Jeannine Plamondon

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the accused's application alleging institutional bias in relation to cannabis-related charges.

The accused alleged that the history of the Jesuits' involvement with Indigenous peoples created a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, and that a question posed by Crown counsel during cross-examination regarding the Pope crystallized this bias.

The accused sought a traditional Indigenous circle for resolution of the matters.

The court granted the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding the underlying application manifestly frivolous and that the accused failed to meet the high threshold for establishing institutional bias.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for a further detention order under section 490(3) of the Criminal Code in relation to items seized from the respondent, Mohammed Ehteshamul Huq, during an investigation into alleged fraud and related offences involving the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS).

The court reviewed the complexity of the investigation, the progress made, and the need for continued detention.

While recognizing the investigation's complexity, the court limited the further detention period to five months, until April 3, 2025, rather than the nine or twelve months sought by the applicant.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of five constitutional questions (NCQs) raised by Indigenous respondents charged with various cannabis offences.

The respondents claimed their lands were not part of Canada, that cannabis laws infringed their traditional rights and economic well-being, and that the laws were part of genocide/apartheid, and that the Crown failed in its duty to consult.

The court summarily dismissed four of the five NCQs, finding them non-justiciable or without reasonable prospect of success (sovereignty, genocide/apartheid, economic well-being).

The fifth NCQ, regarding traditional use and trade of cannabis/hemp under s. 35 of the Charter, was not summarily dismissed, but the court ordered further case management due to delays in expert reports.

The applicant, having been found guilty of conspiracy to commit human smuggling, challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 117(3.1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The applicant argued the provision violates s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offender who plays a minor role for little profit.

Applying the framework from R. v. Nur, the court agreed that a three-year sentence for a minor participant would be grossly disproportionate and shock the conscience.

The court further found the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, declaring the mandatory minimum provision unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges under the Customs Act and Explosives Act.

The respondent, a domestic traveler, was stopped at a mixed-traffic corridor border crossing, where a search of his vehicle revealed undeclared firecrackers.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that s. 99(1)(f) of the Customs Act did not apply to domestic travelers.

However, the court upheld the acquittal, finding that despite the trial judge's inadequate reasons, the record did not establish that the border services officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a contravention of the Act.

The appellant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling but convicted of two counts of manslaughter by criminal negligence arising from an incident where he transported three Indian nationals on a Sea-Doo across the St. Lawrence River without life jackets, resulting in the capsizing of the vessel and the deaths of two passengers.

The Federal Crown appealed the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's statement and the surviving passenger's hearsay statements.

The accused appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misstated the mens rea test and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

Louie McDonald was found guilty of two counts of manslaughter and breach of probation after transporting three men on an undersized Sea-Doo without life jackets, resulting in two drownings.

The sentencing decision considered the broad discretion in manslaughter, the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and significant Gladue factors.

Despite strong Gladue recommendations for a non-custodial sentence, the court imposed imprisonment to satisfy denunciation and general deterrence, while incorporating restorative elements into the probation order.

The accused was charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and conspiracy to smuggle humans into the United States after his overloaded Sea-Doo capsized in the St. Lawrence River, resulting in the drowning deaths of two Indian nationals.

The court acquitted the accused of the conspiracy charge, finding insufficient evidence that he knew or was wilfully blind to the human smuggling operation, as he likely believed he was transporting marijuana.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of criminal act manslaughter and breach of probation, concluding that operating an overloaded vessel without life jackets or proper training constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person.

In a pre-trial application, the accused challenged the admissibility of several statements and the validity of a search warrant for hospital records following a fatal Sea-Doo accident.

The court ruled that the accused's initial statement to a police officer and a subsequent statement to a paramedic were admissible, finding no Charter breaches or reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, a later statement to a police corporal was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police failed to inform the accused of a new conspiracy charge and denied him a second opportunity to consult counsel, breaching his s. 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court upheld the search warrant for the accused's hospital records, finding sufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain even after excising the excluded statement.

The Crown applied to admit into evidence the out-of-court statements of an absconding witness and the maximum capacity limits section of a Sea-Doo owner/operator manual for the truth of their contents.

The charges involved criminal negligence causing death and human smuggling after a Sea-Doo capsized, resulting in two drownings.

The court dismissed the application to admit the witness statements, finding that while necessity was met due to the witness's unavailability, threshold reliability was not established because the inability to cross-examine the witness resulted in significant prejudice to the accused.

The court also dismissed the application to admit the manual, ruling it was hearsay and lacked evidence of reliability.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 39.75 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the majority of the delay was institutional, totaling 25 months, which was well beyond the acceptable guidelines under the previous Morin framework.

Despite the Crown's arguments regarding complexity and mitigation efforts, and the seriousness of the human smuggling charges, the court concluded that the transitional considerations could not justify the systemic delay.

The accused's constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time was denied.