HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belair Insurance Company Inc. and Barry Rosenthal Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belair Insurance Company Inc. and Barry Rosenthal Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Barry Rosenthal, Carla Smith, Elvira De La Garza, Denise Beckles, Nicole Meaney and Judy Venables Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belair Insurance Company Inc. and Gloria Chabot Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services, Gloria Chabot and Keith Meloff Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belairdirect and Gloria Chabot Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Achille Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Finance, Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc. and State Farm Insurance Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

John Ruffolo Applicant

-and-

Belairdirect Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: May 1, 2013

File Numbers: 2011-09212-I; 2011-09254-I; 2011-10522-I; 2012-12757-I

Citation: 2013 HRTO 728

Indexed as: Ruffolo v. Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc.

APPEARANCES

Achille Ruffolo, Applicant Self-represented (Written submissions only)

Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc., Barry Rosenthal, Carla Smith, Elvira De la Garza, Denise Beckles, Nicole Meaney, Judy Venables and Gloria Chabot, State Farm Insurance Respondents Gina Saccoccia Brannan, Counsel

The Crown in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Finance, Respondent Riverfront medical Services, Respondent Lori Patyk and Jessica Fiore, Counsel Golbon Mehrabkhani and Keith Edwards Counsel

Dr. Meloff, Respondent Andrew McCutcheon, Counsel

1These are applications filed pursuant to section 34 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”) alleging discrimination in services on the basis of disability, and reprisal.

Background

2This Decision deals with a Request for Order filed by Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc. (“Belairdirect”) and the individual respondents Barry Rosenthal, Carla Smith, Elvira De la Garza, Denise Beckles, Nicole Meaney, Judy Venables and Gloria Chabot (the “Belair respondents”). This Request has been referred to in the various Decisions and Directions of the Tribunal as the January 31 Request or Request. Subsequent to the initial filing of this Request the other respondents identified above adopted the position taken by the Belair respondents. I note that in the various applications filed against Belairdirect the corporate respondent has been variously named and referred to as “Belair”, “Belairdirect”, “Belair Insurance Company Inc.”, and “Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc.” For clarity, this is the same corporate respondent and its correct legal name is Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc.

3In their Request the respondents seek the dismissal of these Applications as an abuse of the Tribunal’s process. They also seek an Order declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant before the Tribunal and that he not be permitted to file any Applications with the Tribunal without leave. Alternatively the Belair respondents seek an Order that the applicant not be permitted to file any Applications against it or any of its employees without first obtaining leave of the Tribunal.

4For the reasons that follow the Requests of the respondents are granted in part. I find that these Applications are an abuse of process and in the circumstances should be dismissed. I also find that the applicant is a vexatious litigant and that it would be appropriate to make the alternative Order requested by the Belair respondents.

5The applicant alleges he was involved in an automobile vehicle accident in September 2009. He applied for and received certain benefits under the Statutory Automobile Accident Benefits Schedule (“SABs”), a regulation made pursuant to the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990. C. I-9. Although this is not entirely clear from the material, the applicant may not have received all of the SABs benefits he has claimed. He also has taken issue with Belairdirects’s attempts to have him assessed in the adjusting process of his various claims. Significantly, the applicant has not engaged the dispute resolution procedure for disputes concerning SABs benefits, under the Insurance Act.

6Belairdirect is an insurer providing amongst other products, automobile insurance. At the time of the motor vehicle accident the applicant had a contract of insurance with the respondent Belairdirect. The individual respondents Nicole Fletcher, Barry Rosenthal; Gloria Chabot; Carla Smith; Elvira De la Garza; Denise Beckles; Nicole Meaney; and Judy Venables are or were at the material times employees of Belairdirect.

7Riverfront Medical Services (“Riverfront”) amongst other things, provides medical assessments for insurers and others and in this case apparently provided assessments to Belairdirect during the management of the applicant’s SABs claims.

8State Farm Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was the insurer of the third party vehicle which the applicant alleges struck his vehicle in the September 2009 motor vehicle accident.

9The applicant has filed at least 17 Applications with the Tribunal between February 22, 2010 and December 2012. In 8 of the Applications the applicant named Belairdirect and several of its employees as respondents. In three Applications the applicant has named service providers used by Belairdirect in its assessment of his SABs claims. These include the respondents Riverfront Medical Services, Focus Assessments Inc., and Evolve Assessments and Diagnostics Inc. (“Evolve”) and one of its assessors.

10In another Application the applicant named a former Member of the Tribunal who had been adjudicating the instant Applications, as well as counsel for Belairdirect in these cases. This Application was dismissed in Ruffolo v. Liang, 2012 HRTO 360. Most recently the applicant filed two Applications (2012-12756-I; 2012-12813-1) against the Tribunal in November 2012 alleging discrimination by the Tribunal and its members in relation to the adjudication of these many Applications. These Applications were dismissed as abandoned in Ruffolo v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2013 HRTO 245 and Ruffalo v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2013 HRTO 247 (sic) when the applicant failed to respond to Notices of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) requiring submissions on whether the applications were jurisdictional.

11Although not referred to by the respondents in their argument the applicant has filed at least two other Applications, Tribunal files 2010-04869-I and 2010-04994-I both of which were dismissed as abandoned in 2010 HRTO 2167 when the applicant failed to respond to NOIDs. A NOID was issued in both cases because it appeared that the Application might be dismissed pursuant to s. 53(8) of the Code which requires the dismissal of an Application where it has already been the subject matter of a complaint to the Ontario Human Rights Commission.

The Applications

12The Applications at issue in this case can be summarized as follows.

13In February 2010 the applicant filed an Application (Tribunal file 2010-04908-I against the Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Finance, State Farm and Belairdirect alleging that the SABs discriminates on the basis of disability because it provides different levels of benefits with different levels of impairment. This Application was withdrawn by the applicant with leave of the Tribunal in September 2010.

14In the 7 Applications the applicant has filed naming Belairdirect as one of the respondents since February 2010 the applicant has alleged that the conduct of the respondents in handling his claims for SABs benefits has been in reprisal for the first Application which he withdrew.

15The first of these Applications, 2010-05633-I, was filed on May 10, 2010. In this Application the applicant alleged that the denial of a treatment plan by the respondent Fletcher was reprisal for the applicant having filed the first Application. This Application was dismissed by the Tribunal in Ruffolo v. Fletcher, 2011 HRTO 1819 because in the Tribunal’s opinion it had no reasonable prospect of success.

