HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Henry Freitag

Applicant

-and-

HGR Graham Partners LLP, The Corporation of the Town of Penetanguishene, The Corporation of the Town of Midland, Flynn's Traditional Irish Pub Inc., The German Canadian Club, Midland Service Ontario Centre, The Corporation of the Town of Wasaga Beach and The Corporation of the Township of Tiny

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: September 23, 2015

File Numbers: 2013-15035-I; 2014-16434-I; 2014-16441-I; 2014-18350-I;

2014-19482-I; 2014-19629-I; 2014-19662-I; 2014-18671-I;

2014-19208-I; 2014-19044-I; 2014-19045-I; 2014-19208-I;

2015-20373-I; 2013-15292-S

Citation: 2015 HRTO 1275

Indexed as: Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town) et. al.

APPEARANCES

Henry Freitag, Applicant

Self-represented

The Corporation of the Town of Penetanguishene, Respondent

Stacey Cooper, Representative

The Corporation of the Town of Midland, Respondent

Andrew Mae, Counsel

The Corporation of the Town of Wasaga Beach, Respondent

George Vadeboncouer, Counsel

The Corporation of the Township of Tiny, Respondent

Shawn Persaud, Representative

HGR Graham Partners LLP, Respondent

Andrew Mae, Counsel

The German Canadian Club, Respondent

Joehen Schmidt, Representative

Flynn's Traditional Irish Pub Inc., Respondent

No one appearing

Midland Service Ontario Centre, Respondent

Andrew Mae, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

1The applicant has filed thirteen Applications under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination in the provision of goods and services, primarily on the basis of disability and in two cases on the basis of creed. In one of the Applications the applicant could identify no ground.

2In a Case Assessment Direction ("CAD") issued on March 18, 2015, the Tribunal directed that all of these cases be scheduled at the same time at a preliminary hearing to consider whether or not these Applications should be dismissed because some or all of them have no reasonable prospect of success, or because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with them, or because some or all of them are an abuse of process. The Tribunal also directed that the parties make submissions about whether or not the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant.

3This preliminary hearing was ordered, in part, pursuant to Rule 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, which read as follows:

19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.

19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.

4In a CAD issued to the parties on May 13, 2015 a further Application was filed by the applicant alleging a breach of settlement. In the May 13, 2015 CAD I directed that this further Application be considered along with the others identified previously. In addition to the issues to be addressed as set out in a CAD issued to the parties in this case on September 18, 2014 the Tribujnal would also consider this Application as part of its determination of the vexatious litigant issue.

The Issues

5A central concern that arose with respect to many of the Applications alleging disability discrimination is the absence of facts which would establish that the applicant has experienced discrimination himself. This same issue was canvassed in the Tribunal's Decision 2013 HRTO 554, which considered 17 separate Applications filed by the applicant. The Tribunal discussed the issue as regards 13 of those 17 Applications at paras. 8 and 9:

In the particular case before me, I advised the parties that it seemed to me that several issues arise upon which I was inviting submissions from the parties regarding whether the applicants have a reasonable prospect of success in proving their allegations. The first issue I identified is whether the applicants have established that they have a disability within the meaning of the Code and restrictions or limitations arising from that disability that result in discrimination against them personally as a result of the various allegations raised in the 13 Applications before me. In particular, I noted that an issue arises as to whether the applicants have established that they have experienced a real burden or disadvantage because of their particular disability and limitations arising from the various situations about which they have complained.

This Tribunal does not have general jurisdiction to enforce the Building Code, or regulations under other legislation, or non-legislative accessibility standards, although these things may be referenced in evidence in a Tribunal proceeding. This Tribunal's only jurisdiction in this proceeding is under s. 1 of the Human Rights Code, and to determine whether either applicant personally has experienced discrimination because of disability in respect of services for which the Town is responsible. In a proceeding under the Code initiated by an individual, the evidence needs to establish an infringement of that specific individual's rights under the Human Rights Code because of a prohibited ground of discrimination, as opposed to an infringement of the rights of other persons. So the issue is not whether some other person with a particular kind of disability would face barriers or discrimination because of the situations raised in the Applications before me. Rather, the sole issue before me is whether the individual applicants experienced discrimination because of any particular disability they may have.

