ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-05-283654
DATE: 20130425
BETWEEN:
WILLIAM SCHNURR and MICHELLE BELL
Plaintiffs
– and –
ROBERT CARD and BRIAN CARD
Defendants
Nawaz Tahir, for the Plaintiffs
William C. Wolfe, for the Defendants
HEARD: February 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2013
T. Mcewen J.
reasons for decision
introduction
[1] This action arises as result of a fire that occurred in the early morning hours of February 16, 2003 at a residential property located at 107 Drayton Avenue in Toronto (“107 Drayton”). 107 Drayton is co-owned by the defendant, Robert Card (“Robert”), and his brother, Carl Card (“Carl”). At the time of the fire, Robert was living in the home while Carl resided elsewhere.
[2] The plaintiffs, William Schnurr (“Schnurr”) and Michelle Bell (“Bell”) (collectively “the plaintiffs”), own 109 Drayton Avenue (“109 Drayton”). 107 Drayton and 109 Drayton are residential properties that share a common wall and are typically described as semi-detached houses.
[3] As a result of the fire, the plaintiffs’ home was damaged. They commenced an action against Robert. The Statement of Claim was amended to add his son, Brian Card (“Brian”), as a defendant. Brian has not defended the action and has been noted in default. He did not participate in the trial in any way.
[4] The plaintiffs and Robert have entered into an agreement with regard to damages, which have been agreed to be in the amount of $127,500, plus prejudgment interest, costs, disbursements and GST/HST.
[5] The action proceeded to trial solely on the issue of liability.
the claim against brian
[6] Brian did not defend the action and was noted in default. He is deemed to admit the allegations contained in the Statement of Claim. Based on the evidence at trial and the deemed admissions, I find that he is liable to the plaintiffs. I have also reviewed the damage documentation of the plaintiffs. The amount sought of $127,500 is reasonable.
the claim against robert
Witnesses
[7] The plaintiffs called the following witnesses:
• Bell;
• Schnurr;
• Bruce Rabjhon (“Rabjhon”) – Fire Captain with the Toronto Fire Service;
• Gerald George (“George”) – retired District Fire Chief of the Toronto Fire Service; and
• Richard Redigonda (“Redigonda”) – Sergeant with the Toronto Police Service
[8] Robert testified on his own behalf and did not call any other witnesses. Brian did not testify. This is noteworthy because the plaintiffs allege that Brian caused the fire, while he was at 107 Drayton, by way of careless smoking which ignited a loveseat. Robert was not home at the time of the fire. Therefore, Brian is an important witness with respect to the cause of the fire and the events surrounding the fire. As I will discuss in greater detail below, Brian told his father that he fell asleep on a loveseat while smoking a cigarette.
[9] At trial, after the parties had closed their cases, I expressed my concern to counsel that the one witness who could best shed light on how the fire occurred, Brian, was not called. Robert’s counsel advised that he had no desire to call Brian as a witness. I advised the plaintiffs’ counsel that I would entertain submissions as to whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to reopen their case to have Brian testify. I expressed concern that without Brian’s testimony, even though Robert testified that Brian admitted starting the fire, Brian’s admission would not be admissible in the action between the plaintiffs and Robert. Notwithstanding my concerns and my willingness to hear a motion in this regard, the plaintiffs’ counsel declined my offer. He submitted that, in his view, Brian’s statement to Robert was admissible with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim against Robert.
Admissibility of Brian’s Statement to Robert
[10] As noted, Brian did not testify. In response to my questioning, Robert stated that Brian still resides in Toronto, was competent and available to testify. There was no evidence led by any party at trial to suggest that attempts had been made to serve Brian with a summons to witness, that he was evading service, that he was unavailable to testify, or that he was incapable of testifying. No one sought an adjournment of the trial to compel Brian’s attendance. The plaintiffs, upon whom the burden of proof rests, also declined my offer to seek to have Brian testify after the close of evidence.
