Eric Lay

The appellant appealed a judgment interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport.

The application judge found that a specific bequest of the Hopewell Avenue property to the testator's predeceased son passed to the son's wife pursuant to section 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the anti-lapse provision), rather than lapsing into the residue of the estate.

The appellant argued the will showed a contrary intention and that the solicitor's evidence should have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the anti-lapse provision or the will's terms.

The court also upheld the occupation rent requirement, finding it was properly raised and calculated.

The appellant and respondent, adult siblings, were named co-estate trustees of their father's estate.

Disagreements arose over the payment of estate debts, leading to a breakdown in the administration of the estate.

The application judge removed the appellant as estate trustee, finding she had obstructed the estate's administration and preferred her own interests, while dismissing the application to remove the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision and concluding that the appellant's arguments regarding the law of abatement were an ex post facto rationalization for her conduct.

The Landlords (Vince and Colleen Battista) brought a motion seeking an order declaring that the stay of proceedings under section 69.3 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) does not apply to the eviction provisions of a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order, or alternatively, lifting the stay under section 69.4 of the BIA.

The LTB order required the bankrupt tenant (Justin Evan Stevenson) to vacate the unit due to non-payment of rent.

The court found that the eviction provisions of the LTB order are not "claims provable" under section 121(1) of the BIA, and therefore the automatic stay does not apply.

Alternatively, the court would have lifted the stay as it would be just and equitable and would not affect other creditors.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the Landlord.

The Landlord sought an order declaring that the stay of proceedings under section 69.3 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) does not apply to the eviction provisions of a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order, or alternatively, lifting the stay under section 69.4 BIA.

The bankrupt tenant opposed, arguing new maintenance issues.

The court found that the LTB order for possession is not a "claim provable" under section 121(1) BIA, thus the automatic stay did not apply to the eviction.

Alternatively, the court would have lifted the stay as it would not affect other creditors and the Landlord continued to incur expenses.

The motion was granted, and the Landlord was awarded costs.

This appeal concerned the division of a residential property between former spouses following their divorce.

The respondent (original applicant) sought a sale of the property and 50% of proceeds, while the appellant (original respondent) cross-applied for a constructive trust due to disproportionate post-separation contributions.

The application judge ordered a sale and granted a constructive trust, apportioning the net proceeds 35% to the respondent and 65% to the appellant, considering factors like post-separation payments, sole occupancy, and credit risk.

The appellant sought a larger share, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the application judge's discretionary apportionment of the constructive trust.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondents sought full indemnity costs, citing contractual language in mortgage actions and the appellants' "reprehensible conduct" and "scurrilous accusations." The appellants argued the claim was excessive and duplicative.

The court, while acknowledging contractual full indemnity, exercised its overriding discretion due to the complex and overly litigious nature of the case, finding both parties contributed to procedural skirmishes.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellants to the respondents at $170,000, all-inclusive, a reduction from the $190,372 claimed.

The appellants, Gilles Jozias Overtveld, Enrique M. Jurado, and Rachida Youmouri, appealed several interlocutory orders made by a case management judge in an underlying application concerning Mr. Overtveld's capacity to manage property and personal care.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals as all challenged orders were interlocutory, not final.

The orders included dismissal of a contempt motion, a motion to strike the application, motions regarding access to Mr. Overtveld, a motion to remove counsel, and a motion for payment of accounts.

The court quashed the appeal, affirming that interlocutory orders do not finally dispose of the parties' rights.

The appellants (Beach parties) appealed summary judgments granted in favour of the respondents (Magenta parties) in three mortgage enforcement actions, and the motion judge's refusal to stay enforcement of those judgments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment or to decline a stay.

The court clarified and applied a restated multi-factorial approach for stays under Rule 20.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the merits of the counterclaim, the relationship between claims, the defendant's litigation conduct, and the balance of prejudice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion brought on consent.

The motion was dismissed, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The Appellants sought two orders from the Court of Appeal: an extension of time to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal to clarify that they were appealing the underlying summary judgment on both grounds raised below, and permission to file fresh evidence.

The court granted the extension for the Supplementary Notice of Appeal, finding that the Appellants had intended to appeal both issues from the outset and that it was in the interest of justice to permit this clarification.

However, the motion to adduce fresh evidence was denied, as the evidence was not new and could have been adduced at the original summary judgment motion.