6In partial response to this same issue, as raised in the present proceeding, the applicant filed what appears to be a note from his physician. The note, which is brief and handwritten, lists a number of medical issues which need not be repeated here. The note concludes that the applicant is "disabled for medical reasons". Significantly, the note does not describe any particular impairment resulting from the various medical issues that are listed nor is there any indication of what kinds of accommodation might flow from any such impairment. In other words, the medical note does not provide evidence that the applicant has any disability related accommodation needs relevant to any of the issues raised in his various applications under consideration.

7A hearing was held by telephone conference call on June 23, 2015. All parties except for Flynn's Traditional Irish Pub participated. I heard the submissions of the parties on each of the issues outlined above and in prior Case Assessment Directions.

8For the reasons that follow all of these Applications are dismissed. I also find for the reasons set out below that the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant before the Tribunal and will be prevented from filing further Applications without leave of the Tribunal.

The Disability Applications

2013-15035-I (HGR Graham Partners LLP)

9In this Application the applicant alleges that the surface of the path leading to the office of the respondent is uneven. In particular, the applicant alleges that in spots the cross slope of the path is 9%. The applicant concedes that he may never use this path, but as a committed citizen he believes he must consider "other" persons with disabilities.

10The respondent denies they have breached the applicant's right to equal treatment with respect to services on the basis of disability. The respondent is a law firm. The respondent asserts that they have provided no services to the applicant at any time and, therefore, they owe no duty to the applicant under the Code. The respondent argues that the Application is intended as punishment for the fact that the respondent has represented other respondents named in other of the applicant's previous Applications.

11This Application is dismissed. The respondent is the only occupant of the building but not the owner of the premises. There is no evidence that it is responsible for any perceived defects in the access to the building. I also agree with the respondent that there is no service relationship between it and the applicant. In the absence of this the applicant has no basis for a claim that his right to equal treatment with respect to services has been breached.

12Additionally, as confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Shaw v. Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155 (at para. 14), the three elements of the prima facie test for establishing discrimination under the Code require a complainant to prove the following: 1. that he or she is a member of a group protected by the Code; 2. that he or she was subjected to adverse treatment; and 3. that his or her gender, race, colour or ancestry, etc. was a factor in the alleged adverse treatment. In addition to not alleging or establishing a service relationship, the applicant has not actually alleged that he himself has experienced any adverse treatment. The application is also dismissed because the applicant has not established he was subjected to adverse treatment.

13I also note and adopt the comments of Vice-Chair Hart from 2013 HRTO 554, above, and note that there is no evidence to which the applicant can point that he would be unable to access any service provided in the building should that need ever arise. This is like many of the other Applications the applicant has filed in the nature of what he perceives to be a public interest complaint that it may be that another person with mobility issues might be hindered from accessing the building because of the alleged defects in access. This brings me to an important issue and problem with many of the applications before me, which is that the applicant has no actual standing to bring applications that are solely in the nature of public interest complaints. This issue was dealt with not only in 2013 HRTO 554, dismissing a number of his previous applications, but also in Carasco v. University of Windsor, 2012 HRTO 195 ("Carasco"), at paras. 4 – 7, and 14:

The Code provides for three ways for an application to be filed. First, a person can file under s. 34(1) if she or he "believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed." Second, recognizing that sometimes the affected individual(s) is not in a position to file an application, s. 34(5) of the Code also allows for other persons or organizations to file an application on his or her behalf, with the consent of the affected individual.