[11] Undoubtedly, Brian’s statement is admissible with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim against him since it constitutes an admission by a party. However, the law is well settled that admissions made by a party are receivable only as evidence against the party who made them: see Alan W. Bryant, Sidney K. Lederman & Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3d ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009), at para. 6.412. Since Brian’s statement to Robert is clearly hearsay, it is not admissible as evidence against Robert unless it fits into one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
[12] In certain circumstances, hearsay evidence can be admitted into evidence for the truth of its contents if it meets the criteria of necessity and reliability: R. v. Hawkins, 1996 154 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043. I find that the criterion of reliability has been met given Robert’s evidence about the conversation he had with Brian.
[13] With respect to necessity, counsel for the plaintiffs submits that I can conclude that Brian was unavailable by virtue of the fact that he had no fixed address. I disagree. As noted above, there is no evidence led at trial to suggest that he was unavailable. In fact, Robert’s evidence suggested that Brian was available. With respect to the issue of Brian’s whereabouts, plaintiffs’ counsel also submitted that Robert did not answer an undertaking in which he agreed to provide Brian’s last known address. In my view, this submission has little merit for the simple reason that the plaintiffs were aware of Brian’s address and that they were able to serve him with the Amended Statement of Claim. Thereafter, there is no evidence they attempted to contact him for the purpose of securing his evidence at trial.
[14] Further, the plaintiffs, relying upon the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal case in Thomas v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1972), 1972 1041 (BC CA), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 521, submit that there is authority that would allow me to use Brian’s admission to bind Robert. The plaintiffs rely on the following passage, at p. 527:
It is trite law that a party’s own statements are admissible against himself to prove the truth of the facts admitted which may be taken as true against him. It is also clear that such admissions bind only the party who makes them and are not evidence against another as to the truth of the contents unless that other be present and assents, or is deemed under the circumstances to so assent by silence when he might reasonably be expected to make some observation, explanation or denial. But, of course, a statement made in the absence of another party (or in his presence when no assent to, or acceptance of, it is made or should be inferred by such silence) is admissible if part of the res gestae (inter alia) not to prove against him the truth of the statement, but only that the statement was made. It is admissible because it does not offend the hearsay rule when used for that purpose, whereas clearly the introduction of a statement to prove the truth of the matters stated would be hearsay, and inadmissible, unless falling into one of the exceptions to that rule. Clearly, such an admissible statement can be used as evidence against the other party on the issue of credibility, even if the statement cannot be used as evidence of the truth of the things so stated.
[15] There are four main reasons why Thomas does not assist the plaintiffs in their argument. First, the facts of that case are entirely distinguishable. In Thomas, all of the parties were present during the motor vehicle accident. In other words, they all knew what occurred during the accident and if they heard the admission, they could have spoken up to confirm or deny the admission when it was made. In this case, Robert first met with Brian, at the earliest, three days after the fire, and at the latest, two weeks after the fire. However, it is largely immaterial as to whether it was three days or two weeks considering Robert was not present when the fire occurred and there is no basis upon which Robert could confirm or deny Brian’s statement.
[16] Second, the passage in Thomas has been the subject of discussion for its improper use of the res gestae exception to hearsay. Where a party is not seeking to admit an out-of-court statement for its truth, the statement is admissible without having to fall under a hearsay exception: see The Law of Evidence in Canada, at para. 6.302. In this case, the court stated that the res gestae exception could be used to admit an out-of-court statement for the fact that the statement was made, but not for its truth. I respectfully question the correctness of this statement.
[17] Third, Brian’s out-of-court statement is not admissible under the res gestae exception or the principled approach to hearsay. There is no way that Brian’s statement, which was made at least three days after the fire took place, could be considered to be part of the res gestae considering the complete lack of contemporaneity. Under the principled approach, there is no necessity. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs even tried to call Brian as a witness and when I provided them with the opportunity to make submissions on reopening the case in order to call him, they declined my offer. As a result, the plaintiffs cannot now argue that Brian was unavailable and that the requirement of necessity under the principled approach is met.
[18] Finally, even if I admit Brian’s out-of-court statement for a purpose other than for its truth, which I am permitted to do without resorting to a categorical hearsay exception or the principled approach to hearsay, this would not assist the plaintiffs in any way. The only way the plaintiffs’ case against Robert could be advanced by Brian’s statement is if it is admitted for its truth – the fact that Brian fell asleep on the loveseat smoking a cigarette. The mere fact that Brian made this statement does not further the plaintiffs’ case.