16The next three Applications (2010-06072-I; 2010-06409-I and 2010-06916-I) were filed on June 21, July 23 and September 24, 2010 respectively. In these three Applications the applicant alleged that Belairdirect by the actions of one its employees, the respondent Rosenthal, were reprising against him for his having filed the first Application. In the final Application of these three, the applicant alleges that Rosenthal enlisted the help of Carla Smith, Elvi De La Garza, Denise Beckles, Nicole Meaney and Judy Venables to “retaliate and defeat” the applicant’s claims under the SABs.

17The respondents filed detailed Responses to each of these three Applications. The applicant filed a Reply in only one of these cases.

18These three cases were scheduled for a summary hearing to determine whether all or part of them should be dismissed because they had no reasonable prospect of success. The summary hearing has never occurred for reasons which will be discussed in more detail below.

19In 2010-07252-I filed on October 25, 2010 the applicant repeats the allegations made in the prior Applications and adds the allegation that the respondent Chabot reprised against him in allegedly not responding to emails he claims to have sent.

20The respondents filed a Response to this Application; the applicant did not file a Reply.

21In Tribunal file 2011-09212-I filed on June 16, 2011 the respondents include Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services and one of its assessors, Dr. Keith Meloff. The applicant alleges that the respondents conspired together to change Dr. Meloff’s assessment of him in order to defeat his claims to SABs benefits and in reprisal for his prior Applications. In an Interim Decision Ruffolo v. Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services, 2011 HRTO 2065 the respondents were directed not to file a Response to the Application and it was held in abeyance pending the respondents’ filing of this Request.

Other Applications

22The applicant has filed other Applications in relation to alleged discriminatory treatment of his SABs claims. In 2010-6178-I the applicant alleges that Focus Assessments Inc. discriminated against him in requiring him to sign consents to release medical information. The Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held to determine whether or not all or part of the Application should be dismissed because it had no reasonable prospect of success. The Application was dismissed in Ruffolo v. Focus Assessments Inc., 2011 HRTO 1820 because it was concluded that it had no reasonable prospect of success.

23A further Application, Tribunal file 2011-09254-I, was filed on June 22, 2011 and in it the applicant alleged that the respondents Belairdirect and Chabot were not paying him certain SAB’s benefits because he had filed “numerous Applications” at the Tribunal. This Application was not delivered to the respondents directly but was provided to their counsel at the instance of the Tribunal and was held in abeyance pending the determination of this Request. See Ruffolo v. Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services, 2011 HRTO 2065.

24The applicant also filed an Application, Tribunal file 2010-06365-I, against Evolve, a service provider used by Belairdirect in adjusting accident benefit claims. In this Application the applicant repeats many of the allegations made in his other Application involving these respondents. In this Application the applicant alleges that Evolve retaliated against him for insisting on his rights under the Code. A summary hearing was scheduled in this case but did not proceed for reasons that will be discussed in more detail below. The Application was ultimately dismissed as abandoned in Ruffolo v. Evolve Assessments and Diagnostics Inc., 2011 HRTO 1696 when the applicant failed to attend a re-scheduled hearing.

25As indicated the applicant filed a further Application on November 24, 2011 (file 2011-10378-I) alleging discrimination by the Vice-chair adjudicating many of the applicant’s applications and counsel for the Belair respondents. This Application was dismissed.

26A further Application was filed on December 14, 2011 against Belairdirect, State Farm and the Province of Ontario. In a CAD issued on March 6, 2012 the Tribunal noted that the allegations made were the subject of the first Application, Tribunal file 2010-04908-I, which was withdrawn by the applicant on September 23, 2010. The Tribunal directed that this Application should be dealt with together with the applicant’s other outstanding applications.

The Processing of these Applications

The Belairdirect Applications

27In a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) issued on February 15, 2011 the Tribunal directed that the 5 Belairdirect Applications filed to that point in time as well as the Evolve Assessment Application be scheduled for a summary hearing by tele-conference to determine whether all or part of them should be dismissed because they had no reasonable prospect of success. As is often the case the Tribunal made further Directions as follows:

a) the parties were directed to deliver and file any further documents they intended to rely on 14 days prior to the hearing;

b) At the same time the applicant was directed to deliver a Reply to each Response filed by the respondents stating whether he agreed or disagreed with any facts alleged by the Responses and if he disagreed setting out his alternative version of the fact, and;

c) Copies of the Applications and Responses would be shared with all of the Respondents upon request.

28The applicant subsequently wrote to the Tribunal and claimed to be a person with a cognitive impairment and requested that a separate hearing be held for each of these six Applications.

29In a CAD issued on February 7, 2011 the Tribunal directed that the applicant provide the Tribunal with medical evidence in support of the assertion that he was a person with a cognitive and mental disability that required the separate scheduling of a summary hearing for each of the Applications.

30In response to this CAD the applicant filed four documents three of which were found to be inadequate. The Tribunal made further Directions to the applicant to provide further medical information in a CAD issued on March 7, 2011. The applicant filed further information and in a CAD issued on March 11, 2011 the Tribunal rescinded that part of its February 15, 2011 CAD which provided that the summary hearings of the 6 Applications be heard together and instead directed that they be heard separately in person in two hour sessions. The parties were directed to provide their availability between May and June 2011. In an Interim Decision dated May 2, 2011 the Tribunal directed that the Summary hearings of these six Applications proceed by telephone conference call on June 15, July 5, July 6 in the morning and in the afternoon, July 20 in the morning and afternoon. See Ruffolo v. Fletcher, 2011 HRTO 851.

31After these dates had been set in the Interim Decision the applicant requested the adjournment of the hearings scheduled on the afternoons of July 6 and July 20, on the basis that he could only attend one per day and in any case was not available at those times. These requests were granted and the Summary Hearing in these cases were scheduled to be heard on October 18 and 21, 2011 respectively.

32The Evolve Application had been previously scheduled to proceed on April 26. The applicant requested an adjournment of this hearing but it was denied.

33On June 21, 2011 the applicant requested that all of the Belairdirect and Evolve Summary Hearings be adjourned until 30 days after the respondents had produced his SABs claim files. The applicant had never requested this production in any of the Tribunal proceedings. This request was denied by the Tribunal on June 30, 2011 in Ruffolo v. Fletcher, 2011 HRTO 1253.

