HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Godfred Kwaku Hiamey
Applicant
-and-
Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, The Honourable Janet Wilson, Benjamin Piper, Lise Leduc, Association des enseignantes et des enseignants franco-ontariens, Roselyn Levine, and The Judicial Administrator of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Paul Aterman
Indexed as: Hiamey v. Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Godfred Kwaku Hiamey, Applicant
Self-represented
1This Decision explains why the Tribunal is refusing to allow the applicant to bring this application against the respondents. In his proposed application he alleges discrimination with respect to services because of race and colour contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code").
2In its Decision 2012 HRTO 1331 dated July 6, 2012 the applicant's Applications against his former employer (the Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud); his union; various lawyers; the Ontario College of Teachers; the Law Society of Upper Canada and one of its officials; the Ontario Labour Relations Board and one of its Vice-chairs; and the Ontario Judicial Council were all dismissed. In that Decision the applicant was also declared by the Tribunal to be a vexatious litigant.
3The scope of the declaration was with respect to "...the termination of his employment with the Board [the Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud] or proceedings relating to that termination" and the declaration prohibited the applicant from "...commenc[ing] any application at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario with respect to such issues without first obtaining leave of the Tribunal."
4The applicant has sought judicial review of that Decision. The judicial review application has not yet been heard, but a number of interlocutory matters relating to the application were dealt with, first by a single judge of the Divisional Court and then by an appeal panel of three judges.
5In a decision dated May 30, 2014 (2014 ONSC 2608) Madam Justice Wilson issued reasons relating to three motions brought by the applicant.
6She refused a motion to strike certain documents from the court file on the ground that they had been filed late.
7She allowed a motion relating to the content of the Tribunal's record of the Decision in 2012 HRTO 1331. Her order in relation to this motion directed the Tribunal to allow the applicant to examine the Tribunal's file to see which missing documents he would like to have included in a supplementary record that would be filed with the court. She directed the Tribunal to pay costs in the amount of $150 to cover the applicant's expenditures in bringing the motion.
8The third motion sought a declaration that Ms. Leduc and Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP were in a conflict of interest in relation to their roles in this litigation. He requested that Ms. Leduc not be allowed to act as counsel to his former union. This motion was rejected on the ground that it had already been addressed by the Tribunal. However, Madam Justice Wilson ordered Ms. Leduc to be added as a respondent to the judicial review application, concluding that her name had been omitted in error.
9The applicant appealed the decision not to remove Ms. Leduc as counsel to the union. Ms. Leduc appealed the order joining her as a party. These appeals were heard by a three judge panel of the Divisional Court. The applicant also requested that the panel order his reinstatement as a teacher with the Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, payment to him of damages by various parties and third parties, and payment by Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP of an award of costs of $150.
10The decision in relation to the appealed orders (2014 ONCS 5801) was released on October 8, 2014. The court refused to order the removal of Ms. Leduc as counsel. However, it overturned the decision of Wilson J. to join Ms. Leduc as a party. In relation to the applicant's request for reinstatement, the court concluded that this was a matter within the Tribunal's jurisdiction to consider if the applicant succeeded on judicial review. It refused to order damages on the ground that the Divisional Court has no such authority when dealing with a judicial review application. The costs award was also refused, on the ground that the applicant did not succeed before the appeal panel of the Divisional Court.
11After the decision of Wilson J., but before the appeal hearing by the Divisional Court, the applicant filed this application.
12The substance of this application is that Wilson J. discriminated against the applicant by not accepting his arguments and ruling in his favour, by not ordering costs against Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP, by not ordering his reinstatement in his former employment and by not ordering payment of his lost income from that employment. He alleges that all of the other respondents are complicit in the alleged discrimination by Wilson J., that they do her bidding and must also be held accountable.
13The Tribunal sent the applicant a letter on August 18, 2014. The letter explains that his application will not be processed because he did not first seek the Tribunal's permission to begin it.
14The applicant responded with submissions which he sent to the Tribunal on August 27, 2014. Those submissions state that he is not vexatious because his application is well-founded. Rather, he argues, the Tribunal and the decision-makers who were involved with his earlier Applications before the Tribunal lack any integrity. Its orders, including the declaration that he is a vexatious litigant, are therefore void. His application should be allowed to proceed because to do otherwise would be to deny him justice.
15Although the initial declaration did not set out the specific test under which an application for leave would be granted, the Tribunal has since considered the issue. In Roy v. Named Respondents, 2014 HRTO 917 at para. 10, the Tribunal set out the following considerations, which I adopt:
In my view the onus rests with the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that these proposed applications should be accepted and processed. My Order asked the applicant to explain three things:
a. why the proposed application is intended as a legitimate assertion of his Code rights;
b. why the proposed application is not intended to vex the respondents; and,
c. why the proposed application will not result in an abuse of process.
16The substance of this proposed application falls squarely within the scope of the Tribunal's earlier declaration of the applicant as a vexatious litigant. The scope of the declaration was limited to matters regarding the termination of his employment and any proceedings related to that termination.
17The present request for leave to file an application is brought in relation to interlocutory decisions of Wilson J. of the Divisional Court. Those interlocutory decisions are in relation to his judicial review application of the Tribunal's Decision. The Tribunal's Decision was in turn made in relation to the termination of his employment and the various proceedings that arose from that termination. Thus there is an unbroken chain which links this proposed application back to the Tribunal's declaration that limits the kind of applications the applicant can bring without having to request permission.
18The applicant has the onus of showing why the Tribunal should allow him to file a further application in relation to the termination of his employment. The reasons set out in the applicant's request to file a new application are not ones which justify allowing it to proceed. This is because his submissions do not spell out reasons to make an exception to the Tribunal's declaration. Rather, they do no more than reject the legitimacy of the vexatious litigant declaration in the first place. I find that the applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that this proposed Application is a legitimate assertion of his Code rights. He has also not shown that it is not intended to vex the respondents and that it will not result in an abuse of process if it is allowed to proceed.
19Because this application falls within the scope of the original vexatious litigant declaration and because the applicant has not provided reasons to make an exception to the declaration, the request for leave to file an Application is denied.
ORDER
20The applicant's request for leave to file an Application is denied.
Dated at Toronto, this 30th day of December, 2014.
"Signed by"
Paul Aterman
Vice-chair