André White

This judgment concerns the trial of two co-accused, Jordan Lazore and Brandon Laffin, jointly charged with firearms trafficking and importation, and Mr. Lazore also with careless storage of ammunition.

The Crown alleged the accused transported guns into Canada and transferred them to other individuals.

The court found the identity of both accused established by overwhelming evidence.

Regarding the trafficking charges, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and intended to transfer the firearms, establishing a clear chain of continuity for the seized weapons.

However, the court acquitted the accused of the importation charges due to an 82-minute gap in surveillance after they crossed the border, which created a reasonable doubt as to when and where the firearms were acquired, preventing the inference that they were imported from New York.

The conspiracy to traffic charge was also acquitted due to insufficient proof of a prior agreement.

The careless storage charge was acquitted at the Crown's request.

The applicant sought leave under R. v. Garofoli to cross-examine the affiant of Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for three search warrants.

The applicant argued the affiant omitted facts and had an ulterior motive to search for drugs rather than evidence of the stabbing.

The court reviewed the timeline and found that the allegedly omitted information was not known to police until after the first ITO was sworn.

The court dismissed the application, concluding the applicant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would assist in determining whether the necessary grounds existed for the issuance of the warrants.

During a trial for domestic assault, the Crown brought an application to admit the complainant's prior audio-recorded out-of-court statement for its truth after she recanted her evidence on the stand.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, focusing on threshold reliability.

The court found that procedural reliability was established because the statement was audio-recorded, the complainant was available for meaningful cross-examination at trial, and she understood the importance of telling the truth to the police.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted.

The offender, an Indigenous woman, was found guilty of robbery after participating in a planned home invasion to steal fentanyl from a vulnerable 67-year-old victim.

The Crown sought 21-24 months in custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Applying Gladue principles and considering the offender's significant rehabilitation, lack of future risk, and the recent Sharma decision allowing conditional sentences in these circumstances, the court imposed a 24-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.

Malcolm Valade was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to life or safety, an offence carrying a four-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The defence challenged this mandatory minimum as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to a fit sentence of twenty months.

The Crown argued for its constitutionality.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate for the offender, infringing s. 12, and not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, the mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The accused, Malcolm Valade, was sentenced for intentionally discharging a firearm.

The court previously found the mandatory minimum sentence of four years unconstitutional and determined a fit sentence of twenty months.

This decision addresses the calculation of enhanced credit for 192 days of pre-sentence custody under notoriously harsh conditions at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) and 827 days under strict house arrest bail conditions.

The court granted enhanced credit for both quantitative and qualitative reasons, recognizing the severe impact of OCDC conditions on the accused's mental health and the punitive nature of house arrest.

Ultimately, the accused received 18 months of credit against the 20-month sentence, resulting in a final sentence of 60 days imprisonment to be served intermittently, along with three years of probation and ancillary orders.

Malcolm Valade was charged with threatening death and discharge of a firearm while reckless.

He pled guilty to the firearm charge, and the threatening charge was dismissed.

This decision provides reasons on sentencing for the firearm offence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including a toxic family relationship and the offender's mental health issues.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought twelve months.

The court determined that if the mandatory minimum of four years for the firearm offence is constitutional, the sentence would be four years imprisonment, as the offender qualified as a "best offender." If the mandatory minimum were not constitutional, the court would have imposed a twenty-month prison term.

Louie McDonald was found guilty of two counts of manslaughter and breach of probation after transporting three men on an undersized Sea-Doo without life jackets, resulting in two drownings.

The sentencing decision considered the broad discretion in manslaughter, the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and significant Gladue factors.

Despite strong Gladue recommendations for a non-custodial sentence, the court imposed imprisonment to satisfy denunciation and general deterrence, while incorporating restorative elements into the probation order.

The accused was charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and conspiracy to smuggle humans into the United States after his overloaded Sea-Doo capsized in the St. Lawrence River, resulting in the drowning deaths of two Indian nationals.

The court acquitted the accused of the conspiracy charge, finding insufficient evidence that he knew or was wilfully blind to the human smuggling operation, as he likely believed he was transporting marijuana.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of criminal act manslaughter and breach of probation, concluding that operating an overloaded vessel without life jackets or proper training constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person.

The court sentenced an offender convicted of multiple sexual offences against his step-child committed repeatedly over a six-year period beginning when the complainant was eight years old.

Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718, 718.01, and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and the appellate guidance in D.D. and D.(M.), the court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount in child sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust.

Aggravating factors included the complainant's young age, profound breach of trust, invasive sexual acts including oral sex and digital penetration, the duration and regularity of the abuse, and devastating victim impact.

Mitigating factors included prior good character, family support, compliance on bail, and a low actuarial reoffence assessment, but absence of pedophilia diagnosis was not mitigating.

A five-year penitentiary sentence was imposed concurrently, together with ancillary orders.

In a pre-trial application, the accused challenged the admissibility of several statements and the validity of a search warrant for hospital records following a fatal Sea-Doo accident.

