Lance Carey Talbot

In a child protection proceeding involving an Indigenous child, long-term foster parents moved to be added as parties to the disposition phase.

The court held that foster parents do not have party status as of right under s. 13 of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families because “care provider” does not include foster parents whose role arises from a state-created placement.

Applying the discretionary framework under r. 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, together with the participation rights contemplated by s. 79(3) of the CYFSA, the court found that full party status was in the child’s best interests.

The foster parents’ lifelong caregiving role, ability to advance a plan of care, and unique evidence about the child’s needs justified their addition without undermining the Federal Act’s emphasis on cultural continuity, Indigenous jurisdiction, and family and community connection.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for extended society care.

The father conceded the finding but argued that a trial was required for disposition, proposing that the child be placed in his care under a supervision order while residing with the paternal grandparents.

The court granted the finding that the child was in need of protection but concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding disposition and access.

The court ordered a mini-trial with focused oral testimony to determine whether a supervision order or extended society care was in the child's best interests.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to strike pleadings based on a respondent father's breach of a prior final order regarding child support payments and income disclosure.

The court found the father had breached the order but declined to strike his pleadings, instead ordering disclosure within 90 days and precluding relief related to child support until compliance.

Both parties sought costs, but the court found success was divided and both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court denied costs to both parties, emphasizing shared responsibility for the unnecessary motion.

This decision addresses a motion to strike pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent father's failure to comply with a prior child support order, specifically non-payment and failure to provide required income disclosure.

The court confirms the father's breach of the Final Order but declines to strike pleadings, emphasizing the importance of proportionality, the timing of the mother's motion, and the best interests of the child.

Instead, the court orders the father to provide outstanding financial documents within 90 days and precludes him from obtaining child support relief until compliance.

The decision highlights the court's discretion in sanctioning non-compliance and balancing procedural fairness with substantive justice in family law matters.

The Children's Aid Society sought leave to withdraw its child protection application concerning two children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) and the father opposed the withdrawal, arguing that live protection concerns and parental alienation issues required adjudication.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that the children's best interests required a full factual record and timely determination of outstanding issues.

The court ordered that the child protection application and the parents' Children's Law Reform Act application proceed to a combined trial, ensuring OCL involvement and preserving the option of continued society involvement.

The respondent, the biological father, brought a motion to vary interim parenting time and primary residence of his six-year-old child, seeking to have the child primarily reside with him and to eliminate the applicant's (the child's step-mother) parenting time.

The applicant opposed, asserting her significant parental role.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, finding the applicant had played a central parental role and was a stable force.

The court noted the respondent's substance abuse, violent and harassing behaviour, and his unwillingness to support the child's relationship with the applicant.

The respondent's motion was dismissed, and the existing temporary order, which provided for the child to primarily reside with the applicant and granted the respondent specific parenting time, was maintained with additional conditions.

This decision arises from a Binding Judicial Dispute Resolution (BJDR) hearing in a family law matter, resolving outstanding issues between separated spouses.

The court adjudicated disputes concerning the treatment of cell phone payments as Section 7 expenses, the inclusion of a personal debt (Fairstone) in the applicant's net family property, the allocation of post-secondary education expenses for the eldest child, the payment schedule for retroactive child support, and claims for occupation rent and contributions to the matrimonial home.

The court found cell phones to be Section 7 expenses, disallowed the Fairstone debt due to insufficient evidence, ordered retroactive child support as a lump sum from trust funds, and awarded occupation rent to the respondent while crediting the applicant for her contributions to the matrimonial home.

Final orders were made regarding child support, spousal support, equalization, and parenting arrangements.

This case concerns a temporary care and custody motion for an Indigenous child, L.L.C., who had been residing with a maternal aunt under a Customary Care Agreement (CCA).

Following the CCA's termination, the child was placed with the father.

Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services initiated a protection application seeking a protection finding and a supervision order with the father.

The court determined that the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (Federal Act) applies and has paramountcy over provincial legislation (CYFSA), altering the method of analysis for Indigenous children's placements.

Applying the Federal Act's national standards, the court found it was in the child's best interests to be placed with the father, without the need for society supervision, as there were no protection concerns.

The court also ordered continued contact with the maternal aunt and suggested the matter be transitioned to a Children's Law Reform Act application.

In a child protection proceeding, foster parents T.O. and M.L. brought a motion for party status concerning the child A.L., who had been in their care since early 2020.

The biological parents, A.H. and D.L., opposed the motion, arguing that the foster parents' input could be obtained through the Children's Aid Society, which took no position.

The court applied a five-factor test to determine if party status should be granted, considering the foster parents' ability to present a plan in the child's best interest, their legal interest (long-term adoption objective), the necessity of their direct evidence given the child's young age and lack of OCL involvement, potential for delay, and the child's best interests.

The motion for party status was granted, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, real-time evidence from primary caregivers.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to vary a temporary without prejudice consent agreement signed by the parties in July 2019.

The father sought to vary provisions regarding access supervision, the presence of the paternal grandmother during access, and child support amounts.

