Timothy D. Ray

The children's aid society sought an order granting custody of a four-year-old child to the maternal grandmother, with access to the parents.

The father initially sought sole custody but conceded during the trial that the grandmother should have custody.

The court found that the father lacked insight into his parenting role and exhibited behaviors that undermined the grandmother and the mother.

Applying the best interests of the child factors under the Child and Family Services Act, the court granted custody to the grandmother and ordered that the father's access be at the grandmother's discretion.

The father was also ordered not to return to court on custody and access issues without proof of meaningful psychotherapy.

Following a simplified procedure trial in a commercial dispute, the court had dismissed both the plaintiff’s claim and the defendants’ counterclaim, except for an order requiring the plaintiff to provide machine access codes to the defendants.

The parties made competing claims for costs, each arguing success and reliance on settlement offers.

The court found the offers irrelevant because neither party achieved a result closer to its offer.

Although both sides were largely unsuccessful and had contributed to the dispute, the court held that the defendants achieved partial success because the ordered delivery of machine codes was critical to operating the equipment.

Costs were therefore awarded to the defendants on a proportional basis.

A small hydroelectric power producer sought a declaration and damages concerning the interpretation of a long‑term electricity purchase contract.

The plaintiff argued that payments after the tenth year of the agreement were required to escalate annually with inflation, while the defendant maintained that the contract fixed the tenth‑year rate as a floor and permitted annual rate determinations thereafter.

The court held the contract language was clear and contained no entitlement to an automatic inflation escalator.

Claims based on estoppel arising from the treatment of other generators were rejected.

Although the limitation period did not bar claims arising within two years before the action, the plaintiff ultimately failed to establish entitlement under the contract.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory ruling made by a coroner at the outset of an inquest into a police shooting.

The ruling limited the scope of cross-examination of two police officers regarding their consultations with counsel prior to making their notes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis of prematurity, holding that courts should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings, particularly coroner's inquests, absent exceptional circumstances that would result in a fundamental failing of justice.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to be cautioned and to participate in a behavioral program.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC failed to disclose 13 interview summaries, 20 internal complaints, and hospital policies considered by its medical inspector.

The Divisional Court found that while the applicant was aware of the complaints and policies, the failure to disclose the 13 interview summaries breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The application was allowed, the ICRC decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration following proper disclosure.

The appellant private career college appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Superintendent to refuse to renew its registration.

The Tribunal's decision was based on findings related to student refunds and compliance issues.

The Divisional Court found that there was ample evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant failed to operate the college in accordance with the law and with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, former counsel for the respondent in family law proceedings, appealed an order and a subsequent costs endorsement.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error of fact or law in the motions judge's findings regarding the advancement of funds.

The court also determined that leave was not required to appeal the costs endorsement under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and found no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Crown applied for a mistrial after the trial judge engaged in an off‑the‑record conversation with the officer‑in‑charge about matters related to the case following the release of guilty verdicts but before sentencing.

The judge acknowledged the conversation occurred in chambers without counsel present and related to a website mentioned in the evidence, though no information about the complainant had been obtained.

While the judge maintained the ability to disregard any information received, the court concluded that the conversation created a reasonable apprehension of bias affecting the perceived fairness of the process.

Given that the court was not functus officio regarding counts awaiting sentence, the judge exercised the authority to vacate the adjudications of guilt prior to sentencing.

A mistrial was ordered and the guilty findings were set aside.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against disputed lands, to require the plaintiff to pay $300,000 into court in exchange for the certificate, and to compel answers and undertakings arising from examinations for discovery.

Due to time constraints, the motion proceeded only on the refusals and undertakings issues.

The court reviewed the disputed discovery questions and ordered several further and better answers, production of the plaintiff’s current insurance policy, and additional itemized responses regarding claimed expenditures and work performed on the property.

Some requests were found premature, while others required re‑attendance at discovery.

The balance of the relief sought was adjourned to a later date, with costs reserved.

Following a four‑day family law trial involving custody, access, child support, and section 7 expenses, the court addressed costs.

The responding party sought costs on an enhanced basis after obtaining a result equal to or better than a written offer to settle.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and considering proportionality, the court found the responding party was the successful party and entitled to costs, though the amount sought was reduced.

The court fixed costs at $15,000 and declined to permit enforcement through the Family Responsibility Office because the case was not primarily about child support.