34On June 22, 2011 the Belairdirect respondents delivered a number of documents to the applicant in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions. In a series of emails the applicant delivered and filed voluminous materials included the Code, Practice Directions of the Tribunal and other materials. The applicant indicated that these materials were related to the Belairdirect Applications but he has never referred to any of this material in subsequent proceedings.

35On June 29, 2011 the applicant requested the adjournment of the July 6, 2011 Summary Hearing. The respondents consented to the request and an agreement was reached to reschedule this hearing to July 11, 2011 in the morning.

36On July 8, 2011 after receiving materials from the Belair respondents which were said to be in anticipation of a July 20, 2011 hearing, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal and the parties claiming not to be aware of a July 20, 2011 hearing and he claimed that he was “away for the rest of the summer after the July 11 hearing.”

37On July 11, 2011 the summary hearing 2010-06916-I was held. Despite having insisted that these Applications be separated the applicant was unable to speak to the issues raised in this Application without referring to several of the other Applications involving Belairdirect and Rosenthal. Ultimately the applicant agreed that he could not separate the allegations he had made against the individual respondent in several of the cases and that they had to be addressed together. The Tribunal directed as follows in a CAD issued on July 14, 2011:

a. The summary hearing in Tribunal File No. 2010-06916-I, scheduled for July 20, 2011 is adjourned;

b. The summary hearing by conference call in Tribunal File No. 2010-06409-I currently scheduled for October 18, 2011 is cancelled;

c. Tribunal File Nos. 2010-06916-I; 2010-06409-I and 2010-06072-I will proceed to an in-person summary hearing together on October 18, 2011. A Notice of Hearing will follow;

d. On or before September 30, 2011, the parties will deliver to each other and file with the Tribunal briefs of documents in paper form, tabbed and bound, containing only the documents they intend to refer to and rely on for the purpose of the summary hearing on October 18, 2011. The Tribunal requires one paper copy, and one electronic copy of each brief of documents.

e. The applicant has indicated that he may file written submissions for the October 18, 2011 hearing, in “Powerpoint” format. If he does, he must file this electronically by September 30, 2011.

38On August 8, 2011 the applicant requested a further adjournment of all Summary Hearings until the Belair respondents paid one of his benefits claims under the SABs. This request was denied in Ruffolo v. Belair Insurance Company Inc., 2011 HRTO 1647.

39The Belair respondents filed their materials in anticipation of the Summary Hearing scheduled to take place on October 18, 2011. The applicant did not file any materials and did not file any written submissions or the powerpoint document he had indicated he might (see Directions above). The applicant also did not comply with the Directions made on February 15, 2011 to file a Reply to the Belair respondents’ Response setting out what facts he agreed with or disagreed with respect to these various allegations.

40On October 18, 2011 at 7:34 a.m. the applicant sent an email to the Tribunal and the respondents stating that he could not attend the hearing due to a migraine. In 2011 HRTO 1882 the Tribunal described the circumstances as follows:

In these three Applications, the parties agreed to have the summary hearings proceed together on October 18, 2011. The parties also agreed to have the hearing in person, in Toronto. The Tribunal confirmed the hearing date in a Case Assessment Direction dated July 14, 2011 sent to the parties, as well as providing other directions in connection with the hearing. A Notice of Hearing was also sent to the parties on September 29, 2011, confirming the time, date and place of the hearing.

On the morning of the hearing, at 7:34 a.m., the applicant sent email correspondence to the Tribunal, copied to counsel for the respondents, the entire text of which reads:

I am not able to attend this mornings hearing due to a migraine.

At the time scheduled for the hearing, the applicant did not appear. Counsel for the respondents was present, and made submissions about how the Tribunal should proceed with these Applications.

41After hearing the submissions of the respondents in those cases the Tribunal directed as follows:

1. These Applications will be adjourned pending the filing of a Request for an Order During Proceedings by the respondents requesting that the Applications be dismissed as an abuse of process and the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant before the Tribunal;

2. The Request shall be filed on or before January 31, 2012;

3. The Tribunal will determine how to proceed with these Applications following receipt of the Request and Response to the Request, if any.

42As regards Applications 2010-07253-I; 2011-09212-I and 2011-09254-I the Tribunal directed that these Applications be adjourned or held in abeyance pending the determination of the respondents’ Request above (the instant Request). See Interim Decisions Ruffolo v. Belair Insurance Company Inc., 2011 HRTO 1902 and Ruffolo v. Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services, 2011 HRTO 2065.

43Later in response to a Request for Summary Hearing filed by the respondents in 2011-09212-I to which the applicant did not respond, the Tribunal determined that it would be appropriate to direct a summary hearing in Tribunal files2011-09212-I, 2011-09254-I, and 2011-10522-I. The Tribunal also directed that the summary hearings of all of these related cases be heard together and that the parties be prepared to address the January 31 Request of the Belair respondents at the same hearing.

The Focus Assessments Inc. Applications

44In a CAD dated November 17, 2010 the Tribunal granted the respondents’ Request for a Summary hearing and directed that a half-day Summary Hearing be held by teleconference. The applicant asked, as an accommodation of a cognitive disability, that the Summary Hearing be held in person, and was advised that he could attend the hearing in person at the Tribunal’s Hearing Centre. The applicant subsequently advised that he had a doctor’s appointment on the date scheduled for the Summary Hearing and requested that it be adjourned to another date. The applicant was directed to provide documentation of the appointment and did so. The hearing was then re-scheduled to take place on April 26, 2011.

45On March 26, 2011 the applicant requested a further adjournment of the Summary Hearing until his driver’s licence was reinstated and a depressive episode resolved. He stated that his driver’s license had been suspended, as a result of a neurologist’s report. The applicant states that he was therefore unable to attend the Summary Hearing and, as well, the suspension of the license had triggered a depressive episode that resulted in an inability to fully participate in the Summary Hearing. He stated that his appeal of the driver’s license suspension will take at least six weeks. The adjournment request was denied because of the lack of documentation to substantiate his claims that a PTSD prevents him from travelling as a passenger instead of a driver in order to attend the hearing on that date, and that he is experiencing a depressive episode that results in an inability to participate in the summary hearing. See Ruffolo v. Focus Assessments, 2011 HRTO 682.

