David Shafin Alli

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on two independent grounds: first, that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim arose from the interpretation and application of a collective agreement; and second, that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the limitation period issue alone, finding that although the appellant's claim was discoverable in late April or mid-May 2020, limitation periods were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic until September 14, 2020.

The two-year limitation period therefore commenced on September 14, 2020, and expired on September 14, 2022.

The appellant commenced her claim on October 27, 2022, which was outside the limitation period.

The defendants brought a motion to compel answers to five questions refused by the plaintiff during an examination for discovery in a wrongful dismissal and breach of contract action.

The refused questions related to the income tax returns of the plaintiff's wife, the financial statements of a family trust, and details regarding the plaintiff's pension from a previous employer.

The court upheld all five refusals, finding the requested information either irrelevant to the pleadings or too far removed to warrant disclosure.

The defendants were ordered to pay costs of $6,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision dismissing her duty of fair representation complaint against her union due to unreasonable delay.

The applicant had delayed filing her complaint for 11.5 months after learning the union would not pursue her grievance to arbitration.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision to dismiss the complaint summarily was reasonable, as the delay was excessive, inadequately explained, and prejudicial to the union.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant, Duca Financial Services Credit Union Ltd., appealed a Master's order declining to recuse himself from hearing a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of an action.

Duca Financial alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the Master's case management actions and comments during the recusal motion.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias was established, and affirmed the Master's decision to continue hearing the motion.

The appellant moved to transfer a residential tenancy appeal from Brampton to Toronto and to expedite the hearing due to the appellant's terminal illness.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing inconvenience and unfairness.

The court granted the motion, finding that the uncontradicted evidence of the appellant's terminal cancer made the transfer and expedition desirable in the interests of justice, and that the respondents failed to demonstrate any resulting unfairness or inconvenience.

The applicant filed multiple human rights applications against various respondents, alleging discrimination on the basis of ancestry, place of origin, and ethnic origin in the provision of goods and services.

The applicant claimed he received poor service because he is East European, Russian, and not of noble birth.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the applications had a reasonable prospect of success and whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant.

The Tribunal dismissed the applications, finding no evidence connecting the respondents' alleged conduct to any prohibited grounds under the Human Rights Code.

Furthermore, the Tribunal declared the applicant a vexatious litigant due to his persistent filing of meritless applications and ordered that he must obtain leave before filing any future applications.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a Registrar’s order dismissing their wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The delay arose after the employee-plaintiff died of cancer and his widow temporarily lacked financial means to continue the litigation, while the plaintiffs’ former lawyer failed to notify the estate trustee of the Status Notice issued by the Registrar.

The court held that the plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendant demonstrated no non-compensable prejudice.

The judge emphasized that the action had not been plagued by delay and that the absence of notice of the Status Notice weighed strongly in favour of relief.

The Registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside and the action reinstated.

During a motion hearing, the judge raised the potential applicability of Rule 57.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding possible costs consequences for counsel based on issues identified in the motion materials.

The defendant moved for the judge’s recusal, arguing that raising the rule created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that merely identifying concerns arising from the written record and inviting submissions does not demonstrate bias or predisposition.

Judges are entitled to form preliminary impressions from motion materials and to alert counsel to potential issues so that they may address them fully.

The recusal motion was therefore dismissed.