Benjamin Kates

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s action as an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, whose license to practice law was previously revoked for professional misconduct, commenced a new action against the Law Society of Ontario and its counsel, alleging malfeasance in public office.

The court found that the action was a continuation of previously litigated issues and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious litigation, including repeated attempts to re-litigate matters already decided and naming opposing counsel as defendants.

The court also held that the defendants’ conduct was protected by absolute privilege.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request to remove a boundary tree, the successful respondents sought costs.

The respondents had made an offer to settle prior to the hearing, which the applicants did not accept.

The court awarded the respondents costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The court found the respondents' counsel's hourly rates and staffing choices reasonable, fixing total costs at $77,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants sought an order authorizing the removal of a mature boundary tree shared with the respondents to facilitate a home extension.

The applicants argued the tree constituted a nuisance because its protection zone prevented their proposed construction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the tree did not interfere with the applicants' current use and enjoyment of their property, but only with their desired enhancement.

The applicants failed to demonstrate that the tree was a substantial and unreasonable interference or that there were no reasonable alternative designs for their renovation.

A pharmacist challenged the Ontario College of Pharmacists' jurisdiction to prosecute discipline charges after the College failed to comply with mandatory statutory timelines for processing a written complaint under section 25 of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Instead, the College accepted the complainant's withdrawal and proceeded with a registrar-initiated investigation under section 75.

The Divisional Court quashed the charges, finding the College lost jurisdiction through non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that written complaints may be withdrawn when the College agrees and the matter proceeds through another statutory process with full procedural safeguards.

The court balanced the public interest in regulating the profession against the accused member's fair hearing rights, finding no procedural unfairness or prejudice to the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement following the release of reasons in an appeal.

The respondents advised that the court had misapprehended the appellants' oral costs submissions regarding quantum.

The parties were permitted to provide further written submissions on the costs issue.

The court affirmed its costs order for the appeal but altered the costs of the motion below, reducing the amounts payable by Bank of Montreal and Toronto Dominion Bank.

The appellants sought to add Toronto Dominion Bank and Bank of Montreal as defendants to an existing class action alleging a secret conspiracy to manipulate the foreign exchange market.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the claim against the respondents was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by establishing too high an evidentiary threshold and by finding that the respondents' identities could have been discovered with reasonable diligence without proper evidentiary foundation.

The court held that the appellants provided a reasonable explanation for why they could not have identified the respondents before the limitation period expired, and that the issue of due diligence should be determined on a summary judgment motion or at trial.

The plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the foreign exchange market brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add BMO and TD as defendants.

The proposed defendants argued the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs claimed they only discovered the involvement of BMO and TD after receiving a proffer of evidence from a settling defendant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the claims against BMO and TD before the expiry of the limitation period.

In a proposed class action alleging price-fixing in the foreign exchange market, the plaintiffs sought to add BMO and TD as defendants.

BMO and TD argued the claims were statute-barred.

On cross-examination for the joinder motion, the plaintiffs' deponent refused to answer questions about a settlement proffer from another defendant, which the plaintiffs claimed was the source of discovering the claims against BMO and TD.

BMO and TD brought a motion to compel answers.

The court ordered the deponent to answer the questions, finding that the evidence was relevant to rebutting the presumption of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that any privilege attaching to the proffer had been waived when the plaintiffs voluntarily relied on it.

The appellants appealed the Divisional Court's dismissal of their judicial review application challenging three decisions of the Ontario Racing Commission: a Suspension and Freezing Order against the owner, a procedural decision dismissing motions to quash or stay the orders, and a merits decision imposing licence suspensions, account forfeiture, and a fine.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate notice and particulars, loss of jurisdiction due to a panel member's expired term, and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice was sufficient, the panel member could continue to sit under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, and the reasons were adequate to permit review of the reasonableness of the decision.

This endorsement addresses two motions to intervene in a land claim action brought by the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee against the Crown.

The Moose Cree First Nation sought to intervene as a necessary party, claiming exclusive Aboriginal title to a portion of the disputed lands.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN), a political territorial organization representing 49 First Nations, sought to intervene as an added party, asserting a general interest in the interpretation and application of Treaty #9.

The court granted the Moose Cree First Nation status as a necessary party without conditions under Rule 5.03, acknowledging its direct territorial claim.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation was granted status as a friend of the court under Rule 13.02, with specific limitations on its participation, as it lacked a direct or immediate interest in the substance of the claim independent of its members.

The court emphasized the complexity of multi-lateral disputes between First Nations in the context of reconciliation.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendants were partially successful in striking out "campaign of defamation" allegations from the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, while the plaintiffs successfully opposed striking out pleas of malice.

The defendants sought $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 and considering the "fair and reasonable" principle, found that despite divided success, the "campaign of defamation" allegations were a principal issue where the defendants' position was validated.

The court awarded the defendants $11,500 in all-inclusive costs, payable by the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, which alleged defamation, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The court struck the paragraphs alleging a 'campaign of defamation' because the plaintiffs failed to plead a coherent body of fact regarding the defamatory statements.

The court declined to strike the pleadings of malice and injurious falsehood, finding they did not necessarily encroach upon solicitor-client privilege.

The court struck the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, as no duty of care was owed to the third parties, but granted leave to amend.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $11,853.89, while the defendants argued the amount should not exceed $5,000 based on average awards for similar written motions.

The court found the motion for leave involved complex constitutional issues, justifying a higher award than typical leave applications.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $8,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a motion judge’s decision partially refusing to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rule 21.

The defendants argued that certain claims relating to the plaintiff’s removal from political office were non‑justiciable due to Crown prerogative and that references to testimony before a Parliamentary Committee were barred by parliamentary privilege.

The court held that the low threshold for surviving a pleadings motion meant the motion judge’s rulings were not open to serious debate.

The court further held that potential conflicts between parliamentary privilege and solicitor‑client privilege could appropriately be addressed at trial on a full evidentiary record.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of an amended statement of claim alleging breach of solicitor-client duties and defamation.

The court considered challenges including alleged non‑justiciable claims tied to parliamentary and executive privilege, insufficient particulars in the libel pleadings, prior determinations that certain statements were not defamatory, and whether fiduciary duty allegations were merely disguised defamation claims.

The court held that most allegations were properly pleaded and could proceed, including claims relating to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and defamatory statements.

However, portions alleging that previously adjudicated statements were defamatory had to be re‑cast due to issue estoppel.

References to parliamentary committee testimony were permitted to remain pending determination of privilege issues at trial.

The applicant corporation sought orders under the Securities Act and the Business Corporations Act to restrict certain shareholders from voting shares allegedly acquired in breach of early warning reporting requirements, to declare that a shareholder rights plan “flip‑in event” had occurred, and to invalidate a dissident proxy solicitation ahead of an annual general meeting.

The court declined to address the alleged early warning breach because the matter was already the subject of an ongoing Ontario Securities Commission investigation and had previously been withdrawn from related litigation.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court held that the discretionary remedy of prohibiting voting rights would not be appropriate given the circumstances and absence of harm to the market or shareholders.

The court also found no evidence that the respondents acted jointly or in concert in organizing the proxy solicitation or that the circular was misleading under applicable securities and corporate law regulations.

The application was dismissed.