The court ruled that the accused's initial statement to a police officer and a subsequent statement to a paramedic were admissible, finding no Charter breaches or reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, a later statement to a police corporal was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police failed to inform the accused of a new conspiracy charge and denied him a second opportunity to consult counsel, breaching his s. 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court upheld the search warrant for the accused's hospital records, finding sufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain even after excising the excluded statement.

The Crown applied to admit into evidence the out-of-court statements of an absconding witness and the maximum capacity limits section of a Sea-Doo owner/operator manual for the truth of their contents.

The charges involved criminal negligence causing death and human smuggling after a Sea-Doo capsized, resulting in two drownings.

The court dismissed the application to admit the witness statements, finding that while necessity was met due to the witness's unavailability, threshold reliability was not established because the inability to cross-examine the witness resulted in significant prejudice to the accused.

The court also dismissed the application to admit the manual, ruling it was hearsay and lacked evidence of reliability.

The accused, Brian Caskenette, president of the Cornwall Minor Hockey Association (CMHA), was charged with fraud over $5,000 for personal use of a CMHA Visa card and cash advances.

He also brought a Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to missing financial records.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no actual prejudice as other evidence provided similar information.

The court found the accused guilty of fraud over $5,000, concluding he knowingly and dishonestly deprived the CMHA of $12,831 through undeclared personal purchases and cash advances, and that his assertions of reimbursement were not credible or recorded.

The appellant, Dennis Piamonte, appealed his conviction for driving while impaired, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a voir dire regarding statements he made to paramedics.

The appellant contended that paramedics were "persons in authority" and his statements should have been subject to a voluntariness inquiry.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no clear evidence in the record that objectively should have alerted the trial judge to the need for a voir dire, as paramedics were not conventional persons in authority and the appellant's interaction with police had concluded before his statements to medical personnel.

The accused, Sauve and Stewart, were charged with various weapons offences after police seized a handgun and ammunition from a backpack carried by Stewart.

The Crown alleged they jointly possessed and transferred the firearm.

The court found insufficient evidence that Stewart knew the backpack contained a firearm, resulting in his acquittal on all counts.

For Sauve, the court found he was wilfully blind to the fact he was picking up a firearm, establishing possession.

However, the Crown failed to prove he knew about the ammunition, possessed it for a dangerous purpose, or knew it was obtained by an offence.

Sauve was found guilty of careless transport and transferring a prohibited firearm, as he handed the backpack to Stewart knowing it contained a gun.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought pre-trial applications alleging breaches of their Charter rights and seeking the exclusion of a handgun and ammunition found in a backpack.

The police detained one of the applicants under the Customs Act after observing suspicious activity near the St. Lawrence River.

The court found the detention was lawful under s. 9 of the Charter, but the subsequent warrantless search of the backpack violated s. 8 as it did not meet the standard for a safety search.

The court also found breaches of the applicant's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not wilful or flagrant, the evidence was reliable and discoverable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was ruled admissible against both applicants.

Jarrett Sauve, charged with various weapons offences, challenged the admissibility of his utterances and videotaped statement to police.

The applications were based on alleged violations of his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter and involuntariness under the common law confessions rule.

The court conducted a voir dire and found that initial utterances to D/Cst.

McGillis were made when Sauve was not detained, thus no Charter breach.

Utterances to Cst.

St-Amand were deemed spontaneous, and no Charter breach was found.

For the videotaped statement, the court concluded that Sauve had waived his right to counsel and that the statement was voluntary, not induced by threats or oppression.

Consequently, all challenged statements were ruled admissible.

Malcolm Valade, charged with serious Criminal Code offences including attempted murder and firearm offenses, applied for a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

He sought release based on a material change in circumstances, presenting a new release plan that included his spouse Christine Valade as an additional surety, independent employment outside the family business (which was the source of the dispute), and a more intensive mental health treatment program.

The court found that the new plan constituted a material and relevant change in circumstances, addressing the deficiencies identified in the initial bail hearing.

The court concluded that detention was no longer necessary on any of the three grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, and granted Valade's release on specific terms and conditions.

The accused day care provider was tried on sexual abuse allegations made by a very young complainant.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of the child’s evolving disclosures, the video-recorded police interview, and the surrounding family context.

Applying the burden of proof, the W.(D.) framework, and the reasonable doubt instruction, the court found the child’s evidence materially inconsistent and the interview process unduly leading.

The Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The Crown sought estreatment of a $5,000 recognizance bond following the accused’s breaches of bail conditions and subsequent convictions for fraud-related offences and failing to comply with recognizance.

The defence argued that the Certificate of Default (Form 33) was invalid because it was not signed by the judicial officer and inadequately described the default as “fail to comply.” The court held that the absence of a signature and the wording on the form did not invalidate the certificate where the court record and transcript clearly established a judicial finding of default and defence counsel had consented to the process.

Applying s. 771(2) of the Criminal Code, the court concluded the accused had not met the burden of demonstrating why the full pledged amount should not be forfeited.

The court ordered the full $5,000 bond estreated to the Crown.