HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Clive Roy
Applicant
-and-
Named Respondents
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Indexed as: Roy v. Named Respondents
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Clive Roy, Applicant
Self-represented
1These are 12 Requests for leave to file an Application (“Requests”) delivered to the Tribunal by the applicant. For the reasons that follow these Requests are denied.
Background
2These Requests follow from Tribunal decision 2014 HRTO 214 (the “Decision”) dismissing 58 Applications filed by the applicant between September 3 and November 20, 2013. See the Decision for a more detailed procedural history of these cases.
3In the Decision, among other conclusions, I found that the applicant was a vexatious litigant before the Tribunal and made the following Orders:
The Applications listed above are dismissed.
The applicant is declared a vexatious litigant. I order that the applicant Clive Roy may not file further applications at this Tribunal without leave of the Tribunal.
If the applicant seeks leave of the Tribunal to file any such future application he must include with his complete application submissions that outline why the application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights, is not intended to vex the respondents and will not result in an abuse of process. The Tribunal will consider any future applications which fail to include these submissions as incomplete and will treat them as such.
4In each of these 12 Requests the applicant makes identical submissions without any reference at all to the particulars of the individual proposed applications.
5In his submissions seeking leave to file these proposed applications the applicant makes three points. First, in response to the direction that he outline why the proposed application is a legitimate assertion of his rights protected by the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), the applicant merely asserts that the proposed application is filed pursuant to what he characterizes as the mandatory obligation imposed by s. 40 of the Code.
6Second, in response to the direction that he outline why the proposed application is not intended to vex or harass the respondent the applicant argues that the factors usually employed to identify a vexatious litigant are not present in these cases. The applicant cites Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company v. Coote, 2013 FC 643, which he asserts identifies the four factors which should be considered:
a. Are there reasonable grounds to institute an action
b. The issue has already been determined
c. Unsuccessful appeals were pursued
d. Grounds and issues raised in previous proceedings tend to be rolled forward into subsequent proceedings.
7Finally, in response to the direction that the applicant outline why the proposed application will not result in an abuse of process the applicant argues that the doctrine of abuse of process only deals with attempts to re-litigate an issue. The applicant relies on Toronto (City) v. CUPE, Local 79, 2003 SCC 63.
Decision
8While the Tribunal has made several vexatious litigant declarations in the past this is the first instance where a person so declared has sought leave to file further applications with the Tribunal. As such the Tribunal has not considered these issues and the law will be developed on a case by case basis depending on the particular circumstances.
9I will not repeat the reasons for my earlier determinations that the applicant’s dozens of prior Applications were an abuse of process and declaring the applicant to be a vexatious litigant. However I note that the applicant continues to pursue his claims in the same manner. Specifically, I note the following similarities:
the narratives of all of these proposed applications fail to identify any facts at all which connect the action complained of to the Code;
he asserts an obligation on the respondent to accommodate a personal characteristic without articulating any differential treatment experienced as a consequence of the personal characteristic;
in several of these proposed applications the applicant identifies every ground of discrimination except for age, receipt of public assistance, record of offences and association;
in no case are there any facts plead which would tend to support the conclusion that the applicant had experienced differential treatment because of the asserted ground(s);
many of the proposed applications arise from a single transaction such as the failure to receive a response to an email. No other facts are plead that would remotely engage the Code.
10In my view the onus rests with the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that these proposed applications should be accepted and processed. My Order asked the applicant to explain three things:
a. why the proposed application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights;
b. why the proposed application is not intended to vex the respondents; and,
c. why the proposed application will not result in an abuse of process.
11I find that the applicant’s Requests do not address the substance of my Order in any meaningful way. As indicated the applicant makes no reference in any of his Requests to any of the circumstances of the proposed application. Instead of explaining why the proposed applications are a legitimate effort to vindicate his Code rights he attempts to make legal points which attack the Decision but provide no reasons why the Tribunal might conclude that these particular proposed applications should proceed. Having reviewed the applicant’s Requests and the proposed applications I am not satisfied that the applicant has met the burden imposed on him by my Order.
12Given the remarkable similarity between these 12 proposed applications and the 58 prior Applications with which I am most familiar, and the applicant’s failure to provide any explanation about why these proposed applications are a legitimate attempt to assert his Code rights I am not satisfied that they are.
13Having come to this conclusion there is no need to consider whether the proposed applications meet the other requirements of my Order. However I would observe that his statement of the law with respect to both abuse of process and vexatious litigant are incorrect in that both doctrines are applicable in a number of circumstances including but not confined to the situations dealt with in the cases cited by the applicant. So, for example, abuse of process is intended to deal with attempts to re-litigate issues which have already been determined but is by no means confined to preventing re-litigation and has been utilized to control many other kinds of inappropriate conduct by a party in the course of a proceeding. See for example Nyonzima v. Idlewyld Manor, 2011 HRTO 1517; upheld on judicial review, Nyonzima v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2012 ONSC 5120.
14For the reasons set out above these 12 Requests for leave to file an Application are denied.
Dated at Toronto, this 23^rd^ day of June, 2014.
“Signed by”
David Muir
Vice-chair