Vanessa V. Christie

The applicant sought a bail review, arguing a material change in circumstances due to delayed medical surgery while in custody and a new release plan including electronic monitoring.

The court found no material change, noting that the correctional centre had taken steps to schedule the surgery and could provide adequate post-operative care.

The court further held that even if a material change existed, bail would be denied on secondary and tertiary grounds due to the applicant's lengthy criminal record, history of breaches, and the extremely serious nature of the kidnapping and robbery charges.

Bail was denied.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for an interim and interlocutory Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging fraud related to a $1.8 million loan.

The plaintiff claimed fraudulent misrepresentation regarding property ownership and the defendants' failure to record mortgages, which allowed subsequent encumbrances.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud but was not satisfied that there was a real risk of asset dissipation or irreparable harm, particularly as the pending sale of a property was deemed a bona fide transaction.

The motion for an interim Mareva injunction was dismissed, but the defendants were ordered to provide disclosure of payout statements and writ of seizure and sale details for the property sale.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial judgment under Rule 51.06 for $1,038,616, an amount admitted by the defendants to have been misappropriated while acting in a fiduciary capacity as trustees.

The plaintiff also sought a declaration that this debt would survive bankruptcy and substantial indemnity costs.

The court granted partial judgment for the admitted amount, awarded pre-judgment interest, and declared that the debt arose from fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

However, the court declined to make a pre-emptive declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy, deeming it hypothetical.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff, and directions were given for scheduling the remaining summary judgment motion.

The accused was tried on historic counts of sexual exploitation and sexual assault arising from sexual activity with a 15-year-old boy in the late 1980s.

The court held that, considering the age gap, the evolution of the relationship, the accused's role as an adult mentor and provider, and the boy's residence in the accused's home, the accused occupied a position of trust that became a relationship of dependency, establishing sexual exploitation under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

On the sexual assault count, however, the court accepted the accused's evidence that the complainant initiated the sexual activity and found material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, leaving a reasonable doubt on subjective non-consent.

The court also held that coercive authority under s. 265(3)(d) was not proven and that s. 273.1(2)(c) did not apply because it was not yet in force during the charged period.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 32.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order for a site visit and permission for his expert to inspect, test, and potentially destructively test one of the defendant's windows.

This was necessary for an occupier's liability action where the original shattered window was no longer available, and its nature and condition were central to the litigation.

The defendant did not provide responding materials.

The court granted the motion, finding the inspection necessary for a proper determination of the issue and that any potential prejudice to the defendant (e.g., needing to replace a destroyed window) could be compensated later.

The applicant brought a mid-trial application seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 278.93/4 hearing and to prevent disclosure of application materials to the complainant, relying on the recent decision in R. v. Reddick which found those provisions unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the principles of stare decisis did not apply because Reddick was decided in the context of a pre-trial application, whereas this was a mid-trial application.

Furthermore, the court held that even if stare decisis applied, the decision in Reddick was plainly wrong as it failed to fully consider the constitutional issues in the context of a mid-trial application and misinterpreted the legislation.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 276/278 admissibility hearing regarding WhatsApp messages.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision (R. v. Reddick) that found the participation provisions unconstitutional, arguing that under the principles of stare decisis, the court should follow Reddick without a formal constitutional challenge.

The Crown argued that a Notice of Constitutional Question was required under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that relying on a previous declaration of unconstitutionality still puts the constitutional validity of the legislation in question, thereby triggering the mandatory notice requirement under s. 109.

However, the court ruled that notice did not need to be served on the complainant.

The youth accused was charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a drug transaction.

The deceased and others had planned to rob the accused.

When the deceased approached the accused wearing a mask and drawing a large knife, the accused reacted by drawing his own knife and stabbing the deceased multiple times.

The court excluded the accused's subsequent statement to police, finding it lacked spontaneity.

However, applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the accused's testimony that he believed he was about to be stabbed and acted to protect himself.

The Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant's representative to answer a refused question from an examination for discovery.

The underlying action involved allegations of negligent repair of an ATV.

The refused question asked the representative to agree that if the threads on the axle were intact, the only way the tire could come off was if the cotter pin was missing.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the question improperly sought an expert opinion on a hypothetical matter from a layperson.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for early documentary discovery before the close of pleadings, seeking the identities of the tenant's employees who resided at the leased property when a fire occurred, as well as the production of the tenant's insurance policies.