Following a three‑day family law trial resolving issues including equalization of net family property, spousal support, child support, arrears, section 7 expenses, division of Aeroplan points, and proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home, both parties sought full indemnity costs.

Each alleged unreasonable conduct by the other and asserted that their settlement offers had been more favourable than the court’s decision.

The court reviewed the offers and the course of the litigation and found that neither party achieved overall success.

Considering the parties’ limited financial resources and the potential impact of a costs award on funds available for the children, the court concluded that a no‑costs order was appropriate.

The defendant foreign state moved to set aside a default judgment of approximately $250,000 arising from a wrongful dismissal claim by a long-term embassy employee.

The court applied the four‑part test for setting aside default judgments: promptness in bringing the motion, explanation for the default, existence of an arguable defence, and overall interests of justice.

Although the court found the defendant did not move promptly and provided a weak explanation for multiple administrative failures in handling the claim, it concluded there was an arguable defence concerning the length of the notice period, deduction of disability benefits, possible frustration of contract due to disability, and human rights damages.

Balancing the factors, the court held that justice favoured permitting the defence to be advanced.

The default judgment was set aside on strict terms, including payment of costs and payment of the judgment amount into court.

The accused brought pre‑trial motions seeking severance of a count alleging sexual assault against a spouse from other counts involving alleged assaults against children, an order under s. 276 of the Criminal Code permitting questioning about the complainant’s prior sexual history with the accused, and production of Children’s Aid Society records.

The court held that severance was not warranted because any risk of reasoning prejudice could be addressed through proper jury instructions and the counts were connected by the family context and overlapping time periods.

The court granted the s. 276 application in part, permitting limited questioning about the general sexual relationship and certain activities relevant to the accused’s defence of consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, while excluding evidence that would invite prohibited sexual history inferences.

Redacted CAS records were reviewed and ordered disclosed to both parties as they were relevant and privacy concerns had been addressed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to consolidate two related actions, add a new plaintiff, and amend its pleadings to include claims for defamation and breach of a duty of good faith.

The court held that the two actions should not be formally consolidated but ordered that they be listed for trial consecutively.

The proposed defamation claim and addition of a new plaintiff were refused because the pleadings lacked the particularity required for defamation and would not survive a motion to strike.

The proposed claim for breach of a duty of good faith was also rejected because such a duty cannot stand as an independent cause of action separate from breach of contract.

Certain amendments pleading material facts were allowed, while others were dismissed for improperly pleading evidence rather than material facts.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault following an unprovoked stabbing incident fueled by alcohol and drugs.

The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, sentencing the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 15 years for the murder, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for the aggravated assault.

The court emphasized the offender's guilty plea, which spared the victims' families and the community from a lengthy trial, as a significant mitigating factor.

The accused, a parish priest and high school chaplain, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching involving a 16‑year‑old student.

The complainant alleged that during an overnight visit at a rectory the accused entered his room and sexually touched him and forced contact with the accused’s genitalia.

Applying the credibility framework from W(D), the court rejected the accused’s denial, accepted the complainant’s testimony, and relied on corroborative circumstantial evidence including parental evidence about the overnight visit.

The court held that the complainant was a young person dealing with a figure of authority and that delay in reporting and lack of verbal resistance could not ground an adverse inference.

The court found the accused abused a position of trust and authority and proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal in a class proceeding, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful party sought full indemnity costs including significant hours for factum preparation, while the opposing party provided its own cost outline for comparison.

The court applied the usual rule that costs follow the event and assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis at 55% of a reasonable full indemnity bill.

Considering the excessive but understandable factum preparation, the court fixed costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff at $7,000.

Following a successful motion permitting amendment of pleadings to remove claims against settling defendants pursuant to a Pierringer agreement, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The settling defendants sought costs as the successful party, while another defendant argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court held that the plaintiffs and the settling defendants were the successful parties and that the usual rule of costs to the successful party should apply.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded after assessing the reasonableness of the parties’ submitted cost outlines.

Following a prior family law decision concerning child support and arrears, the court invited written submissions limited to correcting potential arithmetic errors in the calculations.

After reviewing submissions, the court revised certain calculations relating to the moving party’s proportionate share of child care expenses for 2011 and 2012 and corrected a mistaken statutory reference from s. 9 to s. 7.

The court also accepted that certain child care payments had been made earlier in 2013 and adjusted the commencement date of payments accordingly.

The corrected calculations resulted in revised child support arrears.

The court indicated that submissions on costs would be considered if the parties could not reach agreement.