Applications under s. 34(1) or s. 34(5) can raise issues of systemic discrimination. A person may feel that his or her rights are infringed by operation of a policy or a long-standing systemic pattern of practices rather than an idiosyncratic set of actions or circumstances. For example, in the "special diet" cases, multiple individuals filed applications challenging the Government of Ontario's policies concerning when Ontario Disability Support Program recipients were entitled to receive additional benefits for medically prescribed diets: See Ball v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2010 HRTO 360.

Third, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the "Commission") may file an application under s. 35 where it believes it to be in the public interest to do so. Unlike applications made under s. 34, there is no requirement that the Commission identify and obtain the approval of individuals whose rights have been allegedly infringed as a pre-condition to bringing an application under s. 35.

It is clear from the structure of the Code that an individual whose rights under the Code have not been infringed cannot bring an application to the Tribunal concerning a matter which she or he believes is in the public interest. Counsel for the applicant labels such a person an "officious bystander." I prefer the term "public interest applicant."

In summary, I find that the Code does not permit an individual to bring a public interest application, either on her own, or in conjunction with an individual case. To allow otherwise would circumvent the intention of the Legislature.

14I agree with and adopt the analysis in Carasco and find that it applies to this application, in which the applicant has intended to bring a public interest application. He has not standing to do so, and for this reason, as well, this Application is dismissed.

2014-18350-I (Flynn's Traditional Irish Pub)

15In this Application, the applicant alleges that sometime during the period July 21 to 26, 2014 he wanted to enter the respondent's restaurant, but did not do so because it does not have a barrier free entrance. At the hearing the applicant indicated that there may have been three or four steps up from the street to get into the building.

16The respondent filed a Response, denied the allegation and asserted that it has installed a ramp to provide access for persons with mobility issues. The respondent also questioned whether the applicant attempted to access the restaurant.

17At the hearing I asked the applicant if he was unable to enter the Pub. His response was to suggest that the Tribunal might pay for testing of his heart and then he could tell me. At the hearing the applicant also indicated that he called the respondent and was told there was a ramp. The applicant asked me how safe I thought the ramp looked.

18This Application is dismissed. As with the Application above, there is no evidence to which the applicant can point which would establish that the applicant was prevented from entering this establishment by any disability related impairment if he wished to do so.

2014-18671-I (Midland)

19In this Application, the applicant appears to allege that the respondent's by-law with respect to the provision of parking spots for persons with disability is inadequate.

20The respondent denies the allegations in this Application. Amongst other things, the respondent argues that this Application should be dismissed because the substance of it has been adjudicated in a prior Application and dismissed in Tribunal Decision 2013 HRTO 1898 (Shopper's Drug Mart), or because the applicant has no standing to bring it, or because all or part of it has no reasonable prospect of success.

21This Application is dismissed because the substance of it has been previously adjudicated by the Tribunal in the Decision cited above. The applicant argued that it was not the same issue because in 2013 HRTO 1898 the Application had been dismissed because the respondent in that case had complied with a municipal by-law. In this case the applicant has reframed the claim as a challenge to the by-law.

22I disagree with the applicant's characterization of the reasons for the dismissal of his prior Application. It was the same problem identified in 2013 HRTO 554 and other decisions of the Tribunal, that the applicant was unable to show any disadvantage to him; this time as a result of various alleged defects in parking spots that were provided for persons with disabilities at a Shopper's Drug Mart location in Midland. Similarly in this case, the applicant's claim is a general one allegedly in the public interest but again raised in relation to alleged defects in parking spots that were provided for persons with disabilities at a Shopper's Drug Mart location in Midland.

23In these circumstances this is a distinction without a meaningful difference. The issue is the same in both cases, the alleged failure to ensure that there are adequate disabled parking spots for all those who might need the use of one in the lot in question. Section 45.1 of the Code provides the Tribunal authority to dismiss an application where the substance of the matter has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. The previous tribunal proceeding is a proceeding for the purposes of 45.1 and, for the reasons above, I find the substance of the matter was appropriately dealt with. The application is dismissed accordingly.

