Richard Huneault

The applicant, charged with voyeurism and child pornography offenses, brought a pre-trial application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to proposed trial date was 55 months, 14 days.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 39 months, 10 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, rebutting the presumption of unreasonable delay.

The court agreed that the pandemic was an exceptional discrete event and deducted the associated delay.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, shifting the onus to the applicant to demonstrate unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant failed to take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that issues related to venue investigations, First Nations consultations, and "running lists" did not result in unreasonable delay in this specific case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing unreasonable delay under s 11(b) of the Charter, lack of consent, and insufficient identification evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the Charter and consent grounds but found that the trial judge erred in relying on DNA evidence because the Crown failed to properly authenticate the hospital records and establish the chain of custody for the rape kit.

As the trial judge relied heavily on this inadmissible DNA evidence to establish identity, the conviction was quashed.

However, because there was other circumstantial identification evidence, a new trial was ordered rather than an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the impaired operation count was dismissed.

The central issue was whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand following a positive approved screening device result, particularly in light of evidence of an open beer can found in the vehicle after the screening device test was administered.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on multiple indicia of impairment and that the presence of the beer can did not constitute credible evidence of recent consumption sufficient to undermine the reliability of the screening device result.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a lawful R.I.D.E. stop, the officer detected the odor of alcohol on the accused's breath and administered a roadside screening device, which produced a "fail" result.

The accused was arrested and transported to a police detachment where breath samples were obtained.

The defence challenged the legality of the stop, the placement of the accused in the police vehicle for the screening device test, and alleged violations of the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault against a two‑year‑old child in his care, causing severe vaginal injuries resulting from repeated blunt force trauma and penetration.

The sentencing judge emphasized the extreme vulnerability of the victim, the breach of parental trust, and the gravity of the injuries.

While mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, youth, difficult upbringing, Indigenous background, and limited adult criminal record, the court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount.

The court accepted the Crown’s proposed sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, subject to credit for pre‑trial custody.

Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 was granted for most remand time due to harsh conditions and protective custody, except for 60 days of misconduct credited at 1:1.