46On April 15, 2011 the applicant requested a change of venue for the Summary Hearing and provided a letter from a psychologist which stated, among other things, that the applicant was receiving treatment for several disorders. The letter stated that the applicant meets the diagnostic criteria for, among other things “Specific Phobia (Driver and Passenger Types)”. The letter also set out the applicant’s reports of mood swings, stating that “he has low mood most of the time” and that “when he is feeling depressed, he prefers to stay home and isolate himself from others.

47After reviewing the history of the Focus Assessments Application the Tribunal considered this latest request of the applicant in Ruffolo v. Focus Assessments, 2011 HRTO 763 at paras. 19 to 22:

In light of the history of this matter and the various communications from the applicant, I have some scepticism about the present request for accommodation. His requests for adjournments and accommodation have been based on conflicting and changing needs. For instance, although the applicant had previously asked to attend the summary hearing in person, the letter of April 15 suggests that he is largely unable to leave his home. Although he asked to postpone the hearing until his driver’s license was reinstated, the letter of April 15 suggests he is unable to drive, with or without a license.

The Tribunal wishes to establish a hearing process that takes account of the applicant’s needs for accommodation. However, it must also take account of the respondents’ and the public’s interests in having the matter heard expeditiously and fairly.

The Tribunal did not require the applicant to file medical evidence in support of his request to attend the summary hearing in person. Subsequent medical evidence filed by the applicant (dated May 7, 2009) supports his need for accommodation in the hearing process arising out of limitations in memory, concentration and organization, as well as fatigue and, on the basis of that evidence, the Tribunal revoked a direction to have seven related files heard together. It is possible to view the limitations as supporting an in-person hearing instead of a conference call but in all the circumstances, given all the information now provided concerning the applicant’s accommodation needs, the Tribunal has determined that accommodation of the applicant’s limitations can be made within the context of a conference call hearing, with respect to a single file only and with an opportunity to provide written submissions in advance of the oral submissions. If it becomes apparent during the summary hearing that the applicant is genuinely unable to participate, the Tribunal will consider the parties’ further submissions at that time.

The Tribunal therefore directs that the summary hearing proceed by conference call as initially set. The applicant sent an email on April 13, 2011, in which he sets out his position on the Application and states that “the facts are not in dispute.” If he has any additional written submissions to make, he may deliver them to the respondent and the Tribunal by noon on Thursday, April 21, 2011. The purpose of the conference call is to hear any additional oral submissions the parties may wish to make.

48On April 21, 2011 the applicant made a further request described in Ruffolo v. Focus Assessments, 2011 HRTO 803 as follows:

The applicant requests, as an accommodation of a communication disability, that “the Tribunal appoint a representative from the OHRC or explore other accommodations to enable me to communicate my thoughts and to communicate with the parties my thoughts in these proceedings.” He asks that the proceedings, which include this one, be adjourned until the matter is dealt with “including any complaints that may rise for failure to accommodate against the Tribunal and any appeals that may follow.” He also asks that “the Tribunal order that the lawyers who get rich at the expense of disabled persons respond so they can keep on billing their clients.”

49The applicant’s request was denied. This Summary Hearing proceeded on April 26, 2011 by telephone conference call. The applicant attended and the Application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success. See Focus Assessments Inc., 2011 HRTO 1820.

The Evolve Application

50A Summary Hearing was directed by the Tribunal in the Evolve Application. It was originally scheduled to take place on June 15, 2011. It was re-scheduled to be heard September 9, 2011 by telephone conference call.

51At 9:14 a.m., the Tribunal received an email from the applicant, stating in its entirety:

I am informing you that i am not able to attend this morning hearing 2010-06409-I Ruffolo and Evolve because of a migraine headache this morning.

52The applicant had previously sought and been denied the adjournment of the Evolve Summary Hearing. Because of the history of this case and the related matters above, noting that the applicant’s requests for adjournments and requests for accommodation were based on “conflicting and changing needs” and that the applicant’s failures to attend appeared to follow failed requests to adjourn the Tribunal directed that the summary hearing of this Application be rescheduled to September 14, 2011. The applicant did not attend the hearing on September 14, 2011 and did not communicate in any way with the Tribunal between September 9 and September 14, 2011. This Application was dismissed as abandoned. See Ruffolo v. Evolve Assessments and Diagnostics Inc., 2011 HRTO 1696.

53In an email dated February 6, 2012, the applicant filed a Request for Order in which he indicated his intent to withdraw “all HRTO complaints against Belairdirect”, and referencing Tribunal files 2010-06072-I; 2010-06409-I; 2010-06916-I; 2010-07253-I; 2011-09212-I, and; 2011-09254-I. Although the email was copied to counsel for the Belair respondents, it was not copied to the respondents Riverfront Medical Services and Keith Meloff, who were additional respondents on file 2010-09212-I. On February 7, 2012 the applicant was requested to file his Request using the proper Form 9 and to provide a Statement of Delivery confirming delivery to each respondent. The applicant had not confirmed his compliance with this request by February 15, 2012 and the Tribunal indicated that no further action would be taken on his request until he confirmed his intention to withdraw.

54Pursuant to a Direction made in a CAD issued on March 6, 2012 the applicant wrote to the Tribunal on April 5, 2012 requesting an accommodation in the hearing process. The request was essentially the same as one previously advanced that the Summary Hearings be scheduled separately in two hour blocks. The applicant provided a brief medical note in support of the request. On April 12, 2012 the Tribunal wrote to the parties acknowledging receipt of the applicant’s request and directed the respondents to deliver and file any response they might have to the accommodation request.

55On April 12, 2012 the applicant corresponded with the Tribunal and took exception to the Tribunal’s request for submissions from the respondents on the accommodation issue, calling it a “stupid question.” The applicant indicated as well that if the request for submissions was not withdrawn he would withdraw the above captioned Applications and file a complaint against the Tribunal for discrimination. The applicant went on to state that as he can no longer effectively pursue his Applications he would no longer participate in what he characterized as a “lynching”. In a CAD issued on April 16, 2012 the respondents were directed to respond to the applicant’s request.

56The respondents objected to the applicant’s request because the medical information provided by the applicant did not justify his request. The respondents proposed as an alternative to one Summary Hearing that the issues be heard over three half days beginning first with the Request at issue in this Decision as it of necessity deals with all of the Applications. In the event that the Request was denied then the other two half day hearings could deal with the Summary Hearing issues of the various Applications. In part the respondents’ proposal seemed to be based on the applicant’s prior acknowledgement that at least three of the Belairdirect Applications had to be heard together.

