HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

City of Toronto

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Social Benefits Tribunal

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Social Justice Tribunals Ontario

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Neighbourhood Legal Services

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Co-operators General Insurance Company

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Legal Aid Ontario

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Salvation Army – Ontario Central East

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Salvation Army – Territorial Headquarters

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

Sound Times

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Clive Roy

Applicant

-and-

The Ombudsman for the City of Toronto

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: February 14, 2014

2013-15386-I; 2013-15387-I; 2013-15388-I; 2013-15390-I;

2013-15391-I; 2013-15392-I; 2013-15393-I; 2013-15424-I;

2013-15425-I; 2013-15426-I; 2013-15427-I; 2013-15428-I;

2013-15485-I; 2013-15486-I; 2013-15499-I; 2013-15500-I;

2013-15501-I; 2013-15502-I; 2013-15816-I; 2013-15863-I;

2013-15902-I; 2013-15934-I; 2013-15935-I; 2013-15936-I;

2013-15937-I; 2013-15939-I; 2013-15940-I; 2013-15941-I;

2013-15942-I; 2013-15943-I; 2013-15944-I; 2013-15977-I;

2013-15978-I; 2013-15979-I; 2013-16009-I; 2013-16012-I;

2013-16013-I; 2013-16014-I; 2013-16015-I; 2013-16016-I;

2013-16017-I; 2013-16018-I; 2013-16019-I; 2013-16020-I;

2013-16038-I; 2013-16047-I; 2013-16048-I; 2013-16049-I;

2013-16050-I; 2013-16051-I; 2013-16052-I; 2013-16053-I;

2013-16054-I; 2013-16101-I

Citation: 2014 HRTO 214

Indexed as: Roy v. Toronto (City)

APPEARANCES

Clive Roy, Applicant

No one appearing

City of Toronto, Respondent

Glenn Chu, Counsel

Social Benefits Tribunal and Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario, Respondents

Asad Moten, Counsel

Legal Aid Ontario, Respondent

Andrea Danon, Counsel

Neighbourhood Legal Services, Respondent

Jack de Klerk, Counsel

The Co-operators General Insurance Company, Respondent

Karen Sargeant and Nicole Singh, Counsel

The Salvation Army – Ontario General East and Salvation Army – Territorial Headquarters, Respondents

Andy Pushalik and Christine Leblanc, Counsel

Sound Times, Respondent

Natasha Persaud, Counsel

The Ombudsman for the City of Toronto, Respondent

Kwame Addo, Counsel

1These are 58 Applications filed by the applicant alleging violations of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), by the various respondents above. In a series of Case Assessment Directions (“CAD”) these Applications were scheduled for a summary hearing on January 16, 2014 by telephone conference. A Notice of Summary Hearing was delivered to the parties on December 17, 2013.

2A number of individual respondents were identified by the applicant however, in all of the circumstances including the disposition of these cases, I have not identified them in the style of cause or in the narrative below. All were represented by counsel and participated in the proceeding by counsel.

BACKGROUND

3The hearing was convened to deal with a number of issues arising from the applicant’s filing of an extraordinary number of Applications in a short period of time. Each of the Applications, with only three exceptions, alleged a violation of the Code in respect of virtually every protected ground. The Applications are in form very similar. They allege a violation of the Code in a single transaction of some kind – a phone call or an email exchange, a meeting – and in virtually every case plead no facts that would remotely connect the alleged interaction to the protected grounds asserted.

4With perhaps one or two exceptions none of the Applications allege any facts which, on their face, engage any of the protected grounds cited. For example in all but three of the Applications the applicant alleges a violation of the right to be free of discrimination on the basis of family status. There are no facts plead in any of the Applications that could remotely be construed as engaging this ground. The applicant does not even disclose what his family status might be. Similarly he alleges discrimination in respect of an undisclosed disability.

5In several instances the applicant made a complaint in an internal process of a respondent or filed an Application at the Tribunal based on a transaction on one day, copied the purported individual respondents with the complaint or Application, and then contacted that person the day following and alleged reprisal in respect of that subsequent interaction.

6The first group of these Applications consisted of six Applications against Neighbourhood Legal Services (“NLS”) and the Co-operators General Insurance Company (“Co-operators”) received by the Tribunal in September 2013. On review of these Applications, the Tribunal issued a CAD on September 23, 2013 and directed on its own initiative that a summary hearing be held to determine whether some or all of these Applications should be dismissed in whole or in part because they had no reasonable prospect of success. A similar CAD issued on September 26, 2013 dealt with 16 Applications filed against the City of Toronto (“the City”) and the Social Benefits Tribunal (“SBT”).

7The applicant filed multiple objections and Requests for Reconsideration of these CADs. He also filed separate objections and Responses to a Request for Order during Proceedings (Form 11s) in respect of each Application. For example, in respect of the City Applications the applicant filed 6 separate Requests for Reconsideration; 18 separate procedural objections to the summary hearing; and 8 Form 11s objecting to the Notice of Summary Hearing. The applicant also filed further Applications against the NLS, Co-operators, the SBT and the City. In addition the applicant began filing Applications against the Tribunal alleging discrimination in its decision making.

8The Tribunal issued a further CAD on November 15, 2013 in respect of the 55 Applications then pending against the respondents. In this CAD the Tribunal, pursuant to Rule 1.7(d) of its Rules of Practice, consolidated the Applications by organizational respondent. The Tribunal also directed that all of the Applications would be dealt with together at one summary hearing.

9Finally, the Tribunal directed that the parties make submissions at the summary hearing on the question of whether or not these Applications should be dismissed because they are an abuse of process and/or whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant. In response, the applicant filed multiple Requests for Order During Proceeding (“Requests”) requesting that the Tribunal schedule a mediation in his cases or that the Tribunal provide reasons for its decision to dismiss his Applications. He also filed Requests seeking an Order that the respondents be required to file Responses (“Form 2”) to his Applications.

