Andrew M. Mae

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring a non-seasonally limited easement over their property in favour of the respondents' landlocked cottages and enjoining them from interfering with access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deeds unambiguously granted unrestricted rights of way.

The court also rejected arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a civil context, the relocation of the easement, the test for a permanent injunction, the restriction to a single gate, and the absence of a respondent's factum at the application stage.

The judgment was varied on consent to remove the word 'prescriptive' as the easement was deeded.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking to vary a previous order, permit cloning of a defendant's laptop hard drive, compel password disclosure, freeze and disclose defendant's assets at Sun Life, and reserve costs.

This was the third time the issue of preserving laptop data was before the court.

The court denied the request to clone the laptop, finding no sufficient evidence of relevance beyond speculation and that the balance of convenience weighed against preservation.

The court ordered the immediate return of the laptop to the defendant.

The Mareva Injunction was extended to include Sun Life assets for clarity, but specifically excluded a newly opened TD Canada Trust account.

Costs were reserved.

The plaintiff sought an urgent ex parte Mareva injunction and other ancillary injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendant Tami Kone, a former bookkeeper, had fraudulently issued cheques to herself totaling over $312,000 from the company's account.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding that the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, along with a genuine risk of asset dissipation.

However, the court denied the requested ancillary orders for registering PMSI liens and retaining/imaging a personal laptop, citing lack of authority and privacy concerns.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment on three grounds: the trial judge's credibility assessments, alleged collusion by one respondent with witnesses, and prejudice from a five-month trial adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's credibility findings were adequately explained within the context of the entire judgment and were warranted on the evidence.

The court found no evidentiary support for the collusion allegation, noting that the witnesses' trial testimony was inconsistent with the "will-say" statements allegedly prepared by the respondent, making collusion implausible.

The court rejected the adjournment argument, holding that absent demonstrated actual prejudice or a request for an earlier date at trial, a five-month adjournment does not presumptively require a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a decision establishing the boundary line between their property and the respondent's property.

The application judge determined that a fence line, rather than a surveyor's measured line, constituted the proper boundary based on surveying principles and historical evidence.

The appellants raised four grounds of appeal, contending the application judge misinterpreted surveyor field notes, failed to properly consider a surveyor's plan, failed to apply proper legal principles, and based the boundary location on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors and upheld the lower court decision.

The defendants sought costs following a 20-day trial where the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendants succeeded on their counterclaim.

The court awarded the first group of defendants costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the plaintiffs' reprehensible conduct, which amounted to elder abuse.

The second group of defendants was awarded partial indemnity costs, as the claims against them were not found to be vexatious.

Total costs of over $325,000 were awarded against the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, a couple who sponsored the immigration of the wife's elderly parents (the Nikityuks) from Russia, sued the parents and the YMCA (and an employee) for inducing breach of contract, negligence, conspiracy, and defamation after the parents moved out of their shared home into social housing.

The Nikityuks counterclaimed for fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, seeking damages for lost capital and a constructive trust on the home.

The court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims, finding no malice or unlawful conduct by the YMCA defendants.

The court granted the Nikityuks' counterclaim, finding that the plaintiffs had financially abused the Nikityuks, breached their contract and fiduciary duties, and committed civil fraud by misrepresenting investment returns on the Nikityuks' capital, which was subsequently lost in the stock market.

The Nikityuks were awarded damages for their lost capital, interest, a constructive trust on the Innisfil property, and punitive damages.

The applicant, Steve Smith, sought specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to purchase a unique lakefront property from the respondents, Terry Richard Vankoughnet and Jeremy Rasmussen.

Concurrently, the respondents moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) that Smith had obtained against the property.

The court found no binding oral or written agreement, no sufficient acts of part performance to overcome the Statute of Frauds, and that the property was not unique such that damages would be an inadequate remedy.

The court also noted issues with Smith's identity as the "true applicant" acting for a non-existent corporation.

Consequently, the motion to discharge the CPL was granted, and Smith's application for specific performance was dismissed.

This decision addresses costs following a successful cross-application by the respondent, Gordon Robert Anderson, in a land dispute.

The respondent filed costs submissions, while the applicants, Karen Jean Weaver and William Bryce Weaver, did not.

The court applied Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to partial indemnity costs to the date of an offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter if they obtain a judgment as favourable as their offer.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01(1), including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the value of an expert report, the court awarded the respondent $48,654.30 in fees plus applicable taxes, and $17,706.80 in disbursements, to be paid by the applicants within 90 days.

This case involved a boundary dispute between adjacent property owners on Shawanaga Lake, concerning a piece of land known as "the Point." The applicants sought a declaration of ownership based on a surveyed "White line" while the cross-applicant (respondent) argued the boundary should follow an older fence line, seeking a declaration of ownership or adverse possession.

The court found that the original surveyor erred by not accepting the fence line as the boundary, contrary to established surveying principles and common law.

