Timothy D. Ray

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to strike portions of the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff's action was a product liability claim for damages following a vehicle crash.

The defendants argued that the amended portions, which introduced a defective ETCS-1 throttle control system module as the cause of the crash, constituted a new cause of action asserted after the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the module defect was indeed a new cause of action, not merely a particular of the original claim.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not have discovered the module defect through due diligence prior to the expiry of the limitation period, especially given her membership in a class proceeding where such issues were discussed.

Consequently, the motion was granted, and all portions of the Amended Statement of Claim referencing the module defect were struck.

The defendant Ministry of the Environment moved to strike the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an oil spill clean-up, arguing it owed no private law duty of care.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that once the Ministry chose to exercise its discretionary powers under the Environmental Protection Act and became involved in the remediation, it was obliged to do so without negligence.

The court held that the pleaded facts established sufficient proximity under the Anns test and that no policy reasons negated a duty of care at the pleadings stage.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company.

The plaintiff, Reggie Babcock, was found to be the successful party regarding costs, as the court's order for a defence medical and dismissal of the balance of Wawanesa's relief equalled or beat the plaintiff's offer to settle costs.

The court deemed Wawanesa's motion entirely unnecessary and attributed its necessity to Wawanesa's conduct.

The plaintiff was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $27,810.16, payable by Wawanesa.

The court assessed costs following successful summary judgment motions by Hydro One Network and Sarah McMillan and Andrew Cauty against the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for each of the two combined actions.

The court found the claims not excessive in principle but reduced the total amount to account for duplication of services across the two actions, which were treated as one.

Costs were assessed at $9,000 for Hydro One and $9,000 for McMillan and Cauty, to be split equally between the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The court noted that a complete indemnity award might have been considered had the plaintiffs' motives been argued, given the claims were entirely devoid of merit.

The offender, N.F., was found guilty of five counts of sexual offences against his granddaughter.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's young age, the breach of trust by the grandfather, and the long-term impact on the victim and family.

Mitigating factors such as the offender's age, health, and language difficulties were noted but not considered mitigating for the sentence itself.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a global sentence of three years imprisonment for the sexual offences, with concurrent terms for related counts and a conditional stay for others under the Kienapple principle.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, weapons prohibition, and non-contact/prohibition orders.

The defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company brought a motion for orders requiring the plaintiff to undergo several independent medical examinations.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that the action had already been set down for trial and pre-trials had occurred.

The provided text is an incomplete draft endorsement detailing the procedural history of the action.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the plaintiff the balance owing on a masonry contract and dismissing her counterclaim for faulty work.

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial judge demonstrated bias by disclosing a prior acquaintance with one of the plaintiff's witnesses and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no appearance of bias as the trial judge had repeatedly invited submissions on the issue and the defendant's representative had encouraged him to remain.

The court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, which were supported by the evidence.

The defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company brought a motion seeking orders for the plaintiff to undergo several independent medical examinations (IMEs) in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing delay and the need for leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found Wawanesa did not require leave under Rule 48.04 as it had not set the action down for trial or consented to its placement on the trial list.

However, the court criticized Wawanesa's significant delay in seeking IMEs, noting its failure to list expert witnesses in pretrial briefs.

The motion for a neurological examination was granted with strict deadlines for report service, while requests for occupational therapy, otolaryngology, and psychiatric examinations were dismissed due to lack of evidence regarding their necessity or the plaintiff not relying on such evidence.

The defendants, Hydro One and two neighbours, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions.

The plaintiffs had erected a fence on city property, which the city later ordered removed.

The plaintiffs sued Hydro One for negligence regarding the location of underground services and the neighbours for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of mental distress based on complaints made to the city.

The court granted the motions, finding the claim against Hydro One was statute-barred and lacked merit, and the claim against the neighbours was devoid of merit as there was no evidence of intent to cause harm or damages.

The Crown sought an extension of time to appeal the respondent's acquittal on a fraud charge.

The respondent moved to dismiss the Crown's application for non-compliance with appeal timelines.

The court applied the three-factor test for extending time: bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and merit of the appeal.

While the Crown demonstrated an intention to appeal, it failed to provide adequate explanations for significant delays in serving the notice of appeal, transcripts, and prosecuting the application.

The Crown also did not sufficiently establish the merit of the appeal.

The court found a lack of diligence from the Crown.

Consequently, the respondent's application to dismiss was granted, and the Crown's application for an extension of time was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with five counts related to theft, breaking and entering, and possession of stolen property for trafficking.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, financial difficulties of the defendant, and inconsistencies in his statements to police.

The defendant denied the charges, claiming the coins sold were his own and that he was unaware of the theft at the time of initial sales.