10On November 20, 2013 the Tribunal issued a CAD providing further directions with respect to the conduct of the summary hearing and the issues to be addressed at that time. In addition to the no reasonable prospect of success issue identified, the Tribunal provided additional context for why it had raised the issue of abuse of process as follows:

As of today’s date the applicant has filed 56 Applications against these respondents. The applicant has indicated that further Applications may be forthcoming. He has also filed 22 Applications against the Tribunal alleging discrimination in respect of its decision making. There are a number of additional Applications which the Tribunal has been unable to process to date. In each of his Applications the applicant alleges a discrete violation of the Code allegedly occurring in a single transaction – an alleged failure to follow a policy on one occasion or respond to an email or series of emails sent on a single day or the failure to respond to a telephone inquiry. So for example 10 of the above Applications allege that the failure of the respondent Social Benefits Tribunal to properly deal with a request for reconsideration was discriminatory. All of the requests for reconsideration were apparently made on the same day or within a narrow time frame, but rather than file one Application containing all of these alleged failures to respond appropriately to 10 requests for reconsideration the applicant filed 10 separate Applications alleging a breach of the Code in each. A similar pattern of serial Applications alleging a violation of the Code in a discrete incident, often in a series of similar incidents, can be seen in many of these Applications.

The applicant’s approach and the volume of Applications imposes a significant administrative burden on the Tribunal and the other parties to these proceedings. Consequent to the extraordinary volume of Applications there is an equally extraordinary volume of email correspondence from the Applicant much of which is repetitive and often not copied to all of the other parties.

The applicant has filed an extraordinary number of Applications and has indicated to the Tribunal that more may be filed. As indicated he has chosen to file serial Applications in respect of single discrete interactions which he alleges are discriminatory. He has also filed other Applications alleging that the Tribunal has discriminated against him in its decision making in respect of these Applications. He has filed Requests for Reconsideration of prior CADs issued in these cases. He also filed many Requests for Order During Proceeding in respect of these cases. These factors amongst others give rise to a concern that these Applications are an abuse of the Tribunal’s process. See Drenic v. Governing Council of the Salvation Army, 2010 HRTO 1667; Carlos v. Scher Law, 2010 HRTO 2019 and Bingham v. Roach Schwartz Law Office, 2011 HRTO 15. The parties are requested [to] make submissions on these issues at the summary hearing.

11In the November 15 CAD the applicant was directed to cease his practice of filing separate serial applications in respect of essentially the same issue. The applicant was also advised of the Tribunal’s expectations with respect to communication with it and the other parties and was directed to communicate with the Tribunal and the other parties in a respectful manner. Because of the extraordinary volume of often repetitive communication, often not copied to the other parties, the applicant was directed to communicate with the Tribunal only by regular mail except with respect to the scheduling of the summary hearing. The Tribunal also determined that it would no longer process further Applications filed by the applicant pending the conclusion of the summary hearing.

12In Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1931 issued on November 20, 2013 I dismissed a number of the applicant’s Requests described earlier. I also directed that he cease filing Requests in respect of these Applications pending the conclusion of the summary hearing. Despite this direction, between November 20, 2013 and December 19, 2013 the applicant filed 77 Requests for Reconsideration and 72 Requests for Order. These Requests were filed electronically in contravention of the earlier directions. Consequently they were not acknowledged by the Tribunal and will not be dealt with.

The Applicant’s failure to attend the Summary Hearing

13On January 15, 2014, about mid-day on the day before the scheduled hearing, the applicant began filing Requests seeking the adjournment of the summary hearing. The applicant filed 35 Requests which I denied in 2014 HRTO 65 issued that day.

14At the time set for the hearing (9:30 a.m.), the applicant did not attend on the conference call. All of the other parties above were able to connect to the call. In accordance with the Tribunal’s usual practice the case was held down until 10:00 a.m. At 10:00 a.m. the responding parties attended. The applicant was still not in attendance.

15At that time counsel for the respondent Co-operators advised that she had received an email from the applicant shortly before 10:00 a.m. indicating that he had tried to get on the call at 9:30 a.m. but had not been able to connect. I now understand that 8 similar emails were sent to the Tribunal and copied to the various respondents between 9:52 and 10:26 a.m. Counsel further advised that she had responded by email advising the applicant that the case had been stood down until 10:00 a.m. and that the parties were to return to the call at that time.

16After the hearing I was provided with the text of a number of identical emails addressed to the Tribunal and copied to each of the respondents in turn. The text of the material part of the email is as follows:

This morning around 9:30 AM, I placed a call to 416-212-8012, pursuant to the directions outlined within the attached Notice of Hearing dated December 20^th, 2013. I subsequently entered the code 1233434#, as directed. An operator came on-line and advised me that my call was being transferred. Subsequent to this advisory the line went dead.

The emails go on to reiterate the applicant’s request to adjourn the hearing because of an undisclosed medical condition

17The applicant’s emails were not before me when the hearing resumed at 10 a.m. However counsel for the Co-operators forwarded me a copy with her reply. At that time, after reviewing the email and the reply, I indicated to the parties that in the circumstances it was my view that the hearing should proceed. None of the respondents disagreed with that approach and the hearing proceeded.

18In deciding to proceed with the hearing I was satisfied that the applicant had proper notice of the proceeding and if he had difficulties when he initially attempted to connect to the call, there was no indication of any further efforts in that regard. I also considered the surrounding circumstances including the applicant’s serial failure to comply with Tribunal Directions; the multiple requests to adjourn received the day before the hearing as well as the fact that counsel immediately responded to the applicant informing him that the hearing would be resuming at 10 a.m. I am satisfied he was fully aware of his opportunity to attend the hearing at that time.

19A number of housekeeping and procedural issues were dealt with and, at about 10:10 a.m., I invited submissions from the parties. The applicant still was not in attendance. I note that the emails above were sent to the various respondents beginning just before 10:00 a.m. and continuing until almost 10:30 a.m. Accordingly it is reasonably clear that the applicant was at his computer throughout the hearing and would have received the email from counsel for the Co-operators sent at 10:01 a.m. There is no indication that the applicant attempted to connect to the call again or contact the Tribunal to advise that he was unable to do so. In all of the circumstances I was not satisfied and remain unsatisfied with the applicant’s explanation for his non-attendance at the summary hearing.