[19] Therefore, it is my view that Brian’s statement is not admissible for its truth with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims against Robert.
Issues
[20] The action against Robert raises the following issues:
(a) Have the plaintiffs established, on a balance of probabilities, that the fire was caused by negligence, or was it an “accidental” fire, as defined by the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 4, s. 76:
- No action shall be brought against any person in whose house or building or on whose land any fire accidentally begins, nor shall any recompense be made by that person for any damage suffered thereby; but no agreement between a landlord and tenant is defeated or made void by this Act.
(b) Have the plaintiffs proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Brian was negligent in starting the fire?
(c) Have the plaintiffs proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Robert was negligent with respect to Brian’s setting of the fire?
(d) Have the plaintiffs proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Robert is vicariously liable for any negligence proven on the part of Brian as the common law occupier of 107 Drayton?
(a) Cause of the Fire
[21] Given Brian’s failure to testify, I am put in the unusual position of accepting his statement about starting the fire with respect to his own liability but not with respect to Robert’s. As I am now considering the plaintiffs’ claims against Robert, I can only rely on the admissible evidence at trial.
[22] The plaintiffs, in their closing submissions, rely upon the following evidence to establish that Brian caused the fire:
(i) Brian called Robert on the evening of February 15, 2003 (the fire occurred in the early morning hours of February 16, 2003) and asked if he could spend the night as he had had a fight with his girlfriend. Robert agreed. As Robert was going out to spend the evening with his brother, he left a key under the mat for Brian. Robert later confirmed in a telephone call with Brian that he had arrived at the house.
(ii) Robert testified that it was reasonable to anticipate that Brian would smoke in his house since he was a regular smoker since the age of 15.
(iii) Brian would occasionally stay overnight and sleep on the loveseat in the living room.
(iv) When Robert attended the house after the fire, he noticed a package of cigarettes that he assumed were Brian’s, with one cigarette missing from the package.
(v) Schnurr testified that while in his own home, he had determined there was a fire next door and he heard Brian cursing and the sound of furniture moving.
(vi) Rabjhon, during his attendance at the fire scene, noticed that most of the fire damage was near the front door and that the loveseat had been dragged out of the home.
(vii) George noted, in a report, that the fire was caused by the improper discarding of smoking materials into the loveseat.
[23] In addition to the events on the night in question, the plaintiffs also rely on the fact that Robert spoke to the investigating officer, Constable Tellis (“Tellis”), who has since passed away. Tellis, amongst other things, noted that Robert advised that Brian had a knack for damaging things; he was hyperactive; he overdosed on the drug Ecstasy two years prior; and he was an extremist.
[24] Additionally, Robert testified that he observed burns on Brian’s body after the fire and that Brian generally avoided him for some days or weeks after the incident.
[25] For the reasons below, I have concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the cause of the fire on a balance of probabilities. In doing so, I am bound by the admissible evidence at trial.
[26] First, I found Robert to be a credible witness. While the plaintiffs’ counsel urged me to make some credibility findings against Robert, I decline to do so. Robert was very candid in his evidence, particularly with respect to his relationship with Brian. Much of his evidence was potentially damaging to his own defence. For example, he freely admitted that he allowed Brian to smoke in his house and would have anticipated that he would have done so on the night of the incident. Clearly, Robert could have concocted a far more advantageous story, particularly in light of the fact that Brian did not testify. The issues of credibility raised by the plaintiffs’ counsel, in my view, involved insignificant matters primarily involving timelines and dates. It is not surprising that ten years after the fact, Robert’s memory was not perfect in this regard.
[27] Second, with respect to the interview with Tellis, Robert did not dispute the fact that he had a conversation and that the notes generally reflected the statements that he made. In my view, however, Robert gave plausible explanations as to why certain words were used and that, perhaps, he did not use the most accurate words to describe Brian given the fact that he was distraught with what had occurred. For example, while he did not deny using the word, “extremist”, he testified that he meant that sometimes, Brian would go to extremes during arguments. With respect to his comment that Brian had a knack for damaging things, Robert explained that this generally involved him becoming impatient when working on cars (which Brian does for a living and as a hobby). He did not mean that Brian was involved in destructive behaviour.
