Kelsey Leigh Ivory

Seven spirits suppliers brought an application challenging the enforceability of section 14 of the LCBO's standard purchase order Terms and Conditions — a "most favoured customer" no-price-discrimination clause — after the LCBO assessed approximately $35.9 million in chargebacks by way of set-off for breaches of the provision.

The applicants raised multiple grounds: ultra vires, statutory illegality, restraint of trade, unenforceable penalty/unconscionable forfeiture, waiver, estoppel by convention, bad faith, and unjust enrichment.

The court rejected all grounds, holding that section 14 falls squarely within the LCBO's statutory mandate to buy and sell liquor as a wholesaler and retailer, is not prohibited by statute, does not restrain trade, is not an unenforceable penalty, was not waived, and was not the subject of a shared assumption with suppliers that it would not be enforced.

The application was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) regarding LCBO theft/shoplifting incidents.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) had ordered the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) to disclose the records, but the Divisional Court set aside that order, finding the adjudicator's decision unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal, stepping into the Divisional Court's shoes, found the IPC adjudicator's decision to be reasonable.

The court affirmed that the adjudicator correctly applied the "reasonable expectation of probable harm" standard of proof for FIPPA exemptions and that her reasons were adequate, even with confidentiality constraints.

The Court also declined to consider new statutory arguments not raised before the adjudicator.

The appeal was allowed, restoring the IPC's original disclosure order.

The applicant, Holly Whittaker, faced charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession.

She brought two Charter applications: one alleging violation of her right to silence and right to counsel (ss. 7 and 10(b)) regarding an utterance about a purse, and another alleging unlawful arrest (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) leading to a strip search and seizure of fentanyl.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) regarding the utterance, as police elicited evidence after she requested counsel without providing an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The court also found a breach of s. 9 and s. 8, concluding that the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, as the confidential informant's tip was uncorroborated and unreliable.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded both the utterance and the seized fentanyl and purse under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This decision addresses multiple pre-trial motions in a large-scale drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on Charter violations related to search and seizure (s.8) and the right to counsel (s.10), as well as the voluntariness of an utterance.

The court found the initial warrantless search for cocaine unconstitutional and excluded the evidence.

The initial search warrant for the Warwick premises was quashed, but other evidence seized under it was admitted.

Covert camera evidence was admitted despite an unlawful installation, but references to it were excised from subsequent Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

Tracking warrants and general warrants for other properties were largely upheld after excising unconstitutionally obtained information.

An accused's utterance was found voluntary and admitted, despite a s.10 Charter violation, as the impact on Charter rights was deemed slight and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.