20As a preliminary matter I clarified the status of the Ombudsman of the City of Toronto (“Ombudsman”) against which two Applications have been filed but which were included in the Applications as against the City. I was advised by counsel for the Ombudsman that it is a separate legal entity from the City and should be separately identified in the style of cause. An order to that effect was granted and the style of cause in Files amended accordingly.

21Counsel for the City asked that there be an Order that the hearing not be recorded. In most circumstances Tribunal hearings are not recorded, unless for Code-related accommodation needs. Several respondents concurred and no party disagreed with the request and the Order that the hearing not be recorded was granted.

22After hearing the submissions of the parties I dismissed the Applications because they have no reasonable prospect of success. I also concluded, having regard to the conduct of the applicant in these proceedings including a consideration of the sheer volume of Applications and interlocutory procedural filings he has made, that these Applications are an abuse of process. I also found that the applicant is a vexatious litigant and may not file further Applications without leave of the Tribunal. My reasons for these conclusions follow.

THE SUMMARY HEARING ISSUES

23As indicated in the various CADs issued in this case there were essentially three issues for adjudication in the summary hearing:

a. Whether all or part of some or all of these Applications should be dismissed because they have no reasonable prospect of success;

b. Whether all or some of these Applications should be dismissed because they are an abuse of process;

c. Whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing any further Applications without leave of the Tribunal.

NO REASONABLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS

24The summary hearing was held pursuant to Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure which read as follows:

19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.

19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.

25Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at paras. 8 and 9:

In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.

In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.

26The Tribunal does not have the general power to deal with allegations of unfairness. It can only deal with alleged discrimination or harassment on the grounds set out in the Code. To succeed in an application, an applicant must be able to prove discrimination on the basis of a Code ground on a balance of probabilities. To show discrimination, an applicant must prove a link between a respondent’s alleged actions and a Code ground. The applicant alleges reprisal in virtually every Application and in the narrative of some of them also alleges reprisal. The reprisal section of the Code only applies to actions that are intended as a reprisal for asserting one’s human rights. See Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31. To proceed with the allegations of reprisal, there must be a reasonable basis to believe that the applicant could establish such intention and a link between the grounds cited and the respondent’s alleged actions.

27For the reasons that follow I confirm my oral ruling that these Applications have no reasonable prospect of success and must be dismissed. In general terms the primary difficulty with the Applications as they are framed is that there are no facts asserted that make any connection to the grounds of discrimination that the applicant has claimed.

28Each Application describes a brief transaction or inter-action with one or more employee or official of each of the respondents. Generally the narrative includes a request of some kind by the applicant made to an individual employed by one of the respondents. The typical narrative then describes a failure to respond in a way satisfactory to the applicant, or beyond a timeline prescribed in a policy of the respondent. Examples of some of these narrative descriptions from Box 8 of four of the Applications against the City are included by way of example (errors in the original):

I am an Ontario Work Participant, which ls-governed by the Ontario WorksAct,-O:Reg.134/98 and 93 MCSS Provincial Policy Directives. My rights under the aforementioned Provincial legislation and policies are being arbitrarily contravened by senior City of Toronto officials. This represents an act of "constructive discrimination", contrary to s.11(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code. The latest failure/refusal to properly uphold my rights under the aforementioned Provincial law and Provincial policies was conveyed in a letter dated August 30th, 2013, from C S, Toronto Employment & Social Services' (TESS) Director, Central District. This letter was cc’ed to the attention of J P, Toronto City, B P, Toronto Deputy City Manager, P W, TESS' General Manager/Adminstrator, L K, TESS' Manager, U , Director, Office of Equity & A C, Director, Litigation.

In an email dated September 1st I asked C T, Manager of Program Support; Client Services & Information ·Unit, Toronto Employment & Social Services, to provide mediation assistance with respect to meeting with my caseworker, M T -- an individual who has subjected me to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. I made this request to Ms. T, based upon the procedures outlined upon this webpage: http://www.toronto.ca/socialservices/client_svcs. htm. I spoke with Ms. T on Sept. 11th, 2013 around 2:50 PM. During this conversation she advised me, and I quote: "I don't think you need mediation."

On Nov. 12th, 2013, during a meeting with my Caseworker, M T, and his Supervisor, S B, I was advised that they were "unable to acknowledge" emailed documentation and communications. This is contrary to the procedures outlined in OW Policy Directive 2.1. Therefore, the evidence clearly suggests that M T and his Supervisor, S B, are subjecting me to discrimination, harassment and reprisal, contrary to s.8 of the Act. Furthermore they are arbitrarily imposing limitations and/or requirements on me that are inconsistent with the OW Policy Directives and TESS' standard procedures and practices. In other words, I am being subjected to "constructive discrimination", contrary to s.11 (1) of the OHRC. I am also being arbitrarily disadvantaged, as defined by the Supreme Court.

On Nov. 12th, 2013, during a meeting with my Caseworker, MT, and his Supervisor, S B, I was advised that participation reviews are supposed to be conducted at least once every 3 months. In my case, however, this procedure has not been followed. This is contrary to OW Policy Directive 9.1. Therefore, the evidence clearly suggests that M T and his Supervisor, S B, are subjecting me to discrimination, harassment and reprisal, contrary to s.8 of the Act. Furthermore they are arbitrarily imposing limitations on me that are inconsistent with the OW Policy Directives and TESS' standard procedures and practices. In other words, I am being subjected to "constructive discrimination", contrary to s.11 (1) of the OHRC. I am also being arbitrarily disadvantaged, as defined by the Supreme Court.

29Nowhere in any of the Applications does the applicant make any reference to any of the Code grounds raised other than repeated references to being treated as a second class citizen in his own country. So, for example, he claims discrimination on the basis of race but pleads no facts with respect to that issue; family and marital status are relied on as well but the applicant makes no reference to his family or marital status.