[28] Third, notwithstanding George’s conclusion as to the cause of the fire, George was candid in his cross-examination that the information with respect to the discarding of the cigarette into the loveseat was given to him by an unknown third party, possibly by one of the parties to the lawsuit. It is likely that Robert told George about the cause of the fire. Robert testified that on the night of the fire he had a discussion with his daughter and a friend of Brian’s, Darryl Sutherland, by telephone. One or both of them told Robert that Brian said that he caused the fire. On the night of the fire, therefore, Robert was in fact in possession of this information which he shared with others including Schnurr, Bell and Redigonda. George testified that he could not have determined the cause of the fire by his visual inspection. George was also candid in stating that the investigation, with respect to the cause of the fire, was not a thorough one, since arson was not suspected and there were no fatalities.
[29] The cause of the fire must be determined on the basis of the evidence that I have outlined above. Based on this evidence, I cannot determine, on a balance of probabilities, how the fire was caused. Ignoring Brian’s statement, which I must, I am simply left with the evidence that Brian was in the home when a fire occurred on the main floor in or around the living room area, causing extensive damage in that area and in the area of the front door, from which the loveseat was removed. That is as far as the evidence goes. I cannot find that this all resulted from Brian lighting a cigarette and falling asleep on the loveseat. There is no evidence, for example, that he remained alone in the house throughout, or that he lit a cigarette, or that the cigarette ignited the loveseat. While all of this may be possible, it has not been established on a balance of probabilities.
[30] Additionally, the investigation by the fire department was understandably cursory, given that there were no allegations of arson or any serious injuries. George was candid in disclosing that once someone told him that the fire had occurred by the discarding of a lit cigarette into the loveseat, he was satisfied that the investigation could be concluded without any further investigation.
[31] Accordingly, with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim against Robert, I find that they have not established on the balance of probabilities, that Brian caused the fire. I further find that the fire was “accidental” as defined by the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997.
[32] The plaintiffs did not pursue any claims in nuisance or on any other basis. Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed in the closing argument that no such claims were being advanced.
(b) Was Brian Negligent?
[33] Based on my findings above, I cannot conclude that Brian was negligent.
(c) Was Robert Negligent?
[34] The plaintiffs argue that Robert was independently negligent by virtue of his failure to supervise Brian’s activities in his home. If I am wrong with respect to (a) and (b) above, I need to consider this submission. The plaintiffs primarily rely on the following: Robert was told by Brian that he had had a fight with his girlfriend; Brian had a long week at work; and it was reasonable to anticipate that he would smoke at the house and may fall asleep while smoking a lit cigarette. The plaintiffs also rely on the other evidence previously noted concerning Brian’s past history.
[35] I do not find that there is any reasonable evidence suggesting that Brian posed a risk over and above any other ordinary person in or about the time of the incident. He was a 28-year-old adult who had been smoking since the age of 15 and Robert’s uncontradicted evidence at trial was that there were no previous incidents in which Brian created any fires or damaged anything as result of his smoking.
[36] Therefore, in the circumstances, I do not find that Robert was negligent in failing to supervise Brian or preventing him from smoking while he was alone in the house.
(d) Is Robert Vicariously Liable for Any Negligence Proven on the Part of Brian as the Common Law Occupier?
[37] Again, in the event that I am wrong with respect to (a) and (b) above, I will proceed to analyze Robert’s potential vicarious liability.
[38] For the reasons below, it is my view that if the fire was caused by Brian, Robert would not be vicariously liable for Brian’s actions.
[39] Although there is little law on this point, the case law touching this issue has a long history. In cases where the Fire Prevention and Protection Act does not apply, as in cases of negligence, the applicable law was set out by Brooker J. in Alberta v. Hay, 2002 ABQB 282, 313 A.R. 329, at paras. 18, 20:
The common law imposed absolute responsibility upon a person for damage done by fire which originated from his or her premises. That was modified by the Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774, to the effect that liability will not result where the fire is accidentally started.
