Céline Dostaler

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

During cross-examination at trial, the accused revealed having reviewed personal notes prior to testifying.

The Crown sought production of these notes, arguing that any privilege was waived when the accused used them to refresh their memory.

The court held that the notes were protected by both litigation and solicitor-client privilege, as they were created for the dominant purpose of litigation and shared with counsel for legal advice.

The court concluded that the privilege was not waived, noting that the reference to the notes arose during cross-examination rather than examination-in-chief, and the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the probative value of production.

This sentencing decision concerns Sgt. Alex Esliger of the Canadian Armed Forces, convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code for an incident occurring during deployment in Iraq.

The court carefully considered the facts, including the nature of the assault involving forced digital penetration and attempted intercourse, the victim impact, and the offender’s background including mental and physical health issues.

The judge emphasized principles of denunciation and deterrence, referencing key Supreme Court and Court of Appeal authorities, and rejected a conditional sentence despite defence submissions.

The sentence imposed was three years’ imprisonment, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a 10-year firearms prohibition, reflecting the serious nature of the offence and its impact within a military context.

Ralph King was sentenced after being found guilty of sexual assault against three women during private healing ceremonies where he acted as a spiritual healer.

The offences involved inappropriate physical contact under the guise of healing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of a position of trust, significant impact on victims (two of whom were Indigenous and had prior trauma), multiple victims, and fraud.

Mitigating factors included his compliance with release conditions, prosocial lifestyle, and health issues.

The court emphasized the interplay between s. 718.04 (vulnerable victims, particularly Indigenous women, mandating primary consideration of denunciation and deterrence) and s. 718.2(e) (Gladue principles for Indigenous offenders).

The court found that the harm done to the victims and the Indigenous community, coupled with the lack of remorse, necessitated a significant custodial sentence.

This criminal trial concerned one count of sexual assault against the accused, J.D., involving his grandchild, V.C. V.C. alleged multiple incidents of sexual touching over several years.

The court heard testimony from V.C., who adopted her prior video statements to police, and from V.C.'s grandmother (J.D.'s common-law partner), who testified for the defence.

The court assessed V.C.'s credibility and reliability, noting inconsistencies in her testimony and a lack of present memory regarding key details, despite finding her an honest witness.

The grandmother's testimony, which was accepted, contradicted the frequency of the alleged incidents.

Applying principles for assessing young witnesses' evidence, the court found that the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt due to concerns about the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

J.D. was acquitted.

The accused, MG, was charged with two counts of sexual assault against KM, alleged to have occurred in June 2007 and April 2008.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both the complainant and the accused, applying the W.(D.) formulation.

While the judge found parts of the accused's testimony incredible, the complainant's evidence was deemed unreliable due to the significant passage of time and her conscious efforts to suppress memories, leading to a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, MG was found not guilty on both counts.

This is a sentencing decision for W.S., who was found guilty of sexually assaulting two teenage girls, Sarah (15) and Colleen (17).

The court detailed the nature of the offences, which involved grooming and exploitation of a position of trust, and the devastating long-term impact on the victims and the offender's own daughter.

The court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, particularly the emphasis on denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse post-R. v. Friesen.

Despite defence arguments regarding the impact of incarceration on W.S.'s farming business and his partner's health, the court rejected a conditional sentence, finding it inconsistent with the gravity of the offences and the need for general deterrence.

W.S.'s lack of remorse and denial of responsibility were noted as aggravating factors.

The court sentenced W.S. to 35 months in custody, with credit for pre-sentence detention, and imposed various ancillary orders including SOIRA registration, DNA sample, weapons prohibition, and non-communication/proximity restrictions with the victims.

The accused, a spiritual healer, was charged with three counts of sexual assault against women during healing ceremonies.

The complainants testified that the accused touched them inappropriately with his hand in intimate areas, contrary to the stated practice of the ceremony.

The accused denied any hand touching, asserting he only used a deer bone as part of the ritual and that hand touching would be inappropriate.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainants, noting their initial self-blame and later realization of the impropriety after hearing similar complaints from others.

The court found the complainants' evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's denials due to inconsistencies and implausibility.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred without consent or informed consent, leading to findings of guilt on all charges.

The accused, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, was charged with sexual assault in the military justice system.

After nine months, the military charges were withdrawn and new charges were laid in the civilian court (Ontario Court of Justice), purportedly in response to the Arbour Report's interim recommendation.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The court found that the total net delay was approximately 22 months, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the transfer from the military system and the COVID-19 backlog constituted exceptional circumstances, noting a lack of evidence and a failure by the Crown to take reasonable steps to mitigate the delay.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

The defendant, a high school teacher, was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation, possession of child pornography, and communicating with a child for sexual purposes.

The Crown alleged these offenses occurred while the complainant was a minor and a student at his school.

The court found the complainant's testimony inconsistent and unreliable regarding the timeline of events, particularly whether the alleged sexual activity occurred before her 18th birthday.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving, possession of loaded prohibited firearms, and possession of marijuana.

This decision concerns her sentencing.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of three to four years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the accused's personal circumstances, including systemic racism and a difficult upbringing, and the principles of sentencing, particularly denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

Applying the principles from R. c.