The appellant appealed from an order striking out his entire Answer pursuant to a consent order requiring disclosure of financial documentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the settlement judge's jurisdiction to strike pleadings for failure to comply with disclosure obligations, finding that such orders may be made at settlement conferences to promote the overarching objectives of the Family Law Rules.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the portion of the Answer relating to custody and access should not have been struck, as custody decisions must be based on the best interests of the children and require full participation of both parents.

The matter was ordered to proceed to trial on an expedited basis.

The applicants, participants in a syndicated mortgage, sought payment out of court of surplus funds from a municipal tax sale after the mortgage went into default.

They had previously settled litigation against their investment advisor for a substantial sum.

The respondents, also mortgage participants, contended that the applicants must account for these settlement funds, which would alter the distribution of the surplus.

The court found no obligation for the applicants to account for the settlement funds, as these were damages from third-party litigation, not proceeds from the mortgage or land.

The court granted the applications for payment out of court based on the First Priority lenders' interests, dismissing the respondents' accounting claim.

The appellant, a numbered company controlled by Ali Karimi, appealed a motion judge's decision to stay civil proceedings for abuse of process.

The civil actions sought damages for alleged theft against the respondents.

The respondents had previously been victims in a 2011 criminal trial where Karimi was convicted of extortion and criminal harassment based on false theft allegations against them.

The motion judge found that permitting the civil actions to proceed would constitute an abuse of process, as it would allow Karimi to continue the persecution for which he had been criminally convicted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, finding that the motion judge properly applied the abuse of process doctrine and that it was open to conclude the jury implicitly found no theft had occurred.

Following the dismissal of two identical actions via summary judgment, the court determined the scale and quantum of costs.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate, balancing the principle of indemnity with reasonableness and proportionality.

The plaintiff, along with an individual personally liable pursuant to a prior consent order, was ordered to pay $25,000 in costs to each defendant.

The bankrupt's discharge was opposed by the Trustee in Bankruptcy and an unsecured creditor, Tammy Dupuis.

The opposition was based on the bankrupt's failure to disclose a post-bankruptcy posting loan, non-compliance with surplus income obligations, and allegations of causing or contributing to bankruptcy through reckless speculation or negligence.

The court found that the bankrupt's assets were not equal to $0.50 on the dollar of unsecured liabilities, for which the bankrupt was justly responsible, and that he failed to comply with surplus income obligations.

The court ordered a conditional discharge, requiring the bankrupt to pay outstanding surplus income and an additional amount to the estate.

The plaintiff corporation sued former employees for alleged theft.

The corporation's principal was previously convicted of criminal harassment and extortion against the employees, with the criminal jury finding the alleged thefts did not occur.

The defendants moved to stay or dismiss the civil action as an abuse of process.

The court granted a temporary stay, finding the civil action was an impermissible collateral attack on the criminal verdict, which would become permanent pending the outcome of a Supreme Court of Canada leave application in a parallel proceeding.

The defendant was entirely successful on a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim of theft.

The principal of the corporate plaintiff had previously been convicted of extortion and harassment against the defendant but persisted in the civil claim.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a full indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct, fixing the total costs at $57,748.20, payable jointly and severally by the corporate plaintiff and its principal.

The defendant employee brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employer's action for alleged theft.

The employer's principal had previously been convicted of attempting to extort the employee based on these same theft allegations.

The court found there was no admissible evidence of any theft occurring at the plaintiff's premises, let alone by the defendant.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the claim against the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to consolidate two related actions, add a new plaintiff, and amend its pleadings to include claims for defamation and breach of a duty of good faith.

The court held that the two actions should not be formally consolidated but ordered that they be listed for trial consecutively.

The proposed defamation claim and addition of a new plaintiff were refused because the pleadings lacked the particularity required for defamation and would not survive a motion to strike.

The proposed claim for breach of a duty of good faith was also rejected because such a duty cannot stand as an independent cause of action separate from breach of contract.

Certain amendments pleading material facts were allowed, while others were dismissed for improperly pleading evidence rather than material facts.

Following an unsuccessful motion seeking removal of estate trustees, the court addressed the costs consequences of the motion.

Applying Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that costs should ordinarily be fixed and payable immediately rather than reserved to trial.

The court rejected arguments that estate litigation principles justified deferring or shifting costs to the estate, finding the moving parties were effectively advancing creditor‑type claims against the estate rather than beneficiary claims.

The court awarded one set of partial indemnity costs to the responding parties, allocating the amount between the estate and the trustees personally while avoiding duplication.

Costs were fixed at $13,500 payable jointly and severally by the moving parties.