The court found the defendant's evidence not credible and concluded that the only rational conclusion was his guilt based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

Following a trial that determined the validity of a separation agreement, the court addressed costs.

The self-represented applicant sought full indemnity for all action costs, totaling $14,684.00.

The respondent argued for costs limited to the trial of the issue, suggesting $2,582.00.

The court awarded the applicant $3,000.00, inclusive of HST, for the costs related specifically to the trial of the issue, payable by the respondent within 90 days, noting that other costs could be sought in the overall resolution of the proceeding.

This trial determined the validity of a separation agreement signed by the parties on July 30, 2012.

The respondent sought to set aside the agreement, alleging lack of signature, improper witnessing, unfairness due to non-disclosure and overvaluation of assets, and undue influence.

The applicant relied on the agreement, asserting full financial disclosure and a fair process.

The court found the agreement valid, signed, and properly witnessed, noting the respondent's admission of signature and the witness's confirmation.

The respondent failed to establish non-disclosure, unfairness, or undue influence.

The court emphasized the policy of enforcing fairly negotiated "kitchen table" agreements where parties have openly exchanged information, even without legal counsel, unless there is clear evidence of improvidence or power imbalance.

The separation agreement was declared valid, and the parties were directed to resume their settlement conference for remaining issues.

The applicant sought an interim injunction and judicial review to overturn his disqualification from the position of Vice-President, Student Services for the Carleton University Students’ Association (CUSA) following an election.

The applicant had received the most votes but was disqualified due to alleged electoral offences by another student on his slate.

The court found that the Constitutional Board exceeded its jurisdiction by defining a new electoral offence that was not in force at the time of the election and by disqualifying the entire slate based on this expanded interpretation.

The court concluded that the electoral decisions were subject to judicial review and set aside the disqualification.

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to return jewellery upon payment of a Quebec default judgment, which had been recognized and ordered enforceable in Ontario.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it constituted a collateral attack on prior final judgments and an abuse of process, as the defendant had failed to appeal or vary any of the previous orders.

The accused, as the directing mind of a construction company, orchestrated a scheme to assemble and transfer approximately $1.7 million to his personal account in Lebanon while the company was insolvent and unable to pay subcontractors, suppliers, employees, and statutory trust obligations.

The court found that the accused knowingly relied on false financial statements, a sham share sale, a fabricated shareholder deposit, and false pretences to obtain credit, bonding, and financing, and then diverted trust and company funds offshore.

Applying the governing fraud principles, the court held that the Crown proved deceit, deprivation, and subjective knowledge of the risk of deprivation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court convicted the accused on ten counts including fraud, obtaining credit by false pretence, bankruptcy offences, laundering proceeds of crime, forgery, and uttering forged documents.

The respondent children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal for delay.

The appellants brought a cross-motion to extend the time to perfect their appeal, citing delays in obtaining Legal Aid funding.

The court found that while the delay was not caused by the appellants, the proposed appeal had no chance of success.

The appeal raised a constitutional challenge regarding the definition of 'Indian' or 'native person' under the Child and Family Services Act, which the court found irrelevant as the children did not fall within the applicable definitions.

Given the lack of merit and the prejudice of further delay to the children, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Sarah Lepine, faced charges of impaired driving, impaired driving causing bodily injury, and dangerous driving causing bodily injury following a single-vehicle rollover collision.

The defence challenged the admissibility of hospital blood test records via a Garifoli application, which the court dismissed, finding the Information to Obtain (ITO) sufficient.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving and impaired driving causing bodily injury based on blood alcohol evidence and expert opinion.

However, the court acquitted the defendant of dangerous driving causing bodily injury, citing an "abysmally inadequate investigation" by the police that failed to establish a "marked departure" in the manner of driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action arising from a temporary lay-off that was not expressly permitted by the written employment contract.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, but rejected the plaintiff's position that the lay-off became constructive dismissal either when imposed or when counsel later purported to treat it as such.

The court found the plaintiff had acquiesced in the lay-off, remained in the employment relationship when the employer recalled him to full-time work, and could not then characterize the lay-off as constructive dismissal.

In the unusual circumstances, the court held the written notice provisions had effectively been displaced and awarded wrongful dismissal damages only for the period from the lay-off to the date the plaintiff commenced higher-paying replacement employment.

The applicant sought compensation for her services as attorney for property prior to the deceased's death and as executor of his estate.

The respondent, the sole beneficiary, opposed the attorney compensation claim, arguing it was barred by the two-year limitation period because the applicant did not claim it annually while the deceased was alive.

The court held that the Substitute Decisions Act does not mandate annual claims and that the limitation period was triggered by the deceased's death, making the claim timely.

The court also rejected arguments to reduce the compensation amounts, awarding the applicant $34,024.29 for attorney compensation and $11,679.00 for executor compensation.