Morris regarding systemic racism and the availability of conditional sentences, the court imposed a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 18 months of probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition for certain items and 10 years for others, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

A fine and driving suspension were also imposed for the Highway Traffic Act offence.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Hells Angels and Red Devils, in a trial where the accused allegedly attempted to forcibly remove a victim's gang-related tattoo.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, unreliable, and the officer lacked proper qualifications.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and found the officer was properly qualified based on her extensive experience.

The court ruled her evidence on gang structure and culture was necessary, but excluded her proposed testimony interpreting text messages and her evidence on tattoo removal practices that relied on inherently suspect hearsay.

The accused was convicted of touching a child, who was between seven and nine years old at the time, for a sexual purpose.

The offence involved sexual intercourse and occurred in the victim's family home.

The accused had a prior conviction for a sexual offence against a minor.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized the profound harm caused to child victims and the breach of trust involved.

The accused was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, along with a 15-year prohibition order, a lifetime SOIRA order, and other ancillary orders.

T.F.D., a young person, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence under s. 64(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), arguing that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that T.F.D.'s actions, though horrendous, were those of an impulsive, immature, and troubled adolescent whose judgment was further impaired by substance use, thus the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted.

The court determined that the maximum youth sentence of 7 years, including 4 years of intensive rehabilitative custody and 3 years of conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) Order, was appropriate and sufficient for accountability and public protection through rehabilitation, especially given T.F.D.'s acceptance into the IRCS Program.

Gayle Whalen appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which found her incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications and mood stabilizers.

The appeal focused on the Board's finding that Whalen lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions, as per section 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and that its conclusion was reasonable, given the evidence of Whalen's persistent denial of her mental disorder and need for treatment.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

L'accusé, Jacques Lalonde, a plaidé coupable d'avoir communiqué dans le but d'obtenir et obtenu moyennant rétribution les services sexuels d'une personne de moins de dix-huit ans, en violation du paragraphe 212(4) du Code criminel.

La Cour a d'abord examiné une contestation en vertu de la Charte, déclarant la peine minimale obligatoire de six mois prévue par l'article 212(4) inconstitutionnelle et inopérante, car elle pourrait entraîner des peines cruelles et inusitées dans des scénarios hypothétiques raisonnablement prévisibles.

Pour la détermination de la peine, la Cour a pris en compte des facteurs aggravants, notamment des incidents multiples, l'exploitation d'une victime vulnérable et le ciblage d'une jeune fille de 16 ans, ainsi que des facteurs atténuants tels que l'absence d'antécédents judiciaires et l'expression de remords.

La Cour a imposé une peine de 12 mois d'emprisonnement, suivie d'une période de probation de 12 mois avec des conditions spécifiques, une ordonnance de 10 ans en vertu de l'article 161, un prélèvement d'échantillon d'ADN et une inscription de 10 ans au registre des délinquants sexuels.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges including sexual assault.

Before sentencing on the convictions, the trial judge declared a mistrial on the convictions after admitting he had visited the dating website where the accused and complainant met and had discussed it with the investigating officer in chambers.

The trial judge concluded he was functus officio regarding the acquittals.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge's independent research and comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias that tainted the acquittals.

A new trial was ordered.

The court tried a sexual assault charge arising from intercourse initiated while the complainant was asleep on a futon after a party involving alcohol and marihuana.

Applying the governing consent jurisprudence, the court found the complainant was asleep when penetration began and therefore incapable of consenting under s. 273.1 of the Criminal Code.

Although the court found an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, it rejected that defence on the facts and held that reasonable steps to ascertain consent were not taken, engaging s. 273.2.

The accused's evidence was not believed, the complainant was found credible, and a finding of guilt was entered.

The Crown applied for a mistrial after the trial judge engaged in an off‑the‑record conversation with the officer‑in‑charge about matters related to the case following the release of guilty verdicts but before sentencing.

The judge acknowledged the conversation occurred in chambers without counsel present and related to a website mentioned in the evidence, though no information about the complainant had been obtained.

While the judge maintained the ability to disregard any information received, the court concluded that the conversation created a reasonable apprehension of bias affecting the perceived fairness of the process.

Given that the court was not functus officio regarding counts awaiting sentence, the judge exercised the authority to vacate the adjudications of guilt prior to sentencing.

A mistrial was ordered and the guilty findings were set aside.

The Crown brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal of the respondent's acquittals.

The proposed appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a post-judgment conversation between the trial judge and the investigating officer.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that although the Crown initially pursued the wrong remedy, there was an arguable appeal on the merits and no undue prejudice to the respondent.

The interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed.

The accused was tried on multiple charges arising from an incident involving a complainant and her teenage daughter, including sexual assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, unlawful confinement, assault, and breaches of recognizance conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

At trial, the court closely scrutinized the credibility of the complainant and the testimony of the daughter who was present during the events.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s evidence and preferred the daughter’s testimony on key issues.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove sexual assault, weapon possession for a dangerous purpose, or unlawful confinement beyond a reasonable doubt, but found the accused guilty of the included offence of simple assault based on minor injuries observed by medical evidence.