Thus, the applicants must show, for the purposes of the present application, that the Crown has no reasonable prospect of success in proving that:
(i) Rod Hay was negligent in starting the fire or allowing it to escape;
(ii) Rod Hay was not a stranger vis-à-vis the applicants; and
(iii) The applicants were occupiers of the lands.
[Citations omitted.]
[40] In this case, the plaintiffs must therefore establish the following:
Brian was negligent in starting the fire or allowing it to escape;
Brian was not a stranger vis-à-vis Robert; and
Robert was an occupier of 107 Drayton.
[41] Robert does not dispute that he was an occupier of the land. Further, for the purposes of this analysis, I have assumed that I am wrong and Brian was negligent in starting the fire by virtue of careless smoking and/or that he negligently allowed it to escape by moving the loveseat towards the front door, thus spreading the fire.
[42] The only issue that remains to be determined, therefore, is whether Brian was a stranger vis-à-vis Robert.
[43] For the purposes of determining vicarious liability, Lord Denning in H & N Emmanuel Ltd. v. Grater London Council and another, [1971] 2 All E.R. 835, defined a stranger as follows:
Who then is a stranger? I think a ‘stranger’ is anyone who in lighting a fire or allowing it to escape acts contrary to anything which the occupier could anticipate that he would do: such as the person in Rickards v. Lothian. Even if it is a man whom you have allowed or invited into your house, nevertheless, if his conduct in lighting a fire is so alien to your invitation that he should qua the fire be regarded as a trespasser, he is a ‘stranger’. Such as the man in Scrutton LJ’s well-known illustration:
‘When you invite a person into your house to use the staircase you do not invite him to slide down the banisters…’
[Footnotes omitted.]
[44] Counsel for Robert submits that whether a person who is invited on to the occupier’s property is a guest or a stranger depends on the act of that person and whether the occupier could reasonably foresee or anticipate that person’s acts. If the act is “foreign”, or beyond the reasonable anticipation of the occupier, the guest will be deemed to be a stranger and the occupier will not be liable for the guest’s negligence.
[45] Counsel for Robert further submits that in this case, Robert could not have foreseen that Brian would negligently start a fire and relies on the following facts, which I accept were established at trial:
• Brian was a 28-year-old adult who had smoked countless times in the house in front of Robert in the years prior to this fire;
• There is no evidence that Brian was intoxicated or incapacitated on February 15, 2003;
• Robert spoke on the telephone with Brian around 8:00 p.m. on February 15, 2003 and did not note that anything was amiss – Brian sounded fine and simply wanted to ”crash” for the night as he had had a fight with his girlfriend. This is something that had happened numerous times in the past without incident;
• During the time that Brian lived at 107 Drayton and during all his subsequent visits and overnight stays, there has never been an issue of careless smoking; and
• Brian had never caused damage to 107 Drayton by virtue of his smoking.
[46] Robert relies on a number of Canadian cases that have considered the matter, interpreting them to stand for the proposition that vicarious liability will only flow where the occupier has actual knowledge of the negligent actor’s conduct, and as a result, the resulting fire was deemed to be foreseeable: Pier 1 Imports (Canada) v. Hancox, 1989 CarswellOnt 1617 (Ont. S.C.); Wager v. Molyneaux (1988), 1988 3861 (AB KB), 90 A.R. 287 (Q.B.) ; Milan v. Hulsman and Tello (1990), 1990 5873 (AB KB), 104 A.R. 228 (Q.B.); and Iversen v. Purser (1990), 1990 678 (BC SC), 73 D.L.R. (4th) 33 (B.C. S.C.).
[47] Robert puts particular emphasis on Osborne J.’s decision in Pier 1 Imports, wherein a fire started when the defendant’s independent contractor was pulling up carpet. While using a solvent to remove the carpet, he decided to smoke a cigarette, which caused the solvent to ignite and a fire ensued.
[48] In the circumstances, Osborne J. held that the occupier knew or ought to have known that the independent contractor would be trying to remove the carpet underpad but that that activity, in and of itself, was not inherently dangerous. However, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the independent contractor would use a solvent to remove the underpad and “while he was at it”, smoke. In those circumstances, the occupier was not found to be vicariously liable. In coming to this conclusion, Osborne J., referred to the H & N Emanuel case and stated, at para. 52:
I think it is important to note that in the Emanuel case the activity by the wrong-doer was foreseeable in the sense that it was known that the wrong-doer consistently did the work it was asked to do, that is the removal of what we would call wartime housing, by burning the structures. In Emanuel principal seems to me to have been guilty of independent negligence. It is also clear, however, that Lord Denning concluded that liability attached apart from that.