24In addition to being duplicative, there is no evidence of any disadvantage to him in the number of accessible parking spots in this lot. In the absence of adverse treatment or disadvantage, the applicant has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination and the application is dismissed.

25I also find, for the reasons above, that this is brought in the nature of a public interest application and the applicant is without standing to do so. The Application is dismissed for all these reasons.

2014-19044-I; 2014-19045-I; 2014-19208-I (Penetanguishene, Tiny, Wasaga)

26In these three Applications the applicant alleges that the by-laws of the three municipalities with respect to the minimum size of dwelling spaces are contrary to the Building Code and, therefore, discriminatory in that they limit access to affordable housing. The applicant identifies no ground of discrimination in these cases.

27These Applications were not served on the respondents and accordingly no Responses have been filed.

28At the hearing I asked the applicant how the allegation made was discrimination on any Code ground. He was unable to answer this question but instead asked whether or not access to adequate housing was a human right.

29I dismissed these Applications at the hearing because it was in my view plain and obvious that whatever the merits of the applicant's view of the effect of these by-laws they raised no Code issues. Even if they did contain allegations relating to the Code, these Applications are also all in the nature of public interest complaint and, for the reasons above, the applicant is without standing to bring them.

2014-19629-I (Midland)

30In this Application, the applicant alleges that his participation in democratic society is not welcome and he is being harassed in obtaining information. The applicant alleges that he sent six letters to the respondent and did not receive a proper reply. The ground of discrimination claimed in the Application is reprisal.

31This Application was not served on the respondent and no Response has been filed. This Application is dismissed.

32The applicant has not alleged that respondent's behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code. Accordingly, these allegations do not fall within the scope of protection from reprisal under s. 8 of the Code and the application is dismissed for that reason. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273.

33Additionally, the applicant is not a resident of the respondent municipality. It does not provide municipal governance services to him and in the absence of any such direct service relationship it is unclear whether the applicant's desire that the municipality respond to his correspondence in a certain way can be said to constitute a relationship with respect to services. It is clear that the Code does not govern, in a free-standing sense, "participation in democratic society" or "obtaining information" absent a connection to one of the social areas (such as services) set out in the Code. The absence of a connection to one of the social areas governed by the Code is a separate reason to find that this allegation is outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction and must be dismissed. Additionally, as is evidently clear from the way the applicant has framed this Application, it is in the nature of a public interest application and he has no standing to bring it.

2014-19482-I (German Canadian Club)

34In this Application, the applicant alleges that the respondent has failed to provide barrier-free access to its premises. The applicant alleges that the respondent is obligated to provide "disabled" parking places with a stable, firm, slip-resistant surface. The applicant alleges that the surface is crushed gravel. The applicant also alleges that on November 21, 2014, when he attended at the respondent's premises, the surface was covered with packed snow. The applicant also alleges that the washroom has no running water. The applicant alleges as well that the picnic area lacks a hard surface and that the picnic tables have fixed seating.

35This Application was not served on the respondent and no Response was filed.

36This Application is dismissed. Whatever the merits of the applicant's concerns about the Club's facilities there is no evidence that he was disadvantaged in any way by the alleged defects in the parking area for the club or the fixed seating in the picnic area. As regards the other allegations it is not at all clear why the lack of running water raises a Code issue. The applicant has no standing to bring this Application for the reasons above and because he is not personally affected by the alleged defects in the respondents' premises.

2014-19662-1 (Midland)

37In this Application the applicant alleges that part of a sidewalk slopes "greatly towards the street" and this is not in the public interest. The applicant alleges that he had some difficulty in navigating this slope. The applicant alleges that part of this sidewalk has a slope of 5% when it should be between 2% and 4%, another portion of the sidewalk has a slope of 12% alleges the applicant.

38These same allegations were raised in a prior Application (2013-13558-I) and dismissed by the Tribunal in 2013 HRTO 1647.

