William C. Wolfe

A personal injury action arising from a fall sustained by the plaintiff while hunting in a deer blind on the defendants' rural property.

The plaintiff initially pleaded that the defendant Todd Drain was an occupier under the Occupiers' Liability Act but withdrew this allegation on the first day of trial.

The court determined that the withdrawal of the occupier allegation eliminated most claims against Todd Drain, leaving only a claim based on alleged misfeasance—specifically, that Todd Drain removed an artificial turf carpet from the deer blind floor, causing it to become wet and slippery.

The jury found that the artificial turf was present on the date of the accident, thereby dismissing the action against Todd Drain.

The decision addresses the interplay between the Occupiers' Liability Act and common law negligence, the proper formulation of jury questions, and the consequences of withdrawing pleadings mid-trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to allege that the defendant Todd Drain was an occupier within the definition of the Occupiers Liability Act.

The original claim, issued in 2018, was based on negligence arising from an incident on November 4, 2016, where the plaintiff was injured falling from a deer blind on property owned by the defendants' parents.

The defendant Todd Drain opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendment relied on facts substantially pleaded in the original claim and represented merely an alternative legal route to establish liability rather than a new cause of action.

The appellant insurer challenged a trial judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages to the respondents for a stolen jewellery claim.

The insurer had denied the claim and defended the action by requiring the insureds to prove pre-policy ownership, despite having accepted their ownership at policy issuance and admitting no material misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of bad faith warranting punitive damages, ruling that the insurer's conduct was an unreasonable and unfair interpretation of the policy.

The Court also affirmed the compensatory damages award based on appraised replacement value, as the insurer failed to provide evidence that actual cash value was lower.

This decision addresses the costs award following a jury verdict in favour of the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought costs on an actual indemnity basis, arguing complete success and a more favourable Rule 49 offer to settle compared to the Defendants' "hardball" offer.

The court, applying Rules of Civil Procedure 57.01 and 49, found the Plaintiff was the successful party and that the Defendants' unreasonable settlement position warranted a higher costs award.

The court awarded the Plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis up to September 15, 2023, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $284,800.73, emphasizing that the principle of proportionality had minimal bearing due to the Defendants' conduct.

The plaintiffs, Dung Truong and Thuan Nguyen, sued their insurer for payment of six pieces of jewellery allegedly stolen in Vietnam.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the plaintiffs failed to prove ownership, the theft occurred, or the value of the loss, and that the jewellery was contraband.

The court found that the insurance contract did not require re-proving ownership post-loss, and that the plaintiffs had an insurable interest.

The court also found the theft occurred as described and rejected the "contraband" defence.

The court awarded the plaintiffs the insured value of the jewellery and punitive damages, finding the insurer's denial based on an unreasonable interpretation of the contract constituted bad faith.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him liable for the respondent's severe ankle injury under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal, including alleged errors in factual findings, disregard for evidence timing, failure to appreciate an affidavit's relevance, and errors in credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's detailed reasons, factual conclusions, evidentiary decisions, or credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge.

The City of Toronto sought substantial indemnity costs of $75,000 after successfully obtaining summary judgment against the plaintiff, Dimostenis Karpouzis, in an occupier's liability and public nuisance action.

The City argued that Karpouzis's conduct unduly lengthened the proceedings and that he rejected offers to settle.

The court awarded the City partial indemnity costs of $55,000, finding that while Karpouzis's delays were a factor, the City's offers to settle were "strategic bullying" rather than genuine attempts to resolve a serious personal injury claim, and thus did not warrant a punitive costs award on a substantial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff, Dimostenis Karpouzis, sued the City of Toronto for negligence (occupiers' liability) and public nuisance after suffering a serious brain injury while skateboarding at night on an unlighted recreational trail in a city park.

The City moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the City's motion, finding that the City did not act with reckless disregard under the Occupiers' Liability Act, as the risks of using an unlit trail at night were obvious and willingly assumed by the plaintiff.

The public nuisance claim was also dismissed, as keeping a forested park open at night with an unilluminated trail was not found to interfere unreasonably with public health, safety, or convenience.

David Turner sued the Town of Oakville under the Occupiers' Liability Act after falling off his bicycle on a recreational trail, claiming the Town acted with reckless disregard.

The parties settled damages, leaving liability as the sole issue for trial.

The Town argued no reckless disregard or causation, and alternatively, contributory negligence.

The court found that the plaintiff's choice to go around a control gate, rather than through it, and his failure to observe the trail ahead, contributed to the accident.

The court concluded that the Town's actions, including trail design, regular inspections, and maintenance, did not amount to reckless disregard for user safety, despite the absence of a specific "steep slope" sign before the incident.

The action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a second independent medical examination.

The plaintiff had surreptitiously recorded a previous examination by the defendant's expert, which the defendant argued compromised the expert's evidence.

The court granted the motion, finding the surreptitious recording improper and that fairness required a second examination.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to record the new examination, noting there is no right to record defence medical examinations without leave.

Following a three‑day civil trial, the plaintiffs obtained default judgment against one defendant while their claim against the other defendant was dismissed.

The court addressed competing submissions regarding costs.

The plaintiffs sought significant costs against the defaulting defendant, but the court found the claimed amount excessive given the straightforward nature of obtaining default judgment and reduced the award to reflect reasonable fees and disbursements.

The successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on a pre‑trial offer to settle, but the court held that the offer to settle rule did not apply because the plaintiffs’ action against that defendant was dismissed entirely.

The court awarded that defendant partial indemnity costs at the upper end of the applicable hourly range and rejected the plaintiffs’ request that the defaulting defendant bear those costs.

Neighbouring homeowners sued after a residential fire originating in the defendant’s semi‑detached house damaged their property.

One defendant, who was alleged to have caused the fire by careless smoking, did not defend and was noted in default.

The court held that the alleged admission by that defendant to his father was inadmissible hearsay against the co‑defendant homeowner and could not be relied upon to prove causation.

Without admissible evidence establishing how the fire began, the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence on a balance of probabilities, and the fire was characterized as “accidental” under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997.

The homeowner was neither directly negligent nor vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of his adult son.