30In the absence of any submissions from the applicant clarifying the basis for his claims in respect of the various protected grounds and in the absence of any submissions from the applicant indicating the evidence available to him which might tend to establish a link between actions complained of and the grounds claimed I would dismiss these Applications in their entirety on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success.

31I will now turn to consider the Applications as against each of the respondents in turn in some more detail.

The Co-operators

32The applicant filed four Applications alleging violations of the Code by this respondent.

33In these Applications the applicant alleges discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of each protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association.

34In the first of these Applications, 2013-15486-I filed on September 12, 2013, the applicant alleges that on September 11, 2013 he was advised that his tenant insurance policy had been cancelled; that a new insurance policy would be provided subject to an inspection of his residence based on “current guidelines”. The applicant alleges that the respondent has repeatedly failed to provide information with respect to the current guidelines and why they are being applied to the applicant.

35The second Application, 2013-15499-I filed on September 13, 2013, reiterates the allegation above. The applicant also alleges that he sent a copy of Application 2013-15486-I to the respondent and asked for clarification regarding the inspection of his residence. The applicant alleges that the respondent responded with an email that “looks like a refusal to provide me with insurance coverage.”

36In the third Application, 2013-15500-I filed on September 15, 2013, the applicant alleges that he was told on May 25, 2013 that his insurance coverage would expire on May 31, 2013. On June 3, 2013 the respondent cancelled his policy which the applicant alleges was contrary to various provisions of the Insurance Act. He further alleges that on September 12, 2013 he filed an Application with the Tribunal and provided a copy to the respondent at the same time. The applicant alleges that on September 12, 2013 an official of the respondent sent an email that prevented the Co-operator’s Ombudsperson from upholding her mandate to investigate these issues.

37In the fourth of these Applications, 2013-15863-I filed on October 30, 2013, the applicant reiterates the allegations above.

38These Applications make no allegations that are connected to the Code in any fashion whatsoever. As indicated above the Tribunal does not have a general power to remedy unfairness it can only deal with substantive acts of discrimination related to the protected grounds in the Code. Beyond an assertion that somehow these circumstances engage the Code there is simply no basis to conclude that there are any facts identified which would tend to substantiate such a claim. These Applications must be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

City of Toronto

39In each of these 19 Applications the applicant alleges discrimination in goods and services on the basis of each protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association.

40In the first Application, 2013-15373-I filed on September 3, 2013, the applicant alleges that on August 30, 2013 the respondent sent him a letter which violated his rights under the Code.

41In a second Application, 2013-15374-I also filed September 3, the applicant alleges that he is being denied rights he has under the Ontario Works Act and because of the “Equity Lense Project”. He further alleges that he brought the issue to the attention of the respondent’s Director of Equity and other senior staff who have chosen to ignore his concerns.

42In a third Application, 2013-15384-I filed on September 3, 2013, the applicant alleges that a transportation allowance was discontinued without notice and without reasons contrary to the Ontario Works Act. The applicant alleges that on July 22, 2013 he sent an email to his caseworker about this issue which was ignored.

43In Application 2013-15390-I filed on September 4, 2013, the applicant alleges that in December 2012 the respondent began making accusations regarding alleged overpayments associated with two SBT files (active before the SBT).

44In Application 2013-15391-I filed on September 3, 2013 the applicant alleges that he made a formal human rights complaint to the respondent and identified a number of individuals who had violated his rights including M.T. and C.S. He also provided a copy of his complaint to these individuals. The applicant alleges that in conversation with M.T. on August 28, 2013 he was accused of having been aggressive on the phone the day before. The applicant alleges that his lawful actions being characterized as aggressive, is a form of retaliation. Although it is not expressly stated in the Application presumably the allegation is that the comment was made in response to the complaint made several days before and provided to this individual by the applicant.

45In Application 2013-15392-I filed on September 4, 2013 the applicant alleges that he filed formal objection to the SBT regarding the “obstruction of justice” by the respondent’s officials. The respondent responded to the formal objection in strong terms accusing the applicant of threatening criminal charges, stating that this was unacceptable and would not be tolerated. The applicant alleges that the respondent’s characterization of his procedural objection as a threat was improper and implied a threat to pursue criminal charges against him.

46In Application 2013-15393-I filed on September 3, 2013 the applicant alleges that on August 23, 2013 he filed a formal human rights complaint to the City’s Office of Equity, Diversity and Human Rights in which he identified four individual employees of the respondent including M.T. and C.S. whom he then copied on the complaint. The applicant alleges that on August 30, 2013 C.S. retaliated by emailing a letter falsely accusing him of failing to meet his caseworker M.T.

47In Application 2013-15424-I filed on September 5, 2013 the applicant alleges that on August 31, 2013 he brought to the attention of P.W. his view that C.S. was refusing to properly uphold his rights under the Ontario Works Act, specifically Ontario Works Policy Directives 9.1. The applicant alleges that in a letter dated September 3, 2013 P.W. ignored C.S.’s discriminatory conduct.

48In Application 2013-15427-I filed on September 9, 2013 the applicant alleges that he made a request of M.T. by email dated July 22, 2013. The applicant alleges that in an email dated July 31, 2013 M.T. ignored his request. The applicant alleges that on August 23, 2013 he made a formal complaint to the City’s Office of Equity, Diversity and Human Rights about M.T. and others. The applicant alleges the Office of Equity, Diversity and Human Rights did not address his concerns. He also repeats the allegation made in 2013-15424-I above.

49In Application 2013-15502-I filed on September 16, 2013 the applicant alleged that on September 1, 2013 he asked C. T., Manager of Program Support, Client Services and Information, Toronto Employment and Social Services, to provide mediation assistance with respect to meeting with his case worker M.T. The applicant alleges that he spoke with C.T. on September 11, 2013 and she said, “I don’t think you need mediation”.