39This Application was not served on the respondent and no Response was filed.

40This Application is dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the issue has previously been adjudicated by the Tribunal in 2013 HRTO 1647. In my view it is clear that the prior adjudication constitutes a proceeding for the purposes of s. 45.1 and that the matter in this application was appropriately dealt with. I would also dismiss this Application because, like most of these Applications, there is no evidence that the applicant is personally impacted by the alleged defect in the sidewalk in question and accordingly has no standing to bring it.

2015-20373-I (Penetanguishene)

41In this Application, the applicant alleges that the failure of the respondent to have built a sidewalk and keep it clear from snow and ice in the winter is discriminatory. This issue appears to have been addressed in the Tribunal's Decision 2013 HRTO 554.

42At the Hearing the applicant made no attempt to distinguish the issue raised in this Application from the issues canvassed in 2013 HRTO 554 but said that he had an issue with the Tribunal's Decision. In my view, the Application must be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the issue has been raised and dealt with appropriately in a prior Tribunal adjudication. It is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, that disagreement with the substantive outcome of a proceeding is a matter for the courts to consider on judicial review or appeal, and not a factor properly considered in assessing whether a matter has been "appropriately dealt with" in another proceeding under a provision such as 45.1 of the Code.

2013-15292-S (Midland Service Ontario Centre)

43This is an Application alleging a breach of settlement of a prior Application. The applicant alleged that "earlier this year" he attended the respondent and was served "only partly while seated and he was required to be served at the counter."

44The Minutes of Settlement ("MOS") provided that the respondent would post a sign in its premises notifying its clientele as follows:

If you need any help to be seated while waiting or getting service, please identify yourself to counter staff immediately.

45In a Case Assessment Direction ("CAD") issued on September 18, 2013, the Tribunal directed that a telephone conference call be scheduled to consider two issues:

a. Whether the facts as alleged could be considered to be a breach of settlement and if so what is the appropriate remedy;

b. Whether all or part of the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code.

46This Application is dismissed. The obligation in the MOS was to post a sign. The Application does not contain an allegation that there was no sign.

2014-16434-I; 2014-16441-I (Penetanguishene and Midland)

47In these Applications, the applicant alleges discrimination in respect of the provision of goods and services because of creed by the respondent municipalities. The respondents were directed that they need not file Responses to these Applications.

48In 2014-16441-I, the applicant asserts that he is not Christian. He does not otherwise identify his creed. The applicant complains about the promotion of the Christian religion in one or more emails sent by the mayor of the Town of Midland on his personal email account. The emails make reference to the Christmas season. An example is set out here:

A fall of snow and the Christmas landscape is upon us. All those who live in Midland know the special caring that we have for our neighbours at this time of year. As we gather family and friends to celebrate the season…

49These emails include news about upcoming events of note in the municipality.

50In 2014-16434-I, the applicant complains about an email from the Mayor of Penetanguishene sent using his official account. The opening lines of the email are reproduced here:

Last nights festival of lights drew a great crowd and was a fantastically fun time. Our town staff were right, we did beat the Griswold's! When I threw the switch, multiple lighting displays and our Town Christmas Tree came to life and were spectacular, especially with the background of fresh white snow!

51The applicant does not identify his creed except in the negative. He self identifies as not a Christian. He lives in Penetanguishene and is not resident in Midland.

52At the hearing I asked the applicant how the emails or the lighting of a Christmas tree impacted or affected his ability to access municipal services. The applicant responded by referencing a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision with respect to prayer before municipal council meetings. He argued that the Code guarantees freedom of religion and freedom from religion in the sense that the Code prevents the state from promoting religion. He also referred to Freitag v. The Municipality of Penetanguishene, 2013 HRTO 893, where the Tribunal concluded that a non-denominational prayer at the commencement of a council meeting where the applicant was present was discriminatory.

