Leslie Christine Zamojc

In a criminal trial on an eight-count information, the prosecution alleged uttering threats to cause death, criminal harassment by besetting or watching a residence, and multiple breaches of probation arising from two encounters at the complainant’s apartment complex.

The court applied the reasonable-doubt standard count by count, accepted prior-discreditable-conduct evidence for limited contextual and animus purposes, and assessed the threatening words objectively under s. 264.1(a) in light of surrounding circumstances.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable, with material corroboration from cellphone video and surveillance evidence regarding attendance, identity, and conduct at the residence.

The court concluded the threatening statements on both dates were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(c) was established, and that probation breaches were knowingly committed.

The accused was convicted on all eight counts.

D.M., a young person, was found guilty of first-degree murder as a co-participant in a senseless, premeditated killing.

The Crown initially sought an adult sentence but abandoned it.

The court considered the appropriate youth sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), taking into account D.M.'s tragic background, mental illnesses, progress in pre-trial custody, and the principles of accountability, proportionality, and rehabilitation.

The court imposed a 10-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, structured as 4 years in secure custody followed by 6 years under conditional supervision, giving credit for the 3 years and 3 months spent in pre-trial custody.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was convicted of aggravated assault and weapons offences against his estranged wife.

He subsequently failed to appear for sentencing and fled to Jamaica.

The court found he had absconded to avoid sentencing and proceeded to sentence him in absentia under s. 475(1) of the Criminal Code.

Weighing the aggravating factor of intimate partner violence against his lack of a prior record, the court imposed a sentence of 4 years' imprisonment, reduced by 1.5:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The offender, A.C., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference against his stepdaughter, and assault and assault with a weapon against his son.

The court delivered reasons for sentence, applying the Kienapple principle to stay the sexual assault conviction as it arose from the same conduct as the sexual interference.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as the victims' young age, abuse of trust, prolonged intra-familial abuse, and devastating impact on the victims, balanced against mitigating factors including the offender's lack of prior record, guilty plea to the assault charges, and advanced age with health issues.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child sexual abuse.

A total sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed after accounting for pre-trial custody credit, along with various ancillary orders.

The Crown applied to have Ali Butt declared a Dangerous Offender following his guilty pleas to two charges of criminal harassment and two charges of threatening death.

Butt opposed the Dangerous Offender designation but conceded that the criteria for a Long Term Offender were met.

The court found that a pattern of violent conduct had been established, meeting the requirements of ss. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code, and that there was a high likelihood of harmful recidivism.

However, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Butt's conduct was intractable, considering his treatment prospects, willingness to engage in therapy, and developing insight.

Consequently, the Dangerous Offender designation was denied.

Butt was declared a Long Term Offender and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for criminal harassment and threatening death, along with an eight-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The accused, J.A., facing charges of first-degree murder and attempt murder, applied to be permitted to sit at counsel table during his jury trial instead of the prisoner's dock.

The application was based on concerns about potential unfair adverse inferences by the jury, the absence of security concerns, and the desire for more meaningful participation in the trial.

The court reviewed the principles governing a trial judge's discretion in seating the accused, noting that the customary position is the dock and that this does not inherently violate Charter rights unless it manifestly precludes the accused from making full answer and defence.

Expert testimony from a criminologist regarding mock trial studies suggesting juror prejudice was considered but ultimately dismissed due to methodological limitations and the inability to replicate a real trial's solemnity and dynamics.

The court emphasized the importance of trusting jurors to follow instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

The application was denied.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder of his six-year-old daughter and attempted murder of his seven-year-old son.

The offences occurred when the accused, motivated by a desire to spite his estranged wife, administered sleep medication to the children in a hotel room.

The court considered the egregious breach of parental trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 18 years for the murder, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for the attempted murder.

The accused was tried for the first-degree murder of his daughter and the attempted murder of his son after giving them sleep medication and alcohol during a suicide attempt.

During the pre-charge conference, defence counsel requested that criminal negligence causing death be left with the jury as a discrete included offence to first-degree murder.

The trial judge declined the request, ruling that in the circumstances of the case, criminal negligence causing death is manslaughter by another name and leaving both would unnecessarily complicate jury deliberations.

This case involved allegations of sexual touching and sexual assault against a four-year-old complainant (J.M.) by the accused (H.C., referred to as Uncle A.).

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of J.M.'s evidence, including a videotaped police interview and trial testimony, against the accused's flat denial.

Despite J.M.'s general competency, significant internal inconsistencies in her statements regarding whether the incident occurred, whether she saw the accused's penis, and the colour of the penis, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court applied principles for assessing child witness credibility and the R. v. W. (D.) framework, ultimately finding that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with robbery, wearing a disguise, carrying a concealed weapon, and breaching probation after a man pulled a knife on three women at a bus stop and demanded their purses.

The central issue at trial was identification.

The court relied on eyewitness testimony from a victim who recognized the accused as a tenant in her building, corroborated by security camera footage and items seized from the accused's apartment.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was arrested for robbery and obstruct police.

After being convicted of obstruct police, he brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging he was denied his right to counsel and gratuitously beaten by police in the fingerprint room.

The court found the s. 10(b) issue moot as the Crown did not seek to adduce the accused's statements.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding the accused's allegations of police brutality lacked credibility, were unsupported by physical evidence, and violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn as they were never put to the police officers during cross-examination.

The accused was sentenced following conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation after groping a woman on a public transit vehicle while subject to a prohibition against being on transit property.

The court considered the offender’s extensive criminal record for similar sexual offences and repeated breaches of court orders.

Although the offender argued that treatment for a paraphilic disorder should remain central to sentencing, the court concluded that previous rehabilitative approaches had failed.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public, the court imposed consecutive custodial sentences and a lengthy probation order with transit prohibitions and no‑contact conditions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which permits the Crown to avoid calling expert evidence if breath samples are taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offense.

The trial judge found that there was an unexplained delay of approximately 36 minutes between the accused's arrival at the police station and the administration of the first breath test.

The Crown failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this delay.

Consequently, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption and the charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that $43,120 in Canadian currency was the proceeds or instrument of unlawful activity under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, and ordering its forfeiture to the Crown.

The appellant argued the application judge improperly shifted the onus of proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, which included expert testimony, a NARC test, a drug dog hit, and the bundling of the money.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of $9,616.98 seized from an individual arrested for marijuana possession.

The application judge had dismissed the application, finding the Attorney General failed to prove the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity and that forfeiture would not be in the interests of justice due to withdrawn criminal charges and potential Charter breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by disregarding the individual's prior drug record, the lack of an innocent explanation for the funds, and the individual's consent to forfeiture.

The Court further held that withdrawn charges and potential Charter breaches do not render forfeiture clearly not in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed a civil forfeiture order regarding a property where police discovered a sophisticated marijuana grow operation.

The appellant claimed he had leased the property to a man he met at a casino and had no knowledge of the operation, which the application judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's factual findings, his conclusion that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of unlawful activity, or his determination that forfeiture was in the interests of justice.