Vanessa V. Christie

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions and provide documents refused at discovery, primarily relating to a prior 1999 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the prior records were irrelevant.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce the requested statement of claim, employment details, medical records, and medical/legal reports, finding them relevant to potential thin-skull or crumbling-skull issues.

The court also ordered the defendants to produce cell phone records and inquire about surveillance as requested by the plaintiff.

The moving party defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in an action concerning the purchase of a vacant building lot.

The defendants had attempted to file a notice of intent to defend and a statement of defence within the required timelines, but errors by a law clerk and the plaintiff's swift action to note them in default prevented the filings.

The court applied the tests for setting aside a noting in default and a default judgment, finding that the defendants had a plausible excuse, moved promptly, and presented an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted, and the noting in default, default judgment, and writ of seizure were set aside.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting in default, default judgment, and leave to issue a writ of possession arising from a defaulted second mortgage.

The defendant argued she was waiting for particulars and relying on a companion action against a third party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant had ample notice of enforcement proceedings, failed to act promptly, and presented no arguable defence on the merits.

The applicant sought to exclude his statement to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

Upon arrest, the applicant repeatedly requested to speak with a specific lawyer.

After learning the chosen lawyer was a civil litigator and unavailable until later that day, the police officer presented the applicant with the option to speak to duty counsel or another lawyer, without advising him of his right to wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice.

The court found this constituted a breach of s. 10(b), as the police improperly steered the applicant away from his chosen counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the breach was serious and impacted the applicant's protected interests, warranting the exclusion of the statement.

Following a judge-alone trial on historical sexual offence charges involving two complainants, the court first addressed the admissibility of one complainant’s police statement and preliminary hearing testimony after she refused to complete cross-examination due to acute psychological distress.

Applying the principled hearsay exception and authorities dealing with unresponsive complainants, the court admitted the prior statements to preserve trial fairness and permit assessment of credibility through prior inconsistent accounts.

On the merits, the court found both complainants’ evidence contained significant and material inconsistencies going to the heart of the allegations.

The Crown failed to prove any count beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on all six charges.

The moving parties, named as estate trustees in the deceased's will, brought a motion to remove a notice of objection filed by the responding party, the deceased's daughter.

The responding party alleged undue influence and unfitness of the trustees but provided no evidentiary basis to support her claims.

The court found that the will was validly executed and that the responding party failed to meet the minimal evidentiary threshold required to call the will's validity into question.

The motion was granted, the notice of objection was removed, and the court directed the issuance of the Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee.

The appellant, a kickboxing coach, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his 14-year-old student.

The offences occurred on an airplane flight.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's disclosure to her therapist, improperly bolstered her reliability based on a lack of motive to fabricate, and improperly used evidence of their relationship as propensity evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper bolstering of reliability, and that the trial judge properly considered the relationship evidence to assess the appellant's state of mind.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to report under a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

At trial, the Crown relied on unauthenticated copies of the original Information and SOIRA order, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in admitting the documents, as they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were not the best evidence available.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden to the appellant to prove a reasonable excuse without first determining if the Crown had proven the mens rea of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant mother brought a motion to vary a temporary week-about parenting schedule for the parties' four-year-old child.

The court found that no status quo had been established as the week-about schedule was intended to be a short-term trial.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court determined that continuing the shared week-about schedule was in the child's best interests, noting the father's flexible work schedule and the child's strong emotional ties to both parents.

The motion to change the temporary schedule was denied.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, brought an action against the trustees of her late mother's estate, seeking her share of the estate and alleging breaches of trust.

The trust was created in Quebec, the assets were located in Quebec, and the trustees resided outside of Ontario.

The defendants moved to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens.

The court granted the motion, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario, that Quebec was the more appropriate forum, and that the forum of necessity doctrine did not apply despite the plaintiff's physical and financial limitations.

The action was stayed and service outside Ontario was set aside.

The defendants were completely successful on a motion for third-party production of documents from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

They sought costs of $4,826.85 on a partial indemnity scale.

The SIU argued there should be no costs but conceded the quantum was reasonable.

The court awarded the requested costs, noting the documents were highly relevant and the SIU had opposed production based mainly on its own policies rather than the specific relevance to the litigation.

The plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against a police officer and the police services board alleging unreasonable use of force.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 30.10 for production of interview records and notes from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) regarding four civilian witnesses.

The SIU opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the documents were highly relevant to the issue of reasonable force and that it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without them, especially since two witnesses could not be located and two refused to consent to production.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the officer administering the approved screening device (ASD) did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was in proper working order, as he failed to check the calibration and accuracy check dates despite knowing their importance.

This constituted a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The applicant Society sought a temporary care and custody order to keep the 10-year-old child in care, while the respondent mother and First Nation requested the child be returned to the mother under supervision.

The child had significant behavioural challenges and trauma from past abuse, and had been placed in specialized foster homes far from her community, which prevented her from accessing necessary trauma therapy.

The court found that the mother had taken significant steps to secure housing and services, and that keeping the child in care without proper therapy was causing harm.

The court concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother, and ordered the child returned subject to a supervision order with conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80.

She brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that her right to counsel was infringed due to a staticky phone line when speaking to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the officer had ample objective and subjective grounds based on the accused's driving, physical indicia of impairment, and admissions.

The court also found no s. 10(b) violation, as the accused failed to be duly diligent in exercising her rights and indicated to police that she was satisfied with the legal advice received.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion seeking an order that police records from the Greater Sudbury Police Service and records from the Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin be declared admissible as evidence for the truth of their content in a custody and access dispute.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion on the grounds that the documents contained inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence.

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the documents qualify as business records under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act and are admissible for the truth of their content, subject to specific limitations regarding hearsay and opinion evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference of a person under 16 years of age and three counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

The offences occurred over more than two years, during which the accused engaged in repeated sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, resulting in two pregnancies.

The court imposed a sentence of 50 months imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory DNA, SOIRA, and firearms prohibition orders, and discretionary section 161 orders restricting contact with the victim and employment involving minors.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion requesting an order pursuant to sections 89 and 112 of the Courts of Justice Act that the Office of the Children's Lawyer be requested to investigate the circumstances of claims for custody and/or access to the child.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer would be helpful in determining the child's best interests given the complex factual disputes, the child's age and ability to express herself, and the child protection overtones in the case.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the victim in the neck on August 14, 2017.

The accused pleaded not guilty and raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed on the facts of the assault.

The defence called psychiatric evidence from two experts: Dr. Beth Eayrs and Dr. Maxym Choptiany.

At the initial hearing, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defence.

The hearing was reopened to allow for additional evidence.

At the reopened hearing, the court found that although the accused suffered from schizophrenia and likely experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of the offence, the evidence demonstrated that the accused had the capacity to know his actions were morally wrong and proceeded to commit the act anyway.

The court found the accused criminally responsible and convicted him of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on June 29, 2017: impaired operation, operation with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100 mL, dangerous operation, and two counts of breach of probation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial was conducted as a blended voir dire and trial.

The court heard evidence from three Crown witnesses and received expert toxicology evidence by affidavit.

The defence filed an affidavit regarding lawyer contact procedures.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation and dangerous operation, but acquitted on the over 80 charge due to uncertainty regarding the timing of the accident and concerns about bolus drinking assumptions in the expert evidence.

The breach of probation charges were to be resolved separately.