53I do not agree with the applicant's understanding of the Code's protection in relation to creed. It is not a freedom of religion provision. The Code protects individual from discrimination in the provision of goods and services, amongst other social areas, on the basis of their creed. The applicant could point to no impact – direct, indirect or adverse - of any kind on his ability to access municipal services arising from the emails or the festival of lights.

54Assuming without deciding that the Tribunal's Decision in Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 2013 HRTO 893 was decided correctly, that decision is in my view distinguishable. In that case, the complaint was about the recitation of a prayer as part of the call to order of every council meeting. Its recitation is integral to and part of every council meeting, which is a service of the municipality within the meaning of the Code. In order to participate in the council meeting, the applicant was required to at least observe the recitation of the prayer. In this case the applicant could point to no service of the municipalities offered to him that was impacted in any way by the emails or the festival of lights.

55These Applications are dismissed.

Whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant

56Rule A8 of the Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario Common Rules found in Part 1 of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's Rules of Procedure applies to these proceedings and provides as follows:

A8 ABUSE OF PROCESS

A8.1 The tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

A8.2 Where the tribunal finds that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the tribunal may find that person to be a vexatious litigant and dismiss the proceeding as an abuse of process for that reason. It may also require a person found to be a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the tribunal to commence further proceedings or take further steps in a proceeding.

57The Tribunal's Rules allow it to control its own process. The Tribunal has found that in exceptional circumstances, it has the power to declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and to prevent an applicant from filing an Application without first obtaining consent of the Tribunal. See Drenic v. Governing Council of the Salvation Army, 2010 HRTO 1667, at paras. 16 and 18-19 and Roy v. Toronto (City) 2014 HRTO 214. The Tribunal's power to prevent the abuse of its processes, including declaring an applicant to be a vexatious litigant, is at the heart of both its statutory mandate to control its proceedings and its specialised expertise. This is especially important in a direct access system where the Legislature has chosen not to require filing fees or to impose costs sanctions. In Dai v. Presbyterian Church in Canada, 2013 ONSC 6630 at paras 19-21, the Divisional Court confirmed the Tribunal's power to make a vexatious litigant declaration, finding, in that particular case, that a declaration was "well within the range of reasonable and acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and the law."

58In Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 1331 at paragraphs 27 and 28, the Tribunal reviewed some of the factors to be applied when determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant:

The seminal decision on the factors that Courts have considered in determining whether an individual is a vexatious litigant were described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Foy v. Foy (No.2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220. These factors are summarized in the decision of Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, [1987] O.J. No . 355 (H.C.):

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; and

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

It is not necessary that all of these factors be present in order for an individual to be declared a vexatious litigant. In order to declare the applicant to be a vexatious litigant, I must be satisfied on an objective standard that the applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself in a vexatious manner during the proceedings.

59I agree with the Tribunal's decisions above and adopt the analysis of our authority in this regard as set out in Hiaimey, above. Several of these factors are present here.

60The applicant has filed a great number of Applications.

61In addition to these 13 Applications, the applicant has filed 45 other Applications.

62Seventeen of these Applications were dismissed because the Tribunal concluded that they had no reasonable prospect of success. Five were dismissed because the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with them for various reasons. Five were dismissed as abandoned and several more withdrawn by the applicant. A small number of these Applications were settled at mediation.

63Twenty of these Application identified Penetanguishene as the respondent. In ten, Midland has been identified as a respondent. All but one of these Applications were dismissed, for the most part because the applicant could point to no adverse effect experienced by him as a result of the thing complained of.

64Two cases went to a full hearing and were dismissed because no violation of the Code was found. In only one Application has discrimination, on the basis of creed, been found. See Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 2013 HRTO 893.

65The applicant makes it clear that he sees it as his mission in life to make the world a better place for persons with mobility issues – the general thrust of many of his Applications. He also has concerns about the state's role in promoting what he perceives as religious practice.