50In Application 2013-15977-I filed on October 30, 2013 the applicant alleges that the Ombudsman of the City of Toronto advised that the applicant was required to confirm his volunteer work in order to reinstate the travel allowance. The applicant alleges that on September 3, 2013 he sent this confirmation to his caseworker M.T. M.T. refused to reinstate the allowance. The applicant alleges that there has been a failure to reinstate the travel allowance and that he is being subject to limitations and requirements on him that are inconsistent with Ontario Works Policy Directives.

51In a second Application, 2013-15978-I filed on October 30, 2013, the applicant alleges that in letters received on August 21, September 9 and October 22, 2013 he was advised by his caseworker M.T. of the need to review his Ontario Works requirements. The applicant alleges that these letters should have told him what was required to maintain his dietary allowance but did not. The applicant alleges that, contrary to the Ontario Works Act, his allowance was discontinued without prior notice. The applicant alleges that he is being subject to limitations and requirements on him that are inconsistent with Ontario Works Policy Directives.

52In a third Application, 2013-15979-I filed on October 30, 2013, the applicant reiterates his allegation that on July 22, 2013 he asked his caseworker to refer him to an employment placement agency. In an email dated October 29, 2013 he reiterated this request to M.T. but he failed to respond prior to the Application being filed the following day.

53In Application 2013-16047-I filed on November 12, 2013 the applicant repeats the allegations made in 2013-15977-I above.

54In Application 2013-16048-I filed on November 13, 2013 the applicant alleges that during a meeting that same day with his caseworker and his Supervisor he was advised that participation reviews are supposed to be conducted every three months. The applicant alleges that this is contrary to Ontario Works Policy Directive 9.1. The applicant alleges that the respondent’s failure to conduct such reviews is discriminatory.

55In Application 2013-16049-I filed on November 12, 2013 the applicant alleges that during a meeting that same day with his caseworker and his Supervisor the applicant was advised that the respondent was unable to acknowledge emailed documentation and communication contrary to Ontario Works Policy Directives.

56In Application 2013-16052-I filed on November 15, 2013 the applicant alleged that on October 30, 2013 he asked for the assistance of U.S. in resolving the discriminatory denial of a travel allowance referred to above. The applicant alleges that U.S. and her assistant L.S. refused to investigate his complaints.

57In Application 2013-16053-I also filed on November 15, 2013 the applicant reiterates his allegation that on October 30, 2013 he asked for the assistance of U.S. in resolving the discriminatory denial of a travel allowance.

58In Application 2013-16054-I filed on November 15, 2013 the applicant alleged that on October 30, 2013 he asked for the assistance of U.S. in resolving the discriminatory denial of a dietary allowance referred to above at para. 51. The applicant alleges that U.S. and her assistant L.S. refused to investigate this complaint.

59These Applications must be dismissed because I find that on their face they disclose no reasonable prospect of success.

60In a number of them the applicant alleges in the narrative of his Application that the actions taken were in reprisal for some prior action on his part. The Tribunal has held that an applicant must show intent to punish or impose a penalty on the applicant. See Noble, above. There must also be evidence that some threat of or an actual penalty imposed on the applicant as a consequence of his having raised human rights concern with a respondent.

61Having reviewed all of these Applications I find that there are no facts plead that would tend to support the conclusion that any of the alleged actions of any of the respondents were intended as a reprisal in response to the applicant having raised a Code issue. In addition it is fair to say that some of the reprisal claims are on their face absurd. So, for example, the applicant claims that being told that he had been aggressive in a meeting or telephone call is a reprisal. It is entirely unclear why this would be the case.

62Several of the Applications appear to claim a denial of benefits. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for benefits under an insurance or social welfare scheme as such. See Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2009 HRTO 1595. In the absence of any other facts plead that make any other allegations of discrimination these Applications must be dismissed as well.

63Otherwise the remaining Applications are completely bereft of any facts plead that make any connection to the Code. Beyond a narrative description of an individual transaction involving a meeting, an email or a telephone call, the claim that the event was discriminatory is a bald assertion. So, for example, the applicant alleges in Application 2013-15978-I that he should have been told how to maintain his entitlement to a dietary allowance. This may be so, and assuming that it is so and the applicant was not provided with this information: where is the connection to any of the grounds claimed? Similarly in Application 2013-16048-I the applicant claims he was advised that participation reviews were to be conducted every three months and that in his case this was not done. Assuming this to be the case: where is the connection to any of the grounds of discrimination claimed? Poor or inadequate service delivery is not in and of itself evidence of discrimination.

64In my view the narratives of these Applications, assuming their contents are true, point to nothing other than that the applicant was dissatisfied with the result of the various inter-actions he describes. These Applications, as drafted, and in the absence of any explanation from the applicant making the necessary connections to the Code, must be dismissed because there is no reasonable prospect that they will succeed.

Neighbourhood Legal Services

65These are 3 Applications filed by the applicant alleging violations of the Code by the respondent above.

66In these Applications the applicant alleges discrimination in goods and services on the basis of each protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association.

67In the first Application 2013-15386-I filed on September 3, 2013 the applicant alleges that he was told that the issues with which he wanted assistance were not ones that the clinic became involved in; would require extensive litigation; that his interpretation of the legislation was unconventional and his claim would be unlikely to succeed.

68In the second Application 2013-15387-I filed on September 4, 2013 the applicant alleges that he was subject to reprisal by another clinic for filing the complaint above. The applicant has not sought to amend this Application and it must be dismissed because it contains no allegations as against the identified respondent.

69In the third of these Applications, 2013-15385-I, which was filed on September 3, 2013, the applicant alleges that when he spoke with the Director of Legal Services and asked for a copy of their Case Selection Criteria Policy and “Complaint Policy” he was told “I won’t give you a deadline on that. I have other clients to deal with and you’re taking up more than your fair share of my time.” The applicant alleges that this individual then hung up on him. I note that the Application was filed on September 3, 2013 the same day the alleged incident occurred.

70These Applications must be dismissed because they have no reasonable prospect of success. As with the other Applications the applicant pleads no facts that link the alleged actions of the respondent to any of the grounds cited in the Application.

Social Benefits Tribunal

71In these Applications the applicant alleges discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of each protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association.

