Robin Vogl

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her three children Crown Wards with continued access.

The mother argued the motions judge failed to consider her cultural background and that the parenting capacity assessment was culturally insensitive.

The Superior Court found the mother failed to present evidence to counter the Society's overwhelming case, which included her guilty plea to assaulting the children and her inability to meet their significant special needs.

The children, who had been in the same foster home for over two years, expressed a clear wish to remain there.

The court also rejected the mother's fresh evidence, finding it insufficient to alter the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed.

The father appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order requiring him to remove internet postings that identified, directly or indirectly, his children as participants in a child protection proceeding, contrary to statutory publication restrictions.

He argued the judge erred in finding the postings identified the children, alleged procedural unfairness, claimed inability to remove the material, and alleged bias and factual errors.

The court held that the videoblogs, including tags and contextual references to family court and a children’s aid society, indirectly identified the children and their connection to protection proceedings.

The judge properly applied the statutory prohibition on publishing identifying information and committed no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed.

A child protection case involving an amended protection application by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking a finding that a child born in 2010 is in need of protection due to parental alcohol and drug abuse.

The parents contested the application and sought placement of the child with them subject to society supervision.

The court found the child in need of protection under subsections 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act based on evidence of chronic alcohol abuse by both parents, their lack of insight into the severity of their substance use, and the resulting risks of physical and emotional harm to the child.

The court made the child a crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption, finding that despite positive aspects of the parents' plan and their love for the child, the unaddressed alcohol abuse and inadequate safety plan posed unacceptable risks to the child's welfare and permanency needs.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of child statements made to police officers in a child protection proceeding.

The respondent mother sought to exclude statements made by two children (ages 14 and 12) to police, arguing that the necessity test should be applied to state of mind exceptions and that many statements did not qualify under that exception.

The court ruled that while the principled exception of necessity and reliability applies to categorical hearsay exceptions, this was not a rare case warranting application of the necessity requirement to state of mind statements.

The court admitted certain statements that clearly reflected the children's emotional and mental state at the time they were made, while excluding statements that were too intertwined with causation or allegations of parental conduct.

The court also excluded a police interview transcript sought to be admitted for the truth of its contents, finding it insufficiently reliable without cross-examination given the high stakes of the proceeding.

A child protection agency sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence regarding the impact of parental substance abuse on child parenting capacity.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The respondent parents opposed the evidence on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, procedural non-compliance, and prejudicial effect.

The court excluded the evidence, finding it lacked relevance and necessity, the expert was not properly qualified in the specific area of substance abuse and parenting, and the probative value was substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, particularly given inadequate notice and the risk of case delay contrary to the child's best interests.