The court granted the request for the employees' names and contact information, applying the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04 to allow the plaintiff to properly name the John Doe defendants and avoid future delays.

However, the court dismissed the request for early production of the insurance policies, finding it premature prior to the delivery of an affidavit of documents.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking to vary a previous order, permit cloning of a defendant's laptop hard drive, compel password disclosure, freeze and disclose defendant's assets at Sun Life, and reserve costs.

This was the third time the issue of preserving laptop data was before the court.

The court denied the request to clone the laptop, finding no sufficient evidence of relevance beyond speculation and that the balance of convenience weighed against preservation.

The court ordered the immediate return of the laptop to the defendant.

The Mareva Injunction was extended to include Sun Life assets for clarity, but specifically excluded a newly opened TD Canada Trust account.

Costs were reserved.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought a ruling on whether an application to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity (WhatsApp messages) under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code could be brought mid-trial rather than pre-trial.

The court reviewed the legislative history, the purpose of the rape shield provisions, and the accused's Charter rights to make full answer and defence and against self-incrimination.

The court concluded that requiring a pre-trial application would force premature disclosure of impeachment material, potentially tainting the complainant's evidence and violating the accused's fair trial rights.

The court ruled that the application could be brought mid-trial.

The plaintiff sought an urgent ex parte Mareva injunction and other ancillary injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendant Tami Kone, a former bookkeeper, had fraudulently issued cheques to herself totaling over $312,000 from the company's account.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding that the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, along with a genuine risk of asset dissipation.

However, the court denied the requested ancillary orders for registering PMSI liens and retaining/imaging a personal laptop, citing lack of authority and privacy concerns.

The respondents, acting as trustees for the deceased respondent's estate, brought a motion for an order to continue the application and to convert it into an action.

The underlying dispute involved a verbal agreement for a share transfer, with the responding party alleging fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court granted the motion to convert the application into an action, finding that material facts were in dispute, credibility needed to be assessed, and expert valuation of shares might be required.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought to adduce WhatsApp messages exchanged between them.

He brought an application for a ruling that the messages were not 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and thus not subject to the admissibility regime in s. 278.92.

The court first ruled that the Crown was not entitled to review the messages at the threshold stage to argue whether they constituted a record.

After reviewing the messages, the court held that the complainant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, as they were voluntarily exchanged with the accused and were innocuous in nature.

Therefore, the messages were not 'records' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

The applicant sought a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a property, alleging the respondent was the true owner despite attempts to conceal ownership, and that her $100,000 investment from refinancing the matrimonial home gave her an interest.

The respondent argued the deposit was for a third-party buyer, Jeff Liu, for whom he acted as a realtor, and that the applicant had no direct interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of fraudulent purchase by the respondent, no demonstrated interest by the applicant beyond a deposit, sufficient other assets for equalization, and that damages would be an adequate remedy.

The applicant, Holly Whittaker, faced charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession.

She brought two Charter applications: one alleging violation of her right to silence and right to counsel (ss. 7 and 10(b)) regarding an utterance about a purse, and another alleging unlawful arrest (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) leading to a strip search and seizure of fentanyl.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) regarding the utterance, as police elicited evidence after she requested counsel without providing an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The court also found a breach of s. 9 and s. 8, concluding that the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, as the confidential informant's tip was uncorroborated and unreliable.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded both the utterance and the seized fentanyl and purse under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant brought an application in Barrie seeking a declaration that a property transfer between the respondent husband and wife in Port Dover was a fraudulent conveyance.

The respondents argued the application was brought in the wrong jurisdiction and should proceed as an action.

The court stayed the proceeding, finding that under Rule 13.1.01(3) the matter relates to a mortgage and must be heard in the Central South Region where the property is located.

The court also directed that the application be converted to an action, as the subjective intent of the parties in transferring the property is a material fact in dispute requiring credibility determinations.

The applicant, a care facility operator, brought an application seeking declarations that the respondent County acted in bad faith by not renewing their annual services agreement under the Domiciliary Care Program.

The County had declined to renew the fixed-term contract due to a history of non-compliance, particularly regarding Fire Code violations and the delayed installation of a sprinkler system.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the contract had a clear end date with no automatic renewal clause, and therefore the County owed no duty of good faith to renew it.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of bad faith, noting that the County had repeatedly communicated its concerns and provided reasons for non-renewal despite having no contractual obligation to do so.