Vanessa V. Christie

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to police during a murder investigation.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of four statements, arguing they were the product of oppressive police questioning and inducements.

Following a voir dire, the court found the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the accused remained assertive, engaged, and in control of his narrative throughout the interviews.

The court also considered whether the probative value of the statements outweighed their prejudicial effect, ordering specific redactions to remove irrelevant police theories and unanswered monologues before the statements could be presented to the jury.

The applicant franchisees sought statutory rescission of a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging the franchisor failed to provide a compliant disclosure document.

The court found fatal flaws in the disclosure, including the failure to provide audited or review engagement financial statements of the franchisor, and the provision of piecemeal disclosure regarding earnings projections and territory.

The court held the applicants lawfully rescinded the agreement and awarded $392,698 in damages against the franchisor and its associates jointly and severally.

Following a traffic stop for expired registration, police extended the detention and purported to rely on the Cannabis Control Act to question the accused about marijuana in the vehicle and to search the occupants and vehicle.

The court held that the continued detention was arbitrary, that police used the Cannabis Control Act as a pretext for a broader criminal investigation, and that they breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to promptly explain the reason for the continued detention and advise of the right to counsel before eliciting incriminating information.

Because the search grounds were obtained through those breaches, the warrantless searches also violated s. 8.

Applying Grant, the court excluded all statements and physical evidence obtained during the stop.

The separate application alleging ss. 7 and 12 breaches arising from custodial treatment was dismissed, and the accused was acquitted on all counts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to allege that the defendant Todd Drain was an occupier within the definition of the Occupiers Liability Act.

The original claim, issued in 2018, was based on negligence arising from an incident on November 4, 2016, where the plaintiff was injured falling from a deer blind on property owned by the defendants' parents.

The defendant Todd Drain opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendment relied on facts substantially pleaded in the original claim and represented merely an alternative legal route to establish liability rather than a new cause of action.

The accused was tried for trafficking and unlawful act manslaughter arising from a fatal overdose allegedly caused by a same-day drug transaction.

The Crown's theory depended on proving that the particular mixture found in the deceased's wallet and blood — cocaine, fentanyl, and U-47700 — was the same substance sold by the accused.

Applying the circumstantial evidence framework, the court held that guilt was not the only reasonable inference because the evidence left open reasonable possibilities that the deceased obtained or consumed other drugs, particularly during an unobserved period before he was found unresponsive.

Although the court accepted the pathology evidence that acute toxicity from the detected substances significantly contributed to death, it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused trafficked that particularized substance.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The applicants, Cash Dillon and Jarra Shifara, challenged the admissibility of firearms and drug evidence seized during a vehicle stop, alleging violations of their Charter rights.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the applicants by transitioning a sobriety check into a Cannabis Control Act investigation without statutory or common law authority.

Additionally, the police failed to promptly inform the applicants of the reasons for their detention or advise them of their right to counsel, and subsequently conducted an unreasonably intrusive search of their groin areas.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court determined that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the court granted the application and excluded all evidence and statements obtained during the stop.

Judge-alone sexual assault trial arising from intercourse after a house party where the accused admitted sexual activity but asserted it was consensual.

The central issue was subjective consent, with the complainant alleging sleep, confusion as to her partner's identity, pain, and non-consent, while the accused described a conscious, coherent, mutually initiated encounter.

The court reviewed the governing consent, capacity, and mistaken-belief authorities, including Barton, J.A., and G.F., and found significant concerns and ambiguities in the complainant's narrative while concluding the accused's evidence could not be rejected and at minimum raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown failed to prove absence of subjective consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from a dog bite, holding that the plaintiff, a dog walker, was an “owner” under the Dog Owners’ Liability Act (DOLA) at the time of the incident.

The court found that the plaintiff was in physical possession and control of the dog immediately before the bite, and thus was jointly and severally liable under the DOLA, precluding her from recovering damages from the other owners.

The decision applies the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “owner” in Wilk v. Arbour and clarifies that dominion or independent control is not required for liability under the DOLA.

The court considered motions for security for costs and for summary judgment regarding a possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Lien Act (RSLA) in a dispute over helicopter repairs.

Mansfield Heliflight Inc. sought security for costs from USCAN Aviation Sales Ltd., while USCAN cross-moved for summary judgment to confirm its possessory lien and for an order requiring Mansfield to provide security.

The court dismissed the security for costs motion, finding USCAN had a good chance of partial success and that the defendant conceded some amount was owing.

The court granted a declaration that USCAN has a possessory lien over the helicopter, but declined to order Mansfield to pay security into court, maintaining the status quo until the amount of the lien is determined.

On a mortgage enforcement motion, the moving party sought leave to amend her defence and counterclaim to add multiple proposed defendants by counterclaim, validate service, convert the action from foreclosure to sale, and obtain consolidation with a separate related action.

The court held there was no non-compensable prejudice and that the proposed joinder satisfied the Rules of Civil Procedure because the pleaded facts alleged an interconnected series of transactions, common factual issues, uncertainty about liability, and a strong interest in avoiding inconsistent findings.

The court further held that the proposed unlawful act conspiracy pleading was legally sufficient at the pleadings stage and need not prove the merits on the motion.

Leave to amend, conversion to a sale action, and validation of service were granted; consolidation was left unnecessary in light of the expected discontinuance of the separate action.

The applicants sought mandamus compelling the SIU Director to lay a murder charge against a subject officer following a fatal police shooting, and also sought a declaration that the decision not to charge was tainted by anti-black racism.