While acknowledging the historical error, the court ultimately declared the boundary to be the westerly limit of Part 1, Plan 42R-12887, which was consistent with the cross-applicant's long-standing occupation and made the disputed Part 1 his property.

The Land Registry was ordered to amend its records accordingly, and a caution registered by the cross-applicant was vacated.

The applicants achieved substantial success in an application and cross-application regarding an easement and right-of-way dispute, which was largely settled on the eve of the hearing.

The court considered the costs of the applications.

Applying Rule 57 and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the applicants costs fixed at $48,105.58 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted the applicants' generous settlement offers and the respondents' lack of cooperation and diligence throughout the litigation.

This case involved an application and cross-application concerning easement and right-of-way issues over a property.

The applicants sought orders to rectify title deeds to confirm their right to park on and have unrestricted access to a right-of-way.

The cross-applicant sought to limit the right-of-way's terminus and deny parking rights.

The court found that the applicants had an unrestricted means of access and egress from and to the right-of-way at any point along its northerly boundary, based on the original grant and the mutual intention of the parties who created it.

The court also confirmed the applicants' right to park four vehicles on the right-of-way.

The respondent William Alfred King was noted in default.

The applicant and respondent, who are stepfather and stepson, disputed the ownership of a residential property.

The property was initially purchased in the respondent's name but subsequently transferred into joint tenancy with the applicant and his wife (the respondent's mother), and later to the applicant and his wife alone, for nominal consideration.

The respondent claimed the property was held in trust for him, while the applicant sought partition and sale.

The court found that the applicant had provided valuable consideration for the transfers, rebutting any presumption of a resulting trust.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the property and awarded occupation rent to the applicant.

The applicant filed 13 applications alleging discrimination in the provision of goods and services, primarily on the basis of disability and creed.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine whether the applications should be dismissed and whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant.

The Tribunal dismissed all 13 applications, finding that the applicant lacked standing to bring public interest complaints, failed to establish any personal disadvantage or adverse treatment, and attempted to relitigate previously decided issues.

The Tribunal declared the applicant a vexatious litigant, noting his history of filing numerous unmeritorious applications, and ordered that he must obtain leave before filing any future applications.

The applicant requested that his four outstanding applications before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario be placed in abeyance due to illness.

Although the applicant failed to fully comply with a previous direction to provide an estimate of his recovery time, three of the four respondents agreed to a three-month deferral.

Given the medical documentation provided and the lack of claimed prejudice by the respondents, the Tribunal granted a three-month deferral and set out conditions for re-activating or further extending the deferral.

An insolvent developer applied for interpretation of a subdivision agreement and standby letter of credit securing municipal works in a development project.

The developer argued that the municipality could use proceeds from the letter of credit to pay unsecured trade creditors who had supplied goods and services before the developer’s insolvency.

The court held that the agreement limited the municipality’s entitlement to prospective costs associated with completion or rectification of municipal works and did not authorize retroactive payment to unsecured creditors.

The court rejected reliance on the autonomy doctrine governing letters of credit, noting that permitting such retroactive payments would be fraudulent where the bank had not secured those obligations.

The application for the requested interpretation was dismissed.

The applicant filed human rights applications alleging that the respondent municipality discriminated against him on the basis of disability due to the condition of certain sidewalks.

The respondent requested a summary hearing.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's medical evidence did not establish restrictions preventing him from navigating the sidewalks as described.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to engage in the collaborative accommodation process by notifying the municipality of his disability-related needs.

The Tribunal concluded the applications had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed them.

The applicant filed two applications alleging discrimination with respect to goods, services, and facilities because of disability, relating to the condition of public walkways.

The respondent requested that the applications be heard together, that a summary hearing be held, and that the scheduled in-person hearing be adjourned.

The Tribunal granted the requests, consolidating the applications and converting the scheduled in-person hearing into a teleconference summary hearing to determine if the applications have a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant alleged discrimination in services on the basis of ethnic origin, ancestry, and place of origin.

He claimed that during a telephone conversation regarding a property standards order and a denied grant application, the respondent's Director of Planning called him a Nazi and told him to return to Germany after he threatened to paint a swastika on his house.

He also alleged that the respondent's mayor and councillors failed to investigate his subsequent complaints about the comment.

The Tribunal conducted a detailed credibility assessment of the conflicting witness testimonies and concluded that the applicant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the discriminatory comment was made.

The Tribunal also found that the applicant did not communicate a complaint of discrimination to the mayor or councillors that would trigger a duty to investigate.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a former employee of a Tim Hortons franchise, alleged discrimination on the basis of age, colour, race, and ethnic origin regarding her termination and treatment during employment.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was terminated for providing food without payment, and there was no evidence linking the termination to a prohibited ground.

The Tribunal also dismissed the allegations of discriminatory treatment, noting that age-related comments were part of tolerated workplace banter in which the applicant participated, and she failed to formally complain under the employer's harassment policy.

The application was dismissed.