57In a CAD issued on April 25, 2012 I indicated my agreement with the respondents that the medical information was inadequate:

I agree with the respondent that it is not clear from the brief medical note what understanding its author had of the history of this matter, the issues involved and the nature of the proceeding contemplated by the March 6, 2012 CAD. In particular it does not explain the basis for the identified accommodation nor is it informed by the fact that at one point the applicant himself acknowledged and agreed that several of the summary hearings must be held together because the issues were inextricably linked.

More generally it is not clear that the author of the medical note understands the nature of the proceedings. These are not hearings on the merits of these Applications. The applicant will not be required to give evidence and no other witnesses will be called. Although this has not been expressly proposed by anyone, the applicant has indicated in the past that he may wish to provide written submissions in advance of the hearing. These requests have been granted so it is always open to the applicant to request that he make his initial submissions in writing and therefore confine his remarks to responding to the respondents’ legal submissions.

58Despite these conclusions, I afforded the applicant a further opportunity to provide more information and made quite specific directions about the kind of medical information he might provide. The applicant was specifically asked to provide information and submissions about why he felt that the respondents’ alternative proposal was not acceptable.

59The applicant requested an extension of time to file further medical information. The circumstances of the request were set out in a further CAD issued on May 18, 2012:

This Case Assessment Direction (CAD) responds to a request from the applicant for further time to respond to my CAD issued April 25, 2012 in which I allowed the applicant a further opportunity to make submissions in support of his request for accommodation (request) in the summary hearing process. It appears at this stage that the applicant is intending to rely on a further consultation with Dr. Jett who has previously provided a brief note which appeared to me to be inadequate to justify the extraordinary accommodation being sought by the applicant.

At that time I directed the applicant to provide to whomever he was to consult on this issue with a copy of the April 25, 2012 CAD as well as the CAD issued on March 6, 2012 (misidentified as being issued on March 12, 2012) and the accommodation proposal of the respondents in their email of April 20, 2012.

On the strength of the applicant’s statement that he had an appointment with his treating practitioner in the first week of May, 2012 in the April 25, 2012 CAD I allowed the applicant until June 1, 2012 to provide any further medical evidence he wished to produce in support of his request for accommodation in the hearing process.

On May 16, 2012 approximately two weeks after the applicant was to have consulted with Dr. Jett the applicant wrote to the Tribunal seeking an extension of time to file his further materials and asking for copies of the respondent’s proposal in an email of April 20, 2012 and the misidentified CAD of March 6, 2012 because he claims that he did not receive them. The applicant did not specify how much additional time he required.

60The applicant was granted a further seven days to provide any further medical information he felt would assist him in his request.

61The applicant filed further medical information. In a CAD dated June 27, 2012 the applicant’s request was denied and I directed that a half day hearing would be held to hear submissions on this Request. I also noted that the respondents had provided detailed written submissions in support of the Request in January 2012 and directed that if the applicant wished to make written submissions on the issues he could do so either in advance of the hearing, or at that time. If necessary the remaining issues would be heard on two further half day hearings to be scheduled at a later date.

62On October 15, 2012 the applicant filed a Request to Withdraw these Applications as well as Request to defer them. In a CAD issued on October 16, 2012 I directed that the Request to withdraw could be addressed at the hearing. The other requests were denied being in substance requests to adjourn the hearing again, without basis.

63On October 23, 2012 the applicant filed a Request seeking the “deferral” of the hearing on October 26, 2012 pending the resolution of a new Application in which the applicant named the Tribunal as a respondent. Although described as a deferral, the practical effect of the applicant’s Request was that the hearing scheduled on October 26, 2012 would be adjourned again. The Request was denied in a CAD issued on October 23, 2012.

64The applicant had indicated on a number of occasions that he would not attend the October 26, 2012 hearing but he indicated that he would on October 25, 2012. The applicant also indicated that he intended to record the proceedings and provide written submissions in response at a later date.

65Later on the same day, the applicant requested that the hearing be adjourned to another date in London, Ontario. The applicant claimed that he had moved in June 2012 from the Kitchener area and accordingly it was too far to drive from his new home in Bayfield Ontario, but as noted by the respondents the applicant indicated in the Application filed on October 16, 2012 that his address had not changed and that he lived in the Kitchener area. Similarly in a Request filed by the applicant on October 15, 2012 he indicated that his address was the same address in the Kitchener area as had been on file with the Tribunal for some time. The applicant’s request for an adjournment and change of venue was denied.

66The applicant then indicated in an email received after business hours that he would be attending the hearing but that he would likely be late and the Tribunal should wait until he arrived.

67At the time and place set for the hearing the applicant was not in attendance. Consistent with Tribunal practice and without objection from the respondents, all of whom were in attendance, the hearing was adjourned until shortly after 10:00 a.m. in hopes that the applicant would attend. At 10:07 a.m., the hearing commenced. When the hearing concluded the applicant had not attended. As of the end of the day, October 26, 2012, there was no indication that the applicant had attended at the Tribunal’s Hearing Centre in Toronto where the hearing was scheduled to take place, nor was there any other contact made with the Tribunal by the applicant.

68Notwithstanding the applicant’s non-attendance at the hearing I had proposed to the respondents that the proceedings be recorded and the applicant be afforded an opportunity to respond to the respondents’ submissions in writing after the fact if he wished to do. The respondents agreed to this proposal and the proceedings were recorded. An audio recording of the proceedings was sent to all parties. The applicant was invited to make any submissions he wished to make in writing and the respondent was afforded an opportunity to respond.

69On October 30, 2012 the applicant wrote to the Tribunal with thanks for providing him an opportunity to respond to the respondents’ submissions. The applicant also advised that he had been attempting to come to the hearing but had been in a car accident on the way.

The applicant’s correspondence with respondents

70The respondents rely upon communications between the applicant, the respondents and their counsel in support of their Request that these Applications be dismissed as an abuse of process and the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant before the Tribunal. Although given the opportunity to counter these allegations the applicant chose not do so and I by and large accept them. I also observe that by and large these communications are in writing and to that extent can be verified as to content.

