The children had been apprehended twice, and two of the parents were facing criminal charges related to the care of the children.

The court ordered that access proceed according to a defined schedule but preserved the society's discretion to vary the schedule when necessary to promote the children's best interests, protection, and well-being.

Following a five-day child protection trial where the court's judgment mirrored the respondent mother's formal offer to settle, the mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society.

The court noted that an award of costs against a Children's Aid Society should be the exception, not the rule, to avoid deterring child welfare professionals from protecting children.

Finding that the Society did not act unreasonably or in bad faith but rather out of an abundance of caution, the court declined to award costs.

Following a judicial review application where the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Child and Family Services Review Board, the parties sought costs against the tribunal for both the tribunal hearing and the judicial review.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs for the proceeding before the administrative tribunal.

Furthermore, the court declined to award costs of the judicial review application against the tribunal, finding its participation was not adversarial and its conduct did not rise to the exceptional level required to justify such an award.

The self-represented parties' alternative claim for costs against the children's aid society was also dismissed as they were unsuccessful in the application.

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The applicant children's aid society brought an urgent motion to stay a decision of the Child and Family Services Review Board pending judicial review.

The Board had ordered the immediate removal of a two-year-old child from his current foster family to be placed for adoption with a previous foster family.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test modified for the child protection context, the Divisional Court found that the society raised serious questions regarding procedural fairness, and that the immediate removal of the child posed a significant risk of irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo in the child's best interests.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant sought declaratory or prerogative relief regarding whether she had elected to receive WSIB benefits and whether such an election was valid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal had not yet decided these issues.

The Court emphasized that the Board should provide election forms to workers as soon as it becomes aware of an illness to ensure they seek legal advice promptly.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry that allowed public disclosure of CAS documents containing information reported to the Child Abuse Register.

The Commissioner had reasoned that because the documents came from CAS files rather than the Register itself, they were not protected by the confidentiality provision in s. 75(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the ruling, holding that a literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity and frustrate the legislative intent.

The court found that the information in the CAS files and the information protected by the Register's confidentiality provision are co-extensive and must be protected from public disclosure.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of a decision refusing to quash a notice of hearing regarding a misconduct complaint.

The applicant argued that because the chief of police's delegate initially found the complaint unsubstantiated, he was functus officio and could not subsequently issue a notice of hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the initial decision was an investigative, administrative screening function, not a final adjudicative decision, and therefore the doctrine of functus officio did not apply.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the respondents.

The court fixed the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board's costs at $13,594.16 on consent.

The court declined to award costs for two prior motions that were unrelated to the judicial review application.

The court fixed the co-respondent Kenmar's costs at $8,806.10, noting that the WSIB was the primary respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review to set aside a settlement reached by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in a subrogated action against the respondent.

The Board, acting as dominus litis, settled the action for $130,000 after considering an independent legal opinion and the applicants' position.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's decision to compromise the lawsuit was reasonable, dismissing the application.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion on the basis that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction because the matter was in the nature of a judicial review application.

The appellants argued the Superior Court had inherent jurisdiction to decline to approve a settlement by the Workers' Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision to compromise the action was an exercise of a statutory power of decision, and any challenge must be brought by way of judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The appellant municipality appealed an order declaring that an amended lease remained in force and that the parties should proceed to arbitration under that lease.

Reviewing the correspondence and internal memoranda, the court held the parties had reached a meeting of the minds on revised terms, including early termination, which superseded the prior lease arrangement.

The application judge erred in finding there had been no acceptance of renegotiation proposals.

The appeal was allowed, the application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the appellant.