[49] Osborne J. also noted, at para. 52, that the test in determining vicarious liability is “[r]easonable foreseeability, not clairvoyance”.
[50] The plaintiffs argue that the act of falling asleep while smoking is not an alien act and that it was reasonably foreseeable.
[51] Although I agree that Brian’s smoking was “not alien” to Robert, in my view, the fire could not have been reasonably anticipated by Robert. Brian was not bringing a “fire” into Robert’s house that night. He was smoking, something that both he and Robert did normally while in the house. The fact that Robert may have stated to Tellis, amongst other things, that his son was troubled, drank, or had a past issue with the drug Ecstasy, is irrelevant in this case. There is no evidence that Brian was troubled, intoxicated or on drugs on or around the night in question that could have foreseeably led to a fire.
[52] Most of the cases referred to by the parties are too different to analogize to this situation such that it can be easily determined whether or not Robert is vicariously liable. In my view, the closest set of facts is set out in Wager. In Wager, the homeowner’s girlfriend normally collected the ashes from their fireplace in a paper bag and left them outside without issue. This is similar to Brian’s smoking – he regularly smoked in Robert’s house without incident. In Wager, the homeowner was well aware of his girlfriend’s practices. In the present case, Robert was similarly aware that Brian smoked in the house and often fell asleep on the loveseat. However, Wager can be differentiated from the present case because the girlfriend’s actions were inherently negligent. In my view, she should never have put ashes from the fireplace into a paper bag. This is an obvious fire hazard. Each and every time she engaged in this practice, a possible fire should have been foreseen by the homeowner. In the present case, smoking in the house is not an inherently negligent or dangerous activity. Although there is obviously a small fire risk associated with smoking, the risk is on par with cooking on a stove. It is an activity that may become dangerous when there is a lack of appropriate attention to the activity. As a result, Wager cannot be analogized to this case and it cannot be said that Robert should have foreseen that a fire would result from Brian’s smoking in the house that evening.
[53] Put another way, by holding someone other than the negligent actor who was directly responsible for the damages liable, the case law suggests that this other person is also to blame for the damages that have resulted. Similar to the negligent actor, this person could have also prevented the damages. This is why the test in Emanuel requires the occupier to have sufficient control over the negligent actor before the occupier can be held responsible. This is also why there must be some kind of reasonable foreseeability. In this case, Brian commonly stayed over at Robert’s house when he fought with his girlfriend. That week, he had been working hard at his job. Brian liked to fall asleep on the loveseat watching television. Robert was aware that Brian is a smoker and has smoked in his house previously. Brian was also a 28-year-old adult with no history of reckless smoking. Given just this information, before Robert agreed to leave Brian the key, could it be anticipated that Brian would fall asleep on the loveseat with a lit cigarette, therefore lighting the loveseat on fire? Or on an even broader level, could it be anticipated that Brian’s smoking would lead to a fire? Put this way, I find that it could not reasonably be said that Robert should have foreseen a fire resulting from Brian’s smoking.
disposition
[54] For the reasons above, judgment is granted to the plaintiffs against Brian in the amount of $127,500, plus prejudgment interest calculated pursuant to the provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, plus costs and disbursements. The plaintiffs’ action against Robert is dismissed. With respect to the issue of costs as between the plaintiffs and Robert, if the parties cannot agree, Robert is to provide written submissions to me within 21 days of these reasons. The plaintiffs shall have 14 days thereafter to respond, and Robert seven days thereafter to reply. If the parties wish, oral hearing arrangements can be made through my assistant.
T. McEwen J.
Released: April 25, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: CV-05-283654
DATE: 20130425
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
WILLIAM SCHNURR and MICHELLE BELL
Plaintiffs
– and –
ROBERT CARD and BRIAN CARD
Defendants
REASONS FOR DECISION
T. McEwen J.
Released: April 25, 2013