Leora R. Shemesh

The appellant, Shane Williamson, appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including possession and discharging a firearm, stemming from a shooting incident where the sole issue at trial was the identity of the male shooter.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the exculpatory aspects of his statements to police (that he was a bystander/victim) under the framework of R. v. W.(D.), and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, particularly regarding eyewitness evidence frailties and other shortcomings in the Crown's circumstantial case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had applied the substance of W.(D.) by considering and rejecting the defence's "alternative explanation" through the Villaroman framework for circumstantial evidence.

The Court also found the reasons sufficient, explaining the path of reasoning and addressing the key issues in context, noting that the case was based on circumstantial evidence rather than direct eyewitness identification.

The applicant sought release from custody following a material change in circumstances, namely the withdrawal and staying of drug offences, leaving only firearms charges.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but argued for continued detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found detention was not justified on the secondary ground but initially found it justified on the tertiary ground due to the strength of the Crown's case regarding an unloaded firearm found in the applicant's bedroom.

However, the court concluded that a strict release plan, including house arrest with a surety and GPS monitoring, alleviated the tertiary ground concerns and granted the application for release.

The applicant, Hamza Badran, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody, calculating the total delay, deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

Despite a total delay exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts, the court found that significant portions were attributable to defence delay (including waivers) and discrete exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay fell just under the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was unreasonable given his lack of sustained effort to expedite proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Steven Ruiz, brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude evidence seized from his residence, alleging breaches of his section 7 and 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant was misleading, the police's dynamic entry into the property was unreasonable, and the manner of the search caused unnecessary damage and disarray.

Considering the cumulative effect of these serious Charter breaches, particularly the unlawful search based on an invalid warrant and the significant impact on the applicant's privacy interests, the court allowed the application and excluded all evidence obtained from the search pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

This decision addresses multiple pre-trial motions in a large-scale drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on Charter violations related to search and seizure (s.8) and the right to counsel (s.10), as well as the voluntariness of an utterance.

The court found the initial warrantless search for cocaine unconstitutional and excluded the evidence.

The initial search warrant for the Warwick premises was quashed, but other evidence seized under it was admitted.

Covert camera evidence was admitted despite an unlawful installation, but references to it were excised from subsequent Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

Tracking warrants and general warrants for other properties were largely upheld after excising unconstitutionally obtained information.

An accused's utterance was found voluntary and admitted, despite a s.10 Charter violation, as the impact on Charter rights was deemed slight and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA and marijuana and possession of currency obtained by crime.

Following a trial, the court found that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b) were violated.

The search of the accused's bag during investigative detention was not justified on safety grounds.

More significantly, the police failed to implement the accused's repeated requests to speak to counsel from the time of his detention through his arrest and overnight custody.

The court excluded all evidence seized pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought disclosure of the audio and transcript of an anonymous 911 call reporting a man with a handgun in a parking lot.

The Crown opposed disclosure, arguing the caller was protected by confidential informant privilege.

After reviewing the audio ex parte, the court applied the test for informant privilege and found that the 911 dispatcher's reassuring comments constituted an implicit promise of confidentiality, and the caller's conduct indicated a desire to remain anonymous.

The court concluded the call was protected by informant privilege and dismissed the application for disclosure.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug production and trafficking charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search incident to arrest and subsequent condominium searches, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, thereby violating the accused's Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the objective reasonableness of the grounds for arrest through the lens of an experienced police officer.

When viewed from that perspective, the totality of the evidence, including extensive surveillance, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused, a registered confidential informant, was charged with serious drug offences after receiving a package containing illicit drugs via a controlled delivery.

The accused testified they did not know the package contained drugs and had attempted to contact their police handler about their suspicions.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, the court granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding the police committed an egregious abuse of process by breaching informer privilege, involving the accused's handlers in the arrest, and releasing the accused into a dangerous situation to further the investigation.

The applicants, charged with production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The case had a complex history spanning over five years, including two mistrials.

The court applied the Morin framework to assess the delay.

For one applicant, the court found the institutional delay exceeded the guidelines and he suffered significant prejudice, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

For the other applicant, the court found no violation due to his express waiver of a substantial period of delay, his counsel's scheduling conflicts, and lesser prejudice, dismissing his application.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding the timing of his detention by police.

The appellant argued he was detained and handcuffed before verbally identifying himself under a false name, contrary to the trial judge's finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's factual finding that the detention occurred after the false identification.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that $43,120 in Canadian currency was the proceeds or instrument of unlawful activity under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, and ordering its forfeiture to the Crown.

The appellant argued the application judge improperly shifted the onus of proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, which included expert testimony, a NARC test, a drug dog hit, and the bundling of the money.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.