Margaret Jarmoc

The accused renewed his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay, arguing that the delay between conviction and sentencing violated his rights.

The court dismissed the renewed motion, noting that the Jordan framework does not apply to post-trial delay.

Furthermore, the court found the 9-month delay between conviction and sentencing was reasonable, as it was primarily caused by the preparation of pre-sentence reports and the accused's own unsuccessful Charter motions.

The defendant, facing drug trafficking and criminal organization charges, brought a mid-trial application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of wiretap evidence, alleging a breach of Crown disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The issue concerned whether Monitor Post Reports (MPRs) alone constituted sufficient disclosure of wiretap intercepts, or if all audio recordings were required, and whether the disclosure method was misleading.

The court found that while the Crown did not wilfully breach its obligations, the disclosure method was insufficient due to a lack of clear explanation regarding the relationship between the MPRs and the disclosed audio recordings.

Despite some lack of diligence by defence counsel, the court determined that the defendant's trial fairness rights were compromised.

Given the extensive time required for the defence to review the newly disclosed audio recordings and the judge's impending compulsory retirement, an adjournment was deemed impractical.

The court granted a mistrial, allowing for a new trial where previous pretrial decisions and admitted evidence could be incorporated.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from a one-party consent wiretap authorization that was previously found to violate s. 8.

The court first determined that viva voce evidence of the conversation between the police agent and the defendant was inextricably linked to the recording and must be considered in the s. 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was not at the higher end of the continuum, the defendant's expectation of privacy in a public restaurant was low, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court concluded that excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore admitted the evidence.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through a series of wiretap authorizations, arguing the initial Information to Obtain (ITO) was inadequate and misleading.

The court reviewed the ITO, noting material omissions regarding the police agent's criminal record and financial compensation agreement.

After editing and amplifying the ITO, the court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been or would be committed, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that information relating to the offences would be obtained through the interception sought.

The initial authorization was set aside, rendering the evidence obtained a presumptive violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The accused faced a 60-count indictment following 'Project A-Wire', an RCMP investigation into drug trafficking, weapons, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rates.

The Crown relied heavily on intercepted communications, surveillance, and physical evidence seized from multiple locations, including a stash apartment, a bar, and the accused's residence.

The court found the accused guilty of conspiring to traffic in cocaine, marijuana, and hashish, and of leading a criminal organization.

The accused was also convicted of possessing prohibited and restricted firearms, possessing proceeds of crime, extortion, and entering into agreements to receive interest at a criminal rate.

The accused was acquitted of receiving payments at a criminal interest rate and one count of extortion.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Charter arising from a warrantless search of his iPhone by CBSA officers at an airport upon re‑entry into Canada.

The defence sought exclusion of the phone contents, subsequent wiretap authorizations, and evidence obtained through search warrants, arguing the border search was a pretext for a police investigation and that the authorizations lacked investigative necessity.

The court held that a cell phone constitutes “goods” under the Customs Act and that CBSA officers are authorized to conduct routine border searches of such goods without prior grounds.

The search was characterized as a first‑category routine border search under R. v. Simmons and therefore reasonable.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted because the state conduct was not serious and the evidence was central to the prosecution.

The defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict acquitting him of four counts related to cocaine trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including numerical text messages sent from the defendant's phone to a co-accused's phone.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, considering whether the circumstantial evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the inferences the Crown asked the jury to draw.

The court found there was some direct and circumstantial evidence to support the inference that the defendant was a party to an agreement to sell cocaine, and therefore dismissed the motion.

During a criminal trial for drug trafficking offences involving cocaine and cannabis, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert to provide opinion evidence regarding drug trafficking indicators, drug jargon, and related matters.

The defence objected, arguing the proposed evidence lacked relevance and necessity and that the witness lacked independence due to police bias.

Applying the test for expert evidence in R. v. Mohan, the court held that some proposed opinions were relevant and necessary to assist the jury, including opinions regarding the level of trafficking indicated by seized items and the use of drug-related jargon.

However, opinions concerning cocaine purity, the role of weapons in trafficking, and evidence relating to hashish or trafficking hierarchies were excluded as irrelevant or unnecessary.

The officer was qualified to give expert opinion evidence only on limited issues.