71The respondents argue that the applicant engaged in a campaign to bully them into complying with his demands with respect to his SABs claims. The threats were made irrespective of whether or not the benefit had been paid or was in dispute at the time. The respondents rely upon several email exchanges wherein the applicant immediately accuses the respondents’ staff of reprisal even in circumstances where the requests being made are reasonable and required under the SABs.

72One example is emblematic of the tenor of the communications. The applicant had made a claim for the payment of a vacuum hose. Payment had been made on June 28, 2010 by cheque in accordance with Belairdirect’s practice.

On July 7, 2012 the applicant at 8:56 a.m. "As such I have requested mediation with the FSCO for the actual cost of the item and I don't receive payment by Friday July 20 2010, I will initiate a claim against you in Superior Court personally for bad faith and deceptive practice as interference and misrepresentation to Belairdirect."

Rosenthal replied: "I would strongly recommend you review your correspondence from Belair, as payment in the amount of $450.87 was issued to you by way of cheque on June 28 2010."

The applicant replied at 9:08 a.m. [stating] that there is no deposit in his account and: "Please ensure the check (sic) was sent and is not sitting on your desk inadvertently."

Rosenthal replied at 9:10 a.m.: Cheques do not come to my desk, they are issued automatically. I would recommend that you review your correspondence from Belair to ensure you have not misplaced the cheque. "

Rosenthal offered a solution if Ruffolo could not locate the cheque.

The applicant responded at 9:19 a.m.: "Let's go to court if I don't get an interact transfer online."

Rosenthal responded at 9:28 a.m.: "Belair does not issue payment via direct deposit."

The applicant responded at 10:21 a.m.: "Found the check (sic) in my blue bin, it was accidentally, tossed out with the junk mail."

73The respondents rely on the fact that the applicant repeatedly used the threat of legal action including but not limited to the filing of an Application or Applications with the Tribunal. A review of the correspondence indicates that such threats were routine from an early stage of the applicant making claims to Belairdirect. He did so on June 8, July 7, July 20, September 3, September 20, November 5, and November 14, 2011.

74The respondents rely on two emails the applicant sent on April 20, 2011 after the Tribunal had directed Summary Hearings in all of the Applications filed to that point in time but before their being heard. One of these was referred to earlier in an Interim Decision of the Tribunal but is repeated her for ease of reference. The first email included the following statement:

In order to save the parties time and expense, I had offered to settle all these matters for an amount equivalent to the legal costs that the respondents will encounter.” “In short, the respondents are going to pay their legal advisors an amount to defend these complaints that is (sic) not recoverable win or lose.”

75Later the same day the applicant sent a further email to the Tribunal and counsel for each of the respondents:

I also ask that the Tribunal order that the lawyers who get rich at the expense of disabled persons respond so that they can keep on billing their clients.

76The respondents also argue that in support of his claim of reprisal the applicant resorted to creating a false history by sending communications to the respondents indicating that he had previously said or done certain things or had communications of various kinds with employees of the respondent.

77The respondents rely on what they characterize as unjustified threats against the Tribunal. On April 21, 2011 for example the applicant sent an email to the Tribunal and all counsel for the respondents suggesting that his request to appear in person was an accommodation granted to him, but then goes on to complain:

This is so unfair just because I am a “mental retard” the Tribunal accommodates everything the lawyers ask for but with me I have to jump through hoops to prove my needs. This is differential treatment and I believe that the Trustee of Investigations will be interested in how this Tribunal has treat (sic) me compared to the lawyers.

78In apparent response to Ruffolo v. Belairdirect, Riverfront Medical Services, 2011 HRTO 2065 the applicant wrote to the Tribunal and all of the parties requesting the proper forms to complain about the Vice-chair who had been adjudicating the applicant’s various Applications.

79On November 14 and 15, 2011 in three further emails sent to the Tribunal, the other parties and the Attorney General the applicant sought advice on how to stop these proceedings while he filed an Application against the Vice-chair.

80On November 24, 2011 the applicant filed an Application (2011-10358-I) naming the Vice-chair as a respondent as well as counsel for the Belair respondents. On December 15, 2011 the applicant filed a Request in this Application followed within an hour by a Form 12, Request for Tribunal Ordered Inquiry to inquire into whether or not the Tribunal does accommodate disabilities in its proceedings.

The applicant’s comments about the Tribunal

81In addition to the Applications against the Tribunal and a Vice-chair, the applicant has made a number of baseless other allegations about the Tribunal’s processing of his Applications.

82For example in an email sent to the Tribunal and several of the respondents the applicant stated as follows:

It is quite clear that this tribunal has colluded with respondents to defeat my claim by not accommodating my disability. I ask that these complaints be withdrawn and new ones submitted to allow me to fully participate fully in all the ontario that not disabled persons [sic]. Also I ask the tribunal to allow a discrimination complaint to be adjudicated with a neutral party. Otherwise its like asking the fox to watch the Hen house.

83In the applicant’s submissions after the hearing the applicant alleges that the “hardline approach” to his Applications is in reprisal for a complaint he made about the “Commission” in 2006. As well, as noted above, the applicant has referred to the Tribunal’s process as a “lynching” and that seeking the submissions of the respondents on a request for accommodation by the applicant was a “stupid question”.

The Positions of the Parties

84The respondents argue that these Applications are an abuse of process and should be dismissed for that reason. They argue that they are not legitimate claims and are not about legitimate disputes concerning the applicant’s entitlement to SABs benefits. The respondent argues that if there were legitimate disputes about SABs entitlements the applicant would have engaged the Dispute Resolution system under the Insurance Act which he has not done. They argue that these Applications are intended to vex and harass them with the ultimate goal of coercing a settlement from them to avoid the extraordinary costs of litigation in these multiple proceedings. The respondents argue that it would be unfair to them and to the other applicants with meritorious claims to allow these Applications to proceed any further.

85The applicant did not address most of these issues in his submissions. He reiterates his claim that he was denied an accommodation he needed to participate in this proceeding. However he continues to assert that the only accommodation would have been to deal with each of his Applications separately ignoring the fact that in respect of this Request, it is about the fact that the applicant filed multiple Applications and his conduct in all of them together that is in issue. The applicant asserts that he has been successful in a court proceeding but that the insurance companies have re-written the law to disentitled persons with disabilities.