The court held that, under s. 32 of the Special Investigations Unit Act, the Director's determination of whether reasonable grounds exist includes both subjective and objective components and permits consideration of all reliable information, including an obvious self-defence issue.

The Director did not err by considering self defence, and mandamus could not be used to force a particular charging result absent jurisdictional error, bad faith, discrimination, or failure to consider a highly relevant factor.

The court found no evidence that race motivated either the officer's conduct or the Director's decision.

Mandamus was also unavailable because a private prosecution under s. 504 of the Criminal Code provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder for killing his father.

Prior to sentencing, the applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years violates sections 12 and 15 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his long-standing mental disorders and substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offence reduced his moral blameworthiness, making the mandatory sentence grossly disproportionate and discriminatory.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application.

The court held that it was bound by the jury's verdict, which necessarily found that the applicant had the requisite specific intent for first degree murder, representing the highest level of moral culpability.

The court found no violation of section 12, as the sentence is not grossly disproportionate for an offender with such high moral blameworthiness.

The court also found no violation of section 15, as the applicant failed to demonstrate that the mandatory minimum sentence disproportionately impacts persons with mental illness, noting that those who lack criminal responsibility or the requisite intent due to mental illness are not subject to the mandatory sentence.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent insurer owed a duty to defend the applicant business owner in three underlying actions arising from a fire.

The fire allegedly started when the business owner used an insured truck to boost a forklift.

The respondent argued that boosting a forklift was not an ordinary use or operation of a motor vehicle.

The court applied the test for duty to defend and the test for use or operation of a motor vehicle, finding that using a truck to boost another vehicle is an ordinary and well-known activity to which motor vehicles are put.

The court declared that the respondent owed a duty to defend and ordered it to pay a one-half share of past and ongoing defence costs.

The Estate of the insured brought a summary judgment motion to determine whether an Excluded Driver Endorsement (OPCF 28A) was valid, thereby excluding coverage for the insured's daughter under her parents' Intact insurance policy.

The daughter was driving her father's vehicle when she was involved in a collision with the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's insurer, Commonwell, argued the endorsement was invalid because it was not proven that the daughter signed it or had notice of it.

The court held that the endorsement was valid, finding that the insured parents understood and agreed to the exclusion, and that notice to or signature by the excluded driver is not a legal requirement under the Insurance Act.

This appeal concerns a dispute over legal fees between a law firm and its client.

The client, Toshiko Nakano, appealed a decision by an Assessment Officer who had reduced the legal fees from over $110,000 to $80,000.

The Appellant argued that the Assessment Officer misapplied the law, failed to consider relevant evidence, and allowed procedural irregularities, particularly regarding the handling of objections and evidentiary issues.

The Respondent solicitors argued that the Assessment Officer's decision was largely correct, with one minor error regarding an adverse inference.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the Assessment Officer's initial procedural errors in handling objections, the original reasons for the assessment were unassailable and the overall result was fair, just, and proportionate.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a property, asserting a 30% ownership interest based on a trust agreement and an investment for a property flip.

The Defendants opposed the CPL, arguing the funds were for safekeeping, and brought a cross-motion to dismiss the CPL, allow payment of $75,000 into court, and delete a caution on title.

The court found a triable issue regarding the Plaintiffs' interest but dismissed the CPL motion, concluding that damages would be a satisfactory remedy as the property was not unique and the investment's purpose was profit.

The court ordered the Defendants to pay $75,000 into court following the property's sale but declined to order the immediate deletion of the caution on title.

The plaintiff brought a post-judgment motion seeking a contempt order and other relief against the defendants for concealing assets and failing to comply with disclosure orders in aid of execution of a judgment for misappropriated funds.

The court found the defendants in contempt under Rule 60.18(5) for deliberately avoiding their obligations by redirecting funds to a spouse's account, opening an undisclosed bank account, and refusing to disclose client receivables.

The court ordered specific steps to purge the contempt, re-attendance at examination, and written questions for the defendant's wife.

The appellant employer appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent employee statutory severance pay.

The appellant argued that it was exempt from paying severance under s. 9 of the Employment Standards Act because its loss of a school bus route contract to a new provider, combined with an agreement to introduce its employees to the new provider, constituted a 'sale of a business'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Deputy Judge's finding that the mere expiry of a contract and introduction of employees to a competitor did not constitute a transfer or sale of a business entity.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage property with the intention of severing it into three lots, relying on the defendant solicitor's advice that severance would be straightforward due to a Planning Act consent stamp on title.

The solicitor later admitted this advice was negligent, as the consent was qualified and severance was not guaranteed.

The plaintiffs sued for the lost hypothetical value of the severed lots and carrying costs.

The court applied the Messineo measure of damages, finding that the plaintiffs suffered no loss because they paid fair market value for the unsevered property, which had since significantly increased in value.

The court awarded only $3,100 in special damages for the wasted retainer and application fees.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a review decision of the Chair of the Ontario Land Tribunal, which had set aside a previous tribunal decision and ordered a rehearing regarding a zoning by-law amendment that restricted cannabis and hemp cultivation.

The moving party argued the Chair breached procedural fairness by failing to provide notice or an opportunity to respond, and by raising a new ground of review.

The Divisional Court found that the review decision was a final order, not interlocutory, but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court held that the Chair followed the established rules, the moving party had actual notice but chose not to respond, and the issues raised were not of sufficient general or public importance to merit an appeal.