Alexandre Papouchine v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2014 HRTO 1366

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Alexandre Papouchine

Applicant

-and-

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: September 15, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1366

Indexed as: Papouchine v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Alexandre Papouchine, Applicant

Self-represented

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to goods and services because of ancestry, ethnic origin, place of origin and race. This Application was filed on April 28, 2014. On the same date the Tribunal issued 2014 HRTO 588 (the “Decision”) in which the applicant was declared a vexatious litigant. Although the Application was received by the Tribunal on the same day as the Decision was issued it is clear that the applicant would not have been aware of the Decision when he delivered the Application to the Tribunal.

2On June 17, 2014 the Tribunal directed that the applicant provide submissions in accordance with the Tribunal’s Orders made in the Decision which required, amongst other things, that if the applicant wished to file a further Application he must first seek leave of the Tribunal and satisfy the Tribunal that the proposed Application was intended as a legitimate assertion of this Code rights, was not intended to vex and harass the respondent, and would not lead to an abuse of process. The applicant provided submissions in response on June 23, 2014 arguing that this Application was not covered by the Order in 2014 HRTO 588.

3A series of administrative errors followed. Despite the Orders made in the Decision and the June 17, 2014 letter on June 26, 2014 the Tribunal accepted the Application for processing and file number 2014-18040-I was assigned to it. The June 17, 2014 letter and the applicant’s response to it were not placed on the file.

4On July 4, 2014 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) because it appeared that the Application was outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent.

5The applicant responded to the NOID and I reviewed his submissions. As indicated, the June 17, 2014 correspondence and the applicant’s response were not in the file when it was reviewed. This further review lead to the issuance of a letter dated August 8, 2014 advising the applicant that the June 26, 2014 letter accepting the Application had been issued in error and directing the applicant to file submissions in accordance with the Orders in the Decision. The applicant responded to the August 8, 2014 letter with essentially the same submissions made in his June 23, 2014 correspondence.

Decision

6The Application is dismissed.

7Having reviewed this file I find that it was appropriate that the Tribunal, as it initially did, direct that the applicant file submissions in support of a request for leave to file this Application as required by the Order in the Decision. The applicant argues that this Application was filed the day before the Decision was issued and therefore was not included in that Direction. I note that in the Decision the Tribunal directed that the applicant provide submissions justifying the further processing of 9 other Applications filed by the applicant which were not before the adjudicator that day. These Applications were dismissed in 2014 HRTO 1148. But for administrative oversight this file would have been added to these 9 other Applications subject to the Direction made in 2014 HRTO 588. Similarly in my view it was appropriate after a review of this Application to direct that the applicant make submissions justifying the processing of it. That direction was made on two occasions in this case and the applicant given an opportunity to respond to it.

8I have reviewed the applicant’s submissions, both those made in response to the initial Direction made on June 17, 2014 and those in response to the Tribunal’s subsequent Direction of August 8, 2014. The submissions are essentially the same and are not responsive to the Orders made in the Decision. In both the applicant challenges the Tribunal’s determination that he must comply with the Orders made in the Decision in respect of this Application. I have dealt with this submission above.

9Accordingly the applicant has made no submissions in response to the Tribunal’s Order that he satisfy the Tribunal that this Application is not intended to vex or harass the named respondent; that it is a legitimate assertion of his Code rights and will not result in an abuse of process. In other cases such as this the Tribunal has concluded that the onus rests on an applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that an application is a legitimate assertion of his or her Code rights. See Roy v. Named Respondents, 2014 HRTO 917. In the absence of any submissions from the applicant in support of his request to file an Application there is no basis to find that the applicant has satisfied the requirements of the Order and for that reason I would deny this request.

10However I have also considered the Application and find that there is no basis to conclude that it is a legitimate assertion of the applicant’s Code rights. In his Application the applicant makes vague and un-particularized allegations that a complaint he made to the Tribunal about the contents of a Tribunal Decision in another of his cases was not appropriately dealt with. In particular the applicant alleges that the Acting Associate Chair indicated in her response to the complaint that she did not understand the basis of the complaint and when he tried to speak to her on the phone he was directed to administrative staff. The applicant also alleges that in correspondence from the Tribunal he was referred to other correspondence about his complaint which the applicant was unable to identify. The applicant alleges that he asked to be provided copies of these letters but was not. In the applicant’s view this “creates discriminatory denial of services” on the basis of the claimed grounds of race, ancestry, ethnic origin and place of origin.

11The applicant who self identifies as Russian, white and not a member of any nobility seeks $500,000 in damages for the alleged discrimination. The applicant also indicates that he was perceived as an unimportant person whose needs could be ignored.

12The Application concerns a complaint filed by the applicant about a Decision issued by the Tribunal in another of his cases. The applicant’s concern seems to be that because he says he may be viewed as an “unimportant person,” i.e. not a noble person, white and Russian he was treated negatively in some way. This is essentially the same complaint that the applicant has made in numerous other cases including those considered in 2014 HRTO 588 and 2014 HRTO 1148.

13In my view it is plain and obvious that this Application cannot succeed. While the applicant has identified facts which might support membership in a protected group there are no facts plead capable of supporting the inference that a factor in the handling of the applicant’s complaint were any of the grounds he cites. Moreover there are no facts plead which would tend to support the conclusion that the applicant’s complaint was treated any differently than any other complaint. As I observed in Papouchine v. Smith, 2013 HRTO 646 in describing that Application:

In my view it is plain and obvious that this Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Aside from the obvious problem that it is unclear what act or inaction on the part of the respond is being complained about, it is entirely clear that the Application and the narrative setting out the incidents of alleged discrimination fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent. The applicant has a question, a suspicion, and a desire to know if something the respondent did or did not do was discriminatory. The allegations at their highest amount to an assertion that the applicant is a member of a protected group and something happened to him. This is insufficient.

In my view the filing of yet another un-particularized complaint making vague allegations of differential treatment without any facts plead which link anything that happened to him to the grounds cited which include that he is not a member of the nobility, supports the conclusion that this Application is not a legitimate assertion of his Code rights and is an abuse of process.

14Accordingly I find that the applicant’s request to file an Application must be dismissed. For the same reasons I find that it is plain and obvious that the Application cannot succeed because there are no facts plead which can be said to be acts of discrimination and for that reason as well I would dismiss this Application.