Amanda Marie Chapman

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on two independent grounds: first, that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim arose from the interpretation and application of a collective agreement; and second, that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the limitation period issue alone, finding that although the appellant's claim was discoverable in late April or mid-May 2020, limitation periods were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic until September 14, 2020.

The two-year limitation period therefore commenced on September 14, 2020, and expired on September 14, 2022.

The appellant commenced her claim on October 27, 2022, which was outside the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order awarding sole custody of the parties' twelve-year-old son to the respondent, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge failed to give proper weight to the son's expressed preferences; (2) that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not specifically refer to the factors in section 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act; and (3) that the trial judge misunderstood or misapplied the law relating to joint custody in parallel parenting mode.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no substantiation for any of the appellant's contentions and affirming the trial judge's fact-based decision.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment on three grounds: the trial judge's credibility assessments, alleged collusion by one respondent with witnesses, and prejudice from a five-month trial adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's credibility findings were adequately explained within the context of the entire judgment and were warranted on the evidence.

The court found no evidentiary support for the collusion allegation, noting that the witnesses' trial testimony was inconsistent with the "will-say" statements allegedly prepared by the respondent, making collusion implausible.

The court rejected the adjournment argument, holding that absent demonstrated actual prejudice or a request for an earlier date at trial, a five-month adjournment does not presumptively require a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant's employment was terminated in October 2012.

In December 2012, the appellant entered into a settlement agreement and release with the respondent.

In October 2014, the appellant commenced an action for wrongful dismissal, defamation, and conversion of his book of business.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss under Rule 21.01(3)(d) based on the settlement agreement and release.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of good faith, no fraudulent misrepresentation, and that the settlement agreement was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge improperly treated the Rule 21.01(3)(d) motion as a summary judgment motion and made findings of fact that were inappropriate at that stage.

The plaintiffs, a couple who sponsored the immigration of the wife's elderly parents (the Nikityuks) from Russia, sued the parents and the YMCA (and an employee) for inducing breach of contract, negligence, conspiracy, and defamation after the parents moved out of their shared home into social housing.

The Nikityuks counterclaimed for fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, seeking damages for lost capital and a constructive trust on the home.

The court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims, finding no malice or unlawful conduct by the YMCA defendants.

The court granted the Nikityuks' counterclaim, finding that the plaintiffs had financially abused the Nikityuks, breached their contract and fiduciary duties, and committed civil fraud by misrepresenting investment returns on the Nikityuks' capital, which was subsequently lost in the stock market.

The Nikityuks were awarded damages for their lost capital, interest, a constructive trust on the Innisfil property, and punitive damages.

Robert Connor, an investment advisor, was terminated by Scotia Capital Inc. for breaching internal policies and IIROC rules.

He subsequently signed a settlement agreement and release.

Connor later initiated a civil action against Scotia for wrongful dismissal, defamation, and conversion of his book of business.

Scotia brought a motion to dismiss the action, asserting the enforceability of the settlement agreement and release.

The court analyzed Connor's claims that Scotia breached a duty of good faith, made fraudulent misrepresentations, that the agreement was unconscionable, and that it was unenforceable due to his mental state and lack of legal advice.

The court found no merit in Connor's allegations, concluding that the settlement agreement and release were valid and enforceable.

Consequently, Scotia's motion was granted, and Connor's action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Ronald Dawson, brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion in his wrongful dismissal action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, including evidentiary conflicts and credibility issues.

The defendant, Colt Food Services Limited, sought substantial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court, exercising its discretion, reserved the costs of the summary judgment motion to the trial judge.

This decision was based on the finding that the work done for the motion would facilitate the trial process, and a significant costs award against the plaintiff, who faced financial hardship, would impede his access to justice.

The plaintiff, Sky High Roofing & Sheet Metal Inc., brought a motion for an interim order under Rule 44 for the return of three pieces of equipment from the defendant, Scott Bennett.

The equipment was initially delivered to the defendant for storage, and while discussions about a potential purchase occurred, no written agreement was finalized.

The court found a triable issue regarding whether a purchase agreement was ever reached and that the plaintiff failed to establish unlawful detention by the defendant, a prerequisite for relief under Rule 44.01.

The motion was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a personal guarantee executed by a shareholder of a corporate borrower for an operating line of credit.

The defendant guarantor argued that the claim should be dismissed for delay and that his liability ended after he sold his shares, the borrower declared bankruptcy, and a co‑shareholder agreed to indemnify him.

The court held that the wording of the continuing guarantee preserved liability despite changes in ownership, bankruptcy of the borrower, or insolvency of an indemnifier.

The court also found that the action’s delay did not justify dismissal because the case was document‑driven and no actual prejudice was established.

Summary judgment was granted to the bank for the guaranteed amount.