Kumail Karimjee

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding the respondent 24 months' notice and bonus entitlements for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the employment contract, resignation, and release in the context of a commercial share sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable errors of law in the motion judge's contractual interpretation, upholding the finding that the release of ESA rights was void, and affirming the 24-month notice period and bonus entitlement.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal, the plaintiff sought $60,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The defendant argued the amount was excessive and proposed $39,519.26.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the plaintiff's success and the moderate complexity of the matter.

Finding the plaintiff's counsel's hourly rate and hours spent to be somewhat high, the court fixed costs at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff, founder and former president of the defendant company, was terminated without cause three years after selling his shares to a purchaser.

The defendant relied on a termination provision and release signed at the time of the sale to limit his notice.

The court found the termination provision and release void for violating the Employment Standards Act by excluding his pre-sale years of service.

The court awarded the plaintiff 24 months of common law reasonable notice, including base salary, benefits, and lost bonus potential, but dismissed his claim for moral damages.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing his action for wrongful dismissal and vacation pay.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a courier, was an independent contractor and had abandoned his position after leaving work midday following complaints from a client and failing to return for 11 days.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error in determining the appellant abandoned his work and was an independent contractor.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory costs order that reserved the costs of their successful injunction motion to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs argued there were conflicting decisions and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in ordering costs in the cause, consistent with the normal practice for interlocutory injunctions, and that differing outcomes in other cases reflected discretionary fact-specific determinations rather than conflicting legal principles.

The applicant, a former resident of a cooperative housing complex, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in housing based on race, marital status, and age by the property management group and its representative.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed most of the allegations, finding no evidence linking the alleged unfair treatment (such as ignored maintenance requests and notices of arrears) to a protected Code ground.

However, the Tribunal allowed two specific allegations regarding discriminatory comments allegedly made by the individual respondent to proceed to a full hearing.

The respondent requested an adjournment of the scheduled hearing dates because carriage of the matter was transferred to new counsel who had a scheduling conflict.

The applicant opposed the request.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment, finding that the respondent had been aware of the hearing dates for several months and that retaining or assigning new counsel late in the process did not constitute exceptional circumstances justifying an adjournment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in his wrongful dismissal and human rights claim against his former employer.

The plaintiff alleged he was terminated without cause, while the employer maintained he resigned or abandoned his position.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial due to significant conflicts in the evidence regarding the circumstances of the plaintiff's departure, his medical condition, and mitigation efforts.

The court declined to use its discretionary fact-finding powers, concluding that a fair and just determination required a full trial.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to housing by her housing cooperative and its representatives.

A summary hearing was scheduled to determine if the application should be dismissed because its subject matter had been dealt with in Superior Court proceedings or had no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the teleconference summary hearing despite receiving notice.

The Tribunal dismissed the application due to the applicant's failure to appear and prosecute her case, noting the significant resources already expended by the respondents and the Tribunal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment, including unwanted sexual advances by her manager.

The manager was criminally charged in relation to the same events.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the resolution of the criminal proceedings.

Both the applicant and the corporate respondent agreed to the deferral.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred to avoid concurrent proceedings and the risk of inconsistent findings of fact.

The defendant employer brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff’s human rights claim from an amended statement of claim arising from his termination following public statements about the Syrian conflict.

The defendant argued the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the alleged dismissal was based on political opinion, which is not a protected ground under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The court held that, accepting the pleaded facts as true, it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff’s views could not constitute a creed linked to protected grounds such as religion or place of origin.

Accordingly, the human rights claim was allowed to proceed.

However, certain paragraphs of the pleading were struck under Rule 25.11 as irrelevant and prejudicial to a fair trial.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action following the closure of the defendant’s manufacturing operations.

The court considered the appropriate reasonable notice period, whether overtime should be included in calculating damages, the compensability of lost employment benefits, and whether mitigation income earned during the statutory notice period under the Employment Standards Act should reduce common law damages.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court determined that a 20‑month notice period was appropriate.

The court held that overtime formed an integral component of the employee’s compensation and must be included in damages, and that the employee was entitled to compensation for lost benefits.

Mitigation income earned during the statutory ESA notice period was not deductible from damages beyond ESA minimum entitlements.

The applicant, an Iranian immigrant whose first language is Farsi, alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, and sex.

She claimed her employer undervalued her work, failed to support her, and unfairly terminated her employment after she allegedly failed to report a client's disclosure of past child abuse.

The Tribunal found that the employer breached section 5 of the Human Rights Code by forcing the applicant to deal with a difficult co-worker without support despite known language barriers, and by hastily terminating her employment based on an ambiguous reporting policy while treating a non-immigrant employee more leniently for similar safety breaches.

The Tribunal awarded $12,012 for lost wages and $10,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellant housing co-operative appealed a judgment that declared the respondent's membership and occupancy rights terminated but stayed the enforcement of the eviction and arrears on certain conditions.

The respondent, who is disabled, had fallen into arrears after his income decreased and the co-operative froze subsidies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing judge erred in principle by effectively granting an indefinite and retroactive subsidy to the respondent, which was an unwarranted interference with the co-operative's democratic decision-making process and imposed an unfair financial burden on the other members.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation and awarding damages to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and damages in favour of one respondent, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the law of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and malice.

The Court also upheld the liability and damages against one appellant in favour of the second respondent regarding untrue statements made to a reporter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the appellant's wife, finding she was not jointly liable for her husband's defamatory statements as she did not participate in making them to the reporter.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed a costs order of $131,000 awarded to the respondents following a successful motion to stay the action.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by relying too heavily on the hours spent and the costs grid, resulting in an award that was not fair and reasonable and exceeded the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Court reduced the costs award to $67,500, emphasizing that the time claimed for preparation was excessive for a motion that was not complex.

The appellant appealed an order staying his Ontario contract action against the respondents on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and Florida was the most convenient forum.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by relying on a privileged letter, finding the agreement contained a Florida arbitration provision, and failing to consider the risk of a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the Muscutt test, the letter was not privileged, and the factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that ordered them to pay $4,222 net to the respondents following a dispute over the construction of a custom home.

The appellants sought over $88,000 on appeal.

The respondents argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the trial judgment was for less than $25,000.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that under the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the judgment ordered, not the amount claimed on appeal.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.