The court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the consent agreement had never been incorporated into a formal court order and therefore could not be varied.

The court recommended that the parties bring motions for interim orders within the existing application rather than attempting to vary the unenforced consent.

A motion to remove counsel for a foster parent in a child protection application.

The respondent child and family services agency sought to disqualify the applicant's lawyer, who had previously represented the agency in related proceedings involving the same child.

The court applied the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin to determine whether a conflict of interest existed.

The court found that the lawyer had access to confidential information as counsel of record for the agency in prior proceedings, including the Customary Care Agreement and the termination of the Crown Wardship Order.

The court held that the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would not be satisfied that no misuse of confidential information would occur.

The lawyer was removed from the record.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion seeking an order that police records from the Greater Sudbury Police Service and records from the Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin be declared admissible as evidence for the truth of their content in a custody and access dispute.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion on the grounds that the documents contained inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence.

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the documents qualify as business records under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act and are admissible for the truth of their content, subject to specific limitations regarding hearsay and opinion evidence.

The applicants (maternal grandparents) brought a motion requesting an order pursuant to sections 89 and 112 of the Courts of Justice Act that the Office of the Children's Lawyer be requested to investigate the circumstances of claims for custody and/or access to the child.

The respondents (biological parents) opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer would be helpful in determining the child's best interests given the complex factual disputes, the child's age and ability to express herself, and the child protection overtones in the case.

The applicant brought a motion to list two jointly owned properties for sale.

The respondent opposed, seeking a right of first refusal or a hold-back from proceeds.

The parties settled the substantive issues by consent order, which included a $60,000 hold-back but no right of first refusal.

The court was asked to determine costs based on written submissions.

The court found that success was divided, as neither party's offers were clearly more favorable than the consent order, and the evidence was insufficient to determine fault in pre-motion negotiations.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party.

This is a costs endorsement arising from an unsuccessful motion by Mr. Regisford to terminate spousal support.

Ms. Regisford opposed the motion, arguing it was premature, which the court agreed with, dismissing the motion.

Ms. Regisford, as the successful party, sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court assessed costs considering the reasonableness of Mr. Regisford's conduct, the complexity of the issues, counsel's hourly rates, and time reasonably spent.

While Ms. Regisford's offer to settle was met, the court found Mr. Regisford's conduct, though not fully compliant with disclosure rules, did not amount to bad faith.

The court awarded Ms. Regisford costs on a substantial indemnity scale for the hearing and partial indemnity for preparation, totaling $5,791.25 inclusive of HST and disbursements, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for two young children apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents sought return of the children with consent to a six-month supervision order.

Following a two-phase trial spanning nearly two years, the court ordered Crown wardship based on the parents' significant mental health diagnoses (father with schizophrenia, mother with a significant personality disorder), the mother's inability to regulate anger and control abusive behavior toward the children and father, the father's lack of engagement and failure to recognize safety issues, and the parents' inability to work therapeutically with child protection services.

The court found that return would be traumatizing to the children.

Access to the biological parents was denied, but access between the two sisters was granted.

On a family law appeal from a motion to change, the court considered retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses for children who were adults by the time the responding claim was advanced.

The court held that jurisdiction existed to determine retroactive support despite the children no longer being dependants, but found the motion judge erred in finding blameworthy conduct and in selecting an unsupported retroactive start date.

Applying the retroactive support framework, the court fixed June 6, 2014 as the earliest permissible notice date and limited recovery accordingly.

Most claimed s. 7 expenses were disallowed, with only the appellant’s proportionate share of one child’s 2014 and 2015 tuition remaining payable.

The reasonable apprehension of bias ground failed, and appeal costs were awarded to the appellant.

A motion concerning the temporary care of three children under the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent parents sought the return of two children (Charles and Thomas) from Society care, while the Society sought Crown wardship for those children and Society wardship for a third child (Charlotte) born prematurely during the proceedings.

The court applied the test under section 51(2) and (3) of the Act, finding that immediate risks to Charles and Thomas could be managed through intensive Society supervision and imposed conditions.

Charlotte remained in temporary Society care due to her fragility and the parents' inability to manage three young children simultaneously.

A child protection case involving two young children apprehended at birth due to parental neglect, domestic violence, and unsafe living conditions.

The Children's Aid Society sought a Crown wardship order.

The parents opposed this, with the mother seeking return of the children under supervision and the father proposing placement with his mother and sister.

Following a mini-trial to address genuine issues regarding parenting capacity, the court granted Crown wardship without access to the biological parents, finding that the children's best interests were served by permanent placement for adoption with their foster parents.

This is a child protection case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two young children apprehended at birth due to deplorable living conditions, lack of prenatal care, domestic violence, and parental capacity concerns.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for adoption purposes.

The parents sought return of the children to the mother's care, with the father seeking alternative return to his care.

The court found that a parenting capacity assessment report constituted a genuine issue requiring trial determination and ordered a "mini-trial" under Rule 16(6.2) of the Family Law Rules to hear evidence from the psychologist and the parents before deciding whether a full trial was necessary.