72In the first of these Applications, 2013-15425-I filed on September 4, 2013, the applicant alleges that the respondent failed to address his properly filed reconsideration request.

73In the second Application, 2013-15426-I filed on September 5, 2013, the applicant alleges that the respondent failed to address his properly filed reconsideration request in a second matter before the SBT.

74In an Application filed on September 6, 2013, 2013-15427-I, the applicant alleges that the respondent failed to respond to a procedural objection made by the applicant on August 19, 2013.

75In an Application filed on September 7, 2013, 2013-15428-I, the applicant alleges that the respondent failed to respond to a procedural objection made by the applicant on August 19, 2013 in another matter before the SBT. In this Application the applicant also complains that the respondent required him to communicate with the Tribunal by regular mail.

76In an Application filed on September 11, 2013, 2013-15485-I, the applicant alleges that on August 21, 2013 he filed a formal request to the Director of Case Management for certified copies of interim assistance orders issued in respect of an SBT file. At the time of the Application the respondent had failed to respond to the request.

77In an Application filed on September 15, 2013, 2013-15501-I, the applicant alleges that on August 23, 2013 he filed a formal request for a stay of proceedings at the SBT. As of the filing of the Application the applicant had not received a response from the SBT or the City.

78On November 5, 2013 the applicant filed 10 Applications: 2013-15934-I; 2013-15935-I; 2013-15936-I; 2013-15937-I; 2013-15939-I; 2013-15940-I; 2013-15941-I; 2013-15942-I; 2013-15943-I and 2013-15944-I. In each the applicant alleged that the SBT failed to respond to requests for reconsideration he filed on February 6, 7 and February 11, 2013 contrary to s. 79(5) of O. Reg. 134/98 and SBT Practice Direction 2.

79On or about November 12, 2013 the applicant filed 9 Applications: 2013-16012-I; 2013-16013-I; 2013-16014-I; 2013-16015-I; 2013-16016-I; 2013-16017-I; 2013-16018-I; 2013-16019-I and 2013-16020-I. These nine relate to requests for reasons for decisions in connection with a number of SBT files. He alleges that, contrary to section 17. 1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”), the SBT has failed to respond.

80These Applications are dismissed because they have no reasonable prospect of success. On their face the narratives disclose nothing which engages the Code. More significantly they are a collateral attack on decisions of the SBT which directed that the applicant communicate with it by regular mail. The directions issued on June 8, 28 and September 20, 2012 are a matter of record. The respondent advises that in each of the circumstances above the alleged failure to respond to his requests for reconsideration etc. was because the applicant failed to comply with the SBT’s directions and made his requests electronically.

81The assertion of the respondent in this regard is the kind of fact which can be accepted in that the directions of the Tribunal are a matter of record. I also note that on repeated occasions the applicant has similarly declined to comply with my Directions that he communicate with this Tribunal by regular mail. Finally these facts which are readily capable of belief are not disputed by the applicant and in fact in 2013-15428-I the applicant alludes to the SBT’s directions. Accordingly I accept that the applicant’s various requests were not processed because they were made contrary to the SBT’s directions issued to control its processes and proceedings. Accordingly, these Applications amount to a collateral attack on the orders of the SBT and consequently are an abuse of process.

Legal Aid Ontario

82In this Application 2013-15816-I filed on October 23, 2013 the applicant alleges discrimination in goods and services on the basis of each protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association.

83In this Application the applicant alleges that on October 22, 2013 he sent an email regarding the refusal of a member of the LAO’s criminal law panel to provide effective legal representation. On October 23 the applicant from 7:05 a.m. to 11:13 a.m. sent a series of five emails to the same individual raising the same concern. The applicant alleges that at 11:58 a.m. he received an email from this individual asking that he restrict his email communications to General Counsel as this individual had been designated to deal with all communications from the applicant. The applicant alleges that he immediately called General Counsel but was left with the “impression” that this individual was not prepared to address the concern.

84This Application must be dismissed because, even assuming that all of the facts plead are true, there is no apparent connection to the Code and the allegation that the response of LAO’s staff was discriminatory is pure assertion without factual foundation.

Salvation Army

85In these three Applications, 2013-15902-I, 2013-16009-I, and 2013-16101-I, the applicant alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of record of offences and reprisal. In the first of these three Applications the applicant alleges that he was informed by an employee of the respondent that he would be required to submit to a criminal background check. The applicant alleges that he complained and was told that his complaint had been referred to their Legal Department for response. The applicant alleges that this referral was a delay tactic.

86In Application 2013-16009-I the applicant alleges that he made the internal complaint referred to above on October 28, 2013 and that on the same day he was told that his complaint had been referred to the respondent’s legal department. He then purported to file a human rights application, presumably Application 2013-16009-I, and emailed a copy to the respondent. In Application 2013-16101-I the applicant then alleges that on October 31 he was advised that “until these issues have been resolved it will not be possible to for you to volunteer”. The applicant alleges that is a reprisal.

87These three Applications must be dismissed because they have no reasonable prospect of success. As with all of the others considered here, there are no facts plead which connect the actions of the respondent to the grounds claimed. So, for example, the applicant does not indicate that he is a person with a record of offence for which a pardon has not been granted. In any case it is not discrimination under the Code for an employer to request a criminal records check of an employee or volunteer. I am also not persuaded that in these circumstances the refusal of the respondent to employ the applicant as a volunteer “until these issues have been resolved” can be reasonably seen to point to an intent to reprise for the applicant having raised a human rights claim.

Sound Times

88In this Application, 2013-16050-I, the applicant alleges that around the beginning of September 2013 he contacted the respondent asking for assistance. He alleges he left emails and voice mails which were ignored. This is alleged to have been discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of every protected ground except for age, receipt of public assistance and record of offences.

89This Application is dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success. On the face of the narrative there is nothing to connect the alleged actions to a Code ground other than the applicant’s assertion.

90In addition what is left out of the Application, according to the respondent, is the fact that the applicant was seeking legal services from the respondent. These are services which the respondent does not provide and the applicant was made aware of this fact.