86The applicant also submits that his Applications including those that have been dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success are legitimate claims. He makes submissions which he has made in other of these cases, that Belairdirect has paid more in assessment fees than some of his benefit claims were worth. Despite this argument being rejected by the Tribunal in Ruffolo v. Fletcher, 2011 HRTO 1819 the applicant continues to assert that this is clear evidence of reprisal. The applicant also submits that Belairdirect was allowed to reprise against him with the approval of the Tribunal. As previously indicated the applicant also submitted that what he characterized as the Tribunal’s hardline approach was in reprisal for a complaint filed with or against the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 2006. The applicant also argues that it cannot be said that all of his Applications are an abuse of process. In particular he argues that the first one could not have been because it was the first one and accordingly it should not be dismissed. I note that the first Application was withdrawn by the applicant.

Analysis

87For the reasons that follow I find that these Applications should be dismissed as an abuse of process. I also find that the applicant is a vexatious litigant and may not file any further Applications against these respondents or any of Belairdirect’s employees except with leave of the Tribunal.

88Section 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (“SPPA”), R.S.O. 1990 c. S. 22 as amended provides as follows:

A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedniogs befor it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

89Rule 1.7 (v.1) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure authorizes the Tribunal:

To make such orders or give such directions as are necessary to prevent abuse of its processes and ensure that the conduct of participants in Tribunal are courteous and respectful of the Tribunal and other participants.

90The Tribunal has made orders pursuant to these provisions where it appears that a party has brought the application for a purpose other than advancing legitimate human rights claims. See Noraghighi v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2009 HRTO 2085 where the Tribunal concluded that the Application was filed to vex and harass the respondent. Similarly, in Khaiter v. York University, 2010 HRTO 1901 I concluded that the applicant had commenced the Application in part because he believed that if he kept the respondent tied up in litigation he could not be fired. In this case I found that this was an abuse of process and the Application was dismissed.

91The Tribunal has also dismissed an Application as an abuse of process where it found that a party had “engaged in a scheme to subvert and abuse the Tribunal’s process” (in this case by fabricating witness statements). See Nyonzima v. Idlewyld Manor, 2011 HRTO 1517.

92The Tribunal has also dismissed an Application in circumstances where the applicant has shown that they would not conduct themselves in accordance with the Tribunal’s Rules requiring that the parties before it treat each other and the Tribunal with courtesy and respect. This obviously depends on the specific facts of the applicant’s conduct, but this has included situations in which applicants have engaged in conduct or made comments that were abusive and disrespectful to the Tribunal or the other parties or have made serious yet unfounded allegations against the Tribunal or another party. Depending on the specific circumstances, it might also, in my view, include consistent failures to comply with the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure or properly respond to the and its directions. See, for example, Drenic v. The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada (“Drenic”), 2010 HRTO 1667.

93In my view the applicant has not treated this proceeding with the seriousness that is required of a litigant before the Tribunal. More specifically, the applicant has consistently failed to comply with the Tribunal’s Directions on various matters. Notwithstanding the Tribunal’s granting of the applicant’s requests for adjournments at various stages of the proceeding and other efforts on the part of the Tribunal to facilitate the applicant’s participation in the process, the applicant failed to file a Reply to the respondents Response as directed in the February 15, 2011 CAD. Moreover instead of complying with the Direction to provide the documents he intended to rely upon 14 days prior to the summary hearing he filed 500 pages of materials, including the Code, none of which appear to be documents he intended to rely. In any event he never referred to any of them in any submissions he made on the issues in these cases.

94The applicant has also failed to attend hearings, sometimes with a last minute excuse for non-attendance and more than once with no explanation at all.

95I also find that the applicant has taken every opportunity to hinder the processing of these Applications. In this category of behaviour I would include his multiple requests for accommodations based on “inconsistent and changing needs” as was noted by the Tribunal in 2011 HRTO 763. I would also include the applicant’s multiple adjournment requests and claims to not be aware of the next step of the proceeding, such as, for example his claim that he was not aware that a hearing had been scheduled for July 20, 2011 notwithstanding the fact that not long before advancing this claim he had requested the adjournment of one of the two hearings that had been scheduled on that day because he was only able to participate in one hearing per day. I find that these claims were strategic and intended to delay proceedings. In my view, using Code-related accommodation requests for the improper purpose of delaying the resolution of ongoing litigation is an egregious abuse of the Tribunal’s process in and of itself. It warrants specific mention because such conduct undermines the important substantive purposes of the Code by threatening to bring into disrepute the integrity of the accommodation process as an important procedural underpinning of ensuring substantive equality of treatment on the basis of Code-related needs.

96I would also include in this category the applicant’s insistence that the Applications all be considered separately, followed by his agreement that at least three of them had to be heard together and then his subsequent request that they all be dealt with separately again.

97I also find based on the applicant’s remarks at various stages of this proceeding that these tactics were intended in large part to punish the respondents by requiring them to incur costs as a consequence of the applicant’s stalling tactics. These tactical manoeuvres on the applicant’s part were also part of the general tactic of attempting to coerce a settlement of his SABs claims. In coming to this conclusion I have considered the applicant’s remark that the Tribunal was his “sledgehammer” to use on the respondents. On two occasions he explicitly referred to the fact that this proceeding was costing the respondents a great deal of money, and on one occasion specifically requested that the Tribunal direct a response from the respondents because it would force them to incur further costs which were not recoverable win or lose. I also have considered his last minute advice, after stating more than once that he would not attend the October 26, 2012 hearing, that he would attend but he would be late and we should wait for him. I find that the applicant had no intention of attending the hearing that day and merely hoped that the respondents would be required to await his arrival. Although he indicated an email that he was able to make contact with his auto insurer that day he apparently made no effort to advise the Tribunal of the circumstances until after the end of the business day and not until he received the audio recording of the hearing several days later. These circumstances lead me to conclude that these Applications were filed in part, and the applicant’s conduct throughout has in large part been motivated by the hope that the respondent Belairdirect, in particular, would be forced to settle the SABs claims rather than incur the extraordinary legal expenses of these proceedings. This is an improper purpose for the filing and maintaining of an Application and whether it can be said to have been the original intention in the filing of each of the Applications, the applicant’s conduct of them makes it plain that this had become the purpose long before the hearing on October 26, 2012.