66As discussed above he has no standing to bring many of these Applications because he has not established that any of the circumstances he complains about have had any impact on him personally. He has been told this by the Tribunal on at least two occasions – see in particular 2013 HRTO 554 and 2013 HRTO 1647. Despite the Tribunal's determinations the applicant continues to file applications which must be dismissed either because he does not allege any adverse impact as against himself (and so does not have standing to bring the applications) or for other significant reasons such as, the lack of a social area (e.g. services) between himself and respondents he has named. While many of these applications have been dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success, they are in fact so flawed that they could equally have been dismissed as plainly and obviously outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The filing of Applications that have no reasonable prospect of success are an abuse of the Tribunal's process, moreso, when the applicant continues to file Applications that the Tribunal has previously determined he has no standing to bring.

67Further, the applicant has begun filing Applications which even he appears to acknowledge have no connection to the Code. See 2014-19044-I; 2014-19045-I; 2014-19208-I, above, in which the applicant complains that three municipalities in Simcoe County have by-laws which require that housing units be of a certain square footage. At the hearing he indicated a number of times that the Code is the problem and needs to be amended or that the Tribunal does not care about human rights. He asked me at one point whether or not there is a human right to adequate affordable housing. Applications like these are an abuse of the Tribunal's process.

68Several of these Applications have already been determined by the Tribunal. An Application that is an attempt to relitigate issues that have previously been determined is an abuse of process. Similarly, an Application that has no reasonable prospect of success filed against the law firm that has previously represented some of the respondents here is an abuse of process.

69It is clear that the applicant is attempting to make a point with the various municipalities in particular. I agree with counsel for one of the respondents that while in some sense (and in some instances) laudable the applicant's efforts are misguided. Whatever the merits of the applicant's concerns these are improper purposes for filing an Application and are an abuse of the Tribunal process.

70I do not mean to say that the applicant is being intentionally malicious although that is a conclusion one might reach with respect to 2013-15305-I, but in my view these Applications are primarily intended to make a point with the various respondents - in large part area municipalities. In my view, having considered all of the circumstances outlined above they are intended to vex and harass the respondents for purposes which whatever their merit are not Code-related concerns of the applicant.

71I also note again that despite the applicant being told repeatedly by the Tribunal that he must show how he has been disadvantaged and/or how he requires accommodation for a disability related need he has continued to file Applications which lack these essential features. Further, there is no indication that he intends to end his practice of filing what amount to public interest applications which will be dismissed for the same reasons as his prior Applications. The Tribunal has a responsibility to make an order that would prevent this ongoing abuse of its process by the continual filing of Applications that will be dismissed.

72For all of these reasons, and to prevent further and future abuse of the Tribunal's process, I find that it is appropriate that the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant and that he be prevented from filing an Application with the Tribunal without first seeking leave of the Tribunal. Despite the one Application where he was successful I make this Order a general one because of the overall pattern of unmeritorious Applications against both private actors and public institutions raising issues from accessibility concerns to freedom of religion concerns and now perhaps a concern on the applicant's part with the availability of affordable housing in our society. In my view, the only adequate way of policing the applicant's misguided effort to employ the Tribunal's process in his public interest advocacy is to make the Order a general one. It is important to remember that this does not prevent the applicant from filing an Application but if he does he will be required to show that the application is a legitimate claim of a violation of the Code over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.

73I make the following orders:

1. The Applications listed above are dismissed.

2. The applicant is declared a vexatious litigant. I order that the applicant, Henry Freitag, may not file further applications at this Tribunal without leave of the Tribunal.

3. If the applicant seeks leave of the Tribunal to file any such future application he must include with his complete application submissions that outline why the application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights, is not intended to vex the respondent(s) and will not result in an abuse of process. The Tribunal will consider any future applications which fail to include these submissions as incomplete and will treat them as such.

Dated at Toronto, this 23rd day of September, 2015.

"Signed by"

David Muir

Vice-chair