91Given the respondent’s advice about the nature of the applicant’s request and the services the respondent provides, which in the circumstances I am entitled to accept for reasons set out above in respect of the SBT Applications, I would also note that there is nothing discriminatory about declining to provide a service that in fact you do not provide.

The Ombudsman of the City of Toronto

92In these two Applications the applicant alleges discrimination in goods and services on the basis of every ground in the Code except for age, record of offences, receipt of public assistance and association. In Application 2013-16038-I filed on November 11, 2013 the applicant reiterates an allegation above that he received correspondence from the City Ombudsman with respect to his travel allowance. The applicant alleges that he brought his allegation that the denial of this allowance was discriminatory to the attention of the City Ombudsman but the respondent refused to “resolve” the matter. In Application 2013-16051-I filed on November 14, 2013 the applicant appears to re-state essentially the same allegations as above with the addition of an allegation of reprisal based on Application 2013-16038-I.

93These Applications must be dismissed as well. As with all of these Applications there is simply nothing that connects the alleged event, in this case an alleged failure to resolve an issue, with the Code. Similarly there are no facts plead that would tend to establish that the respondent intended to not “resolve” his other disputes because of an Application filed mere days before. I note as well that while the applicant alleges that the failure to resolve the dispute had been going on for weeks he also claims that the same failure was a reprisal for an Application to this Tribunal mere days after he provided a copy of the Application to the Tribunal. This casts considerable doubt on the good faith of the applicant in making these Applications which I will consider with many other issues below.

ABUSE OF PROCESS AND VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

94As indicated above I also find that these Applications should be dismissed as an abuse of process.

95As is set out above, the applicant has filed an extraordinary number of Applications. He also gave every indication that he would continue to do so. I therefore issued directions that the Tribunal would not process any further applications pending the conclusion of the summary hearing. As also indicated, the applicant has chosen to file serial applications in respect of single discrete interactions which he alleges are discriminatory. Often he has filed more than one application arising out of the same inter-action. See, for example, the several Applications arising out of meeting with employees of the City on November 12, 2013.

96The volume of Applications filed by the applicant posed problems for the applicant himself who on more than one occasion requested the Tribunal’s assistance to ensure that he was not filing duplicates of Applications already filed. Despite these efforts it is clear from the narrative above that several of the Applications are essentially reiterations of allegations already made in prior Applications and in some instances appear to be the same Application simply re-filed. In this regard I note again that in 2013-15387-I while the applicant identified only Neighbourhood Legal Services as the respondent the allegations appear to relate to another legal aid clinic.

97The Applications are also entirely without merit. As indicated above in the analysis of the individual Applications there is nothing in them that would tend to establish a violation of the Code. At best they are indications that the applicant was dissatisfied with the service he received from the various respondents.

98There is also substantial reason to question the good faith of the applicant in filing many of these Applications. In addition to the sheer volume and the concomitant interlocutory requests and objection which now number in the hundreds, the applicant appears to have deliberately obscured the true nature of the dispute he had with the respondents. This is clearly the case of the SBT Applications in which the applicant only obliquely alludes that the source of the dispute were directions of the SBT that he communicate with it by regular mail. Similarly with the Sound Times Application the applicant chose not to disclose the fact that he was asking for services that the respondent did not provide.

99The Tribunal has the authority, indeed the responsibility, to make such Orders as are necessary to prevent an abuse of its process. Section 23(1) of the SPPA provides as follows:

A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

100Similarly Rule A8 of the Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario Common Rules found in Part 1 of the HRTO’s Rules of Procedure applies to these proceedings and provides as follows:

A8 ABUSE OF PROCESS

A8.1 The tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

A8.2 Where the tribunal finds that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the tribunal may find that person to be a vexatious litigant and dismiss the proceeding as an abuse of process for that reason. It may also require a person found to be a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the tribunal to commence further proceedings or take further steps in a proceeding.

101The Tribunal has, where the circumstances warrant it, exercised these powers to dismiss Applications. See Drenic v. Governing Council of the Salvation Army, 2010 HRTO 1667; Carlos v. Scher Law, 2010 HRTO 2019 and Bingham v. Roach Schwartz Law Office, 2011 HRTO 15. The parties, in particular counsel for the Co-operators, provided further case law which supports the Tribunal’s obligation to make these kinds of orders.

102In my view there could be no clearer case of an abuse of process by a party to a Tribunal proceeding. As set out briefly above the applicant has filed an extraordinary number of Applications in a matter of weeks. It appears that in many cases the applicant would file an Application within hours of a single transaction with a respondent, only to file another Application the next day alleging further violations.

103As previously suggested there is also reason to believe that some of these Applications were not filed in good faith. In addition to the issues discussed above the applicant in a not unusual pattern would file an application (or internal complaint as in the Applications 2013-15391-I and 2013-15393-I) against Person X, then send a copy to that person (which I observe is not consistent with the Tribunal’s Rules), then make contact with Person X, allege an unsatisfactory interaction with Person X and then claim it was a reprisal for the Application recently delivered to him or her. The problematic nature of the manner in which the applicant sought to entrap respondents is most clearly revealed in the Applications as against the Ombudsman for the City of Toronto discussed above, where although the applicant alleged on October 25, 2013 in 2013-16038-I that the respondent’s discrimination was ongoing for some weeks, the same actions or inactions were also, on November 14, a reprisal for the October 25, 2013 Application.

104In addition to the extraordinary number of Applications, the applicant filed a correspondingly large volume of Requests for Order; Requests for Reconsideration and Responses to Requests for Order which were in fact challenges to Tribunal decisions. Every determination of the Tribunal was resisted and challenged on spurious grounds. As set out in my Case Assessment Direction of December 19, 2013 the applicant filed 125 Requests of various kinds. Even after my Direction that he cease filing such Requests until the summary hearing was held a great number more were filed. The volume of material generated by the applicant imposed a significant burden on the resources of the parties as well as the Tribunal.

