Shane Howard Katz

A hired dog walker sustained significant injuries when the respondents' dog attacked her while she was attempting to put booties on the animal in the respondents' home.

The appellant brought an action under the Dog Owners' Liability Act claiming the respondents, as dog owners, were strictly liable.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the appellant herself qualified as an "owner" under the Act and could not recover from fellow owners.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, applying the definition of "possesses" from Wilk v. Arbour and confirming that a person in physical possession and control of a dog just before an attack is an "owner" regardless of whether she was acting under the instructions of the registrant owners, and regardless of whether the attack occurred in another owner's home.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from a dog bite, holding that the plaintiff, a dog walker, was an “owner” under the Dog Owners’ Liability Act (DOLA) at the time of the incident.

The court found that the plaintiff was in physical possession and control of the dog immediately before the bite, and thus was jointly and severally liable under the DOLA, precluding her from recovering damages from the other owners.

The decision applies the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “owner” in Wilk v. Arbour and clarifies that dominion or independent control is not required for liability under the DOLA.

On appeal from a summary judgment decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether a motion judge properly granted judgment to the plaintiff in the absence of a cross-motion, whether hearsay evidence was improperly admitted on the summary judgment motion, and whether the defendant occupier breached its statutory duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The plaintiff was injured when he tripped over a skateboard in a shopping mall food court.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff on liability, directing a trial only on damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge acted unfairly by granting judgment not requested by the plaintiff, improperly admitted hearsay evidence on contested issues, and erred in finding liability.

The Court granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

In an occupier's liability action, the court determined costs following the dismissal of the defendant's summary judgment motion, which had granted the plaintiff judgment with damages to be assessed.

The plaintiff sought costs of $21,784.14 for counsel fees and $7,127.43 for disbursements.

The defendant argued for a lower award, limited to the summary judgment motion, and sought a set-off for the plaintiff's expert evidence that was ultimately ruled inadmissible.

The court awarded the plaintiff $18,500 for counsel fees and $7,127.43 for disbursements, finding it appropriate to award costs for the action to date to facilitate settlement.

The court rejected the defendant's set-off claim and affirmed that computer-assisted legal research is a recoverable disbursement.

The defendant, Cadillac Fairview, moved for summary judgment to dismiss an occupier's liability action brought by the plaintiff, Stephen Drummond, who was injured after tripping over a skateboard in the mall's food court.

The court dismissed Cadillac Fairview's motion and instead granted summary judgment on liability to the plaintiff, finding that Cadillac Fairview breached its statutory duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act by failing to adequately implement its own safety policies regarding skateboard use, despite having a reasonable system in place.

Damages are to be assessed at a later trial if not settled.

The plaintiffs appealed an order dismissing their motion to add the selling dealership as a defendant after the expiry of the two-year limitation period under the Highway Traffic Act.

The plaintiffs argued the discoverability principle applied because they only learned of a potential defect when they received a recall notice from the manufacturer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of due diligence in investigating the cause of the accident during the limitation period or in the months following the commencement of the action against the manufacturer.