98The applicant has also deliberately misled the Tribunal on at least three occasions. As noted above the applicant failed to attend the Evolve hearing which had been re-scheduled after the applicant claimed to have a migraine headache in an email delivered the morning of the hearing. I note that the applicant failed to attend a subsequent hearing after making a similar last minute request for an adjournment of the hearing. In neither of these cases was medical evidence ever provided to substantiate the applicant’s non-attendance. In all the circumstances I find that the applicant was attempting to avoid and delay these hearings and fabricated Code-related reasons for his non-attendance.

99I also find that the applicant misled the Tribunal in two respects about the October 26, 2012 hearing. First he claimed not to know that the hearing was scheduled to take place in Toronto. There is no basis for that claim. Second his assertion that he had moved to the Bayfield area and accordingly could not drive all of the way to Toronto is false. In this regard I note that despite this claim to live in Bayfield he continued to use his address in the Kitchener area in the Applications and Requests which he filed with the Tribunal.

100I also find that the applicant’s claim that he did not know that there was a Summary Hearing on July 20, 2011 was false as he had just prior to advancing that claim made a request to adjourn another of the two hearings scheduled for that day on the basis that he could only participate in one hearing per day.

101I also agree with the respondents submission that when the applicant does not get what he wants he responds by making a complaint of some kind. They argue that this explains the serial filing of these Applications which are an attempt to bully the respondents to comply with his every request. Similarly the respondents argue that when the Tribunal makes an order or direction with which the applicant does not agree he reacts inappropriately and makes accusations about the Tribunal’s conduct including the filing of three Applications against the Tribunal and its staff. I also note as indicated above that on at least two occasions the applicant made baseless allegations about the Tribunal’s decision making in this case.

102I also find that the applicant has not been respectful of the Tribunal or its processes. I would include in this category his remarks that the Tribunal process was a “lynching” and that the Tribunal has colluded with the respondents. Baseless and unsubstantiated allegations of this nature may have serious consequences by improperly and unnecessarily bringing the proper administration of justice into disrepute.

103In conclusion it is clear to me that the applicant is not interested in moving his Applications forward rather he has taken every opportunity to delay and stall the proceedings. I also find that the applicant has filed and continues these Applications for improper purposes of what amounts to an attempt to coerce a settlement of his SABs claims. I also find that the applicant has been non-compliant with Tribunal’s orders and directions and has not been respectful of the Tribunal and its processes. Moreover he has deliberately misled the Tribunal on at least three occasions.

104For all of these reasons I find that these Applications are an abuse of process. Although it is an extra-ordinary step to dismiss an Application as a consequence, I agree with the respondent that it is appropriate in this case. As the Tribunal noted in Drenic, where it would be unfair to a respondent and to the public to allow an Application continue, and in order to prevent an abuse of the process, the dismissal of the Application is appropriate.

Vexatious Applicant

105As previously indicated the SPPA and the Tribunal’s Rules allow it to control its own process. The Tribunal has found that in exceptional circumstances, it has the power to declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and to prevent an applicant from filing an Application without first obtaining consent of the Tribunal. See amongst other Decisions, Drenic, and Abdul v. University of Toronto, 2011 HRTO 2299.

106In Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 1331, at paragraphs 27 and 28, the Tribunal reviewed some of the factors to be applied when determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant:

The seminal decision on the factors that Courts have considered in determining whether an individual is a vexatious litigant were described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Foy v. Foy (No.2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220. These factors are summarized in the decision of Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, [1987] O.J. No . 355 (H.C.):

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; and

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

It is not necessary that all of these factors be present in order for an individual to be declared a vexatious litigant. In order to declare the applicant to be a vexatious litigant, I must be satisfied on an objective standard that the applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself in a vexatious manner during the proceedings.

107In my view several of the indicators discussed in the cases above are present here. To begin with is the evident fact that the applicant has filed multiple Applications most of them claiming essentially the same things over and over again. I also note that before some of these Applications were filed, earlier ones raising the same issues had been dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success. I also have considered that the applicant in his submissions after the hearing made further allegations of reprisal on the part of Belairdirect and on April 11, 2013 wrote to the Tribunal and indicated that he wished to file a further Application against Belairdirect for an alleged reprisal.

108I have already found that the applicant has brought or maintained these Applications for the improper purpose of punishing the respondents and/or coercing a settlement of his SABs claims from Belairdirect.

109I note as well that the applicant has filed multiple Applications against the Tribunal and one in which he names the Vice-chair adjudicating these cases as well as counsel for several of the respondents, another hallmark of a vexatious litigant.

110I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Tribunal to declare the applicant to be a vexatious litigant in respect of any Application brought against any of the respondents in these Applications in relation to any claim he may have arising out of SABs benefit dispute and may not file an Application making any such claim without leave of the Tribunal. For the reasons above, I specifically extend this finding to the applicant’s conduct in relation to Evolve Assessments and Diagnostics Inc. and Focus Assessments Inc. However I do not agree that it would be appropriate to prohibit the filing of an Application in respect of other matters because it does appear that the applicant has only filed Applications in respect of his SABs claims and accordingly the Order should be confined in this way.

111This does not mean that the applicant is barred from seeking to commence an Application if he believes that his rights under the Code have been violated only that he must first obtain the Tribunal’s consent.

ORDER

112Tribunal file numbers 2010-06072-I; 2010-06409-I; 2010-06916-I; 2010-07253-I; 2011-09212-I; 2011-09254-I; 2011-10522-I, and; 2012-12757-I are dismissed on the basis of abuse of process by the applicant for the reasons above.

113The applicant is declared a vexatious litigant. I order that Achille Ruffolo may not commence further applications at this Tribunal against Belairdirect Insurance Company Inc., Riverfront Medical Services, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Finance, State Farm Insurance Company, Evolve Assessments and Diagnostics Inc., and Focus Assessments Inc. as well or any of their employees in relation to any claim he may have arising out of any SABs claim dispute without leave of an adjudicator of the Tribunal.

114If the applicant seeks leave to file any such future applications, he must include with his complete Application submissions that outline why the Application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights, is not intended to vex the respondent(s), and will not result in an abuse of process.

Dated at Toronto, this 1st day of May, 2013.

“signed by”

David Muir Vice-chair

CORRECTION

The Decision issued on May 1, 2013 contains a typographical error is paragraph 8.

Paragraph 8 now states, “State Farm Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was the insurer of the third party vehicle which the applicant alleges struck his vehicle in the September 2009 motor vehicle accident”.

The Decision has been amended accordingly.