105In addition to generating a veritable mountain of Applications and Requests the applicant has routinely failed to comply with the Tribunal’s directions and orders. So, for example, the applicant has continued to ignore the Tribunal’s direction that these Applications be consolidated by respondent. This direction was made for a number of reasons including reducing the administrative burden on the parties and the Tribunal in simply managing the paper generated in this case. Despite this Direction the applicant continued to file Requests, etc. in respect of each separate Application. So, for example, on January 15, 2014, beginning about mid-day, the applicant began filing multiple Requests to adjourn the consolidated summary hearing scheduled for the next day. It appears that he filed 35 such Requests in respect of these 58 Applications before he stopped. I note again that despite my Direction that no further Requests be filed pending the conclusion of the summary hearing several counsel advised that he continued to do so through the month of December.

106The applicant’s Requests for an adjournment were also not made in accordance with the Tribunal’s Practice Direction which requires that such requests be made at least 7 days before the hearing absent exceptional circumstances. There were no exceptional circumstances reported by the applicant and the Requests were without any merit. As I observed in the Interim Decision denying the requests there was nothing that would have prevented the requests being made in accordance with the Tribunal’s Rules and Practice Direction. Finally I have considered the applicant’s failure to attend the hearing and his allegation that he attempted to do so but could not. In the circumstance this claim is impossible to accept for the reasons set out above.

107In light of the lack of merit of any of these Applications, the indication that several of them may not have not been made in good faith, and their sheer volume it is difficult not to conclude that they were filed in large part to vex, harass and punish the respondents for their not immediately responding positively to whatever request the applicant made of them. To my mind it is clear that these Applications have been filed for an improper purpose and therefore constitute an abuse of process and must be dismissed for that reason as well.

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

108As previously discussed, the SPPA and the Tribunal’s Rules allow, indeed require, the Tribunal to control its own process. The Tribunal has found that in exceptional circumstances, it has the power to declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and to prevent an applicant from filing further applications without first obtaining leave of the Tribunal. Such Orders can prevent the filing of applications against anyone or may be confined to one or more respondents. See Drenic v. Governing Council of the Salvation Army, 2010 HRTO 1667; Abdul v. University of Toronto, 2011 HRTO 2299 and Ruffolo v. Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc., 2013 HRTO 728.

109In a further Tribunal Decision, Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 1331 at paragraphs 27 and 28, the Tribunal reviewed the test to be applied when determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant:

The seminal decision on the factors that Courts have considered in determining whether an individual is a vexatious litigant were described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Foy v. Foy (No.2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220. These factors are summarized in the decision of Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, [1987] O.J. No . 355 (H.C.):

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; and

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

110The Tribunal added at paragraph 29:

It is not necessary that all of these factors be present in order for an individual to be declared a vexatious litigant. In order to declare the applicant to be a vexatious litigant, I must be satisfied on an objective standard that the applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself in a vexatious manner during the proceedings.

111I am satisfied on an objective standard that the applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds filed applications intended largely to vex and harass the various respondents above. In my view the circumstances described above are capable of no other interpretation.

112Considering the factors enumerated by the court in Foy, above, I find that in one way or another all of those circumstances are present here. In coming to the conclusion I have considered all of the concerns giving rise to the abuse of process finding above and will not repeat them here. However a few of them bear highlighting again.

113I have concluded for the reasons set out above that these Applications have no reasonable prospect of success because they make no apparent connection to the Code grounds claimed. I have also concluded that the Applications should be dismissed as an abuse of process both because of their sheer volume and all of the surrounding circumstances which clearly evidence an intent to harass, vex and punish the respondents for their perceived failures to respond to the applicant in the manner of his choosing.

114I have also considered the fact that the applicant has consistently refused to comply with Tribunal Directions most particularly that he not communicate with the Tribunal electronically. Subsequent to my Direction that he communicate with the Tribunal only by regular mail, as of December 19, 2013 alone, the applicant had electronically filed 77 Requests for Order and at least 72 Reconsideration Requests. The applicant also appears to have filed 55 further Applications electronically before December 19, 2013. These filings were in addition to a great number of ordinary emails. I have made no attempt to calculate the volume of electronic correspondence or filings that may have been made between December 19, 2013 and the time when the applicant began filing voluminous numbers of separate adjournment requests on January 15, 2014, one half-day before the scheduled summary hearing date.

115I have also considered the fact that the applicant has made a number of unfounded allegations about the conduct of counsel for one or more respondents as well as the Tribunal and its staff. So, for example, the applicant alleges that counsel for the Co-operators has lied and mislead the Tribunal. He also alleges that counsel is conspiring with the Tribunal against him in some way. Similarly he has made repeated baseless allegations that I have lied and that I and the Registrar of the Tribunal have conspired with one or more of the parties to defeat his rights. These allegations are baseless and as with his Applications generally the applicant pleads no facts to support the claim.

116For all of these reasons I confirm my ruling made orally at the hearing that the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant. I also find that the applicant should be prevented from filing an application against any respondent not just the ones identified in these cases without leave of the Tribunal. I make this finding because it appears that the applicant’s approach in these matters is somewhat indiscriminate. The issues with these Applications as set out above are largely similar for all of the respondents and there is no apparent connection between many of them. As such, there is no reason to be confident that there was some identifiable underlying concern on the applicant’s part that connects these respondents in some way such that the kinds of abuse described above might not be visited on some other respondent(s).

117This conclusion does not of course mean that if the applicant believes that he has experienced discrimination prohibited by the Code he may not file an application; only that he must first obtain the Tribunal’s consent before it will be processed.

ORDER

118I make the following orders:

1. The Applications listed above are dismissed.

2. The applicant is declared a vexatious litigant. I order that the applicant Clive Roy may not file further applications at this Tribunal without leave of the Tribunal.

3. If the applicant seeks leave of the Tribunal to file any such future application he must include with his compete application submissions that outline why the application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights, is not intended to vex the respondents and will not result in an abuse of process. The Tribunal will consider any future applications which fail to include these submissions as incomplete and will treat them as such.