Maria Speyer

The young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder for his role in a planned and fatal stabbing.

The court considered the youth's chaotic upbringing, mental health diagnoses, and progress in pre-trial custody.

Applying the sentencing principles of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the court imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years, apportioned as three years in secure intensive rehabilitative custody and four years under conditional supervision, declining to strictly deduct pre-sentence custody to ensure sufficient time for rehabilitation.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available and possessing child sexual abuse and exploitation material.

He had collected over 400 unique images since age 14 and uploaded three to a gaming app.

The Crown sought a two-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Pike, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

However, the court found that the accused's significant lifelong neurodevelopmental and medical conditions, including autism spectrum disorder, mild intellectual disability, and legal blindness, reduced his moral culpability.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, concluding that a community-based sentence with strict computer restrictions would not endanger the public and would satisfy the principles of sentencing.

Sentencing for historical child sexual offences, assault, and pointing a firearm arising from a grooming relationship between an adult in a position of trust and a 12-year-old complainant.

The court treated the devastating long-term impact on the complainant, abuse of trust, grooming, use of intoxicants, sexualized coercion, threats of violence, and the offender's similar prior record as major aggravating factors.

Although the offender had engaged in extensive counselling, demonstrated insight, remorse, and was assessed as presenting a relatively low risk of reoffending, the court held that contemporary sentencing principles for sexual violence against children required a penitentiary sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

A conditional sentence was found unavailable and, in any event, disproportionate.

A global sentence of five years' imprisonment was imposed with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

Linda Gibbons was charged with mischief under section 430(1)(c) of the Criminal Code for picketing an abortion clinic.

The court found that her actions, which involved communicating information and attempting to dissuade patients, did not constitute criminal mischief.

The court applied the defence under section 430(7) of the Criminal Code, which protects acts done for the purpose of communicating information, even if the intended result is to interfere with property use.

The clinic's operations continued, albeit with inconvenience, and there was no physical obstruction or harassment.

The accused was found not guilty.

D.M., a young person, was found guilty of first-degree murder as a co-participant in a senseless, premeditated killing.

The Crown initially sought an adult sentence but abandoned it.

The court considered the appropriate youth sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), taking into account D.M.'s tragic background, mental illnesses, progress in pre-trial custody, and the principles of accountability, proportionality, and rehabilitation.

The court imposed a 10-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, structured as 4 years in secure custody followed by 6 years under conditional supervision, giving credit for the 3 years and 3 months spent in pre-trial custody.

The applicants, charged with robbery of a firearm, brought a Charter motion challenging the validity of search warrants executed at their residences.

The police had obtained the warrants based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that linked the applicants' vehicles to the robbery, but relied on generalized assumptions to conclude that evidence would be found in their homes over two months later.

The court found that the ITO lacked case-specific evidence connecting the residences to the offence, rendering the searches a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious impact on the applicants' privacy rights and the sloppy police conduct warranted the exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The applicant, Mohandranjan Navaratnam, sought a mistrial and permission to re-elect to a jury trial, arguing that the Crown's delayed disclosure of an occurrence report breached his Charter rights to full answer and defence and a jury trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report was subject to third-party disclosure, not first-party, and that even if it were, the delay did not prejudice the applicant's rights given his prior knowledge of the incident and existing defence strategy.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge against sections 276(2), 278.92, 278.93, and 279.94 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Bill C-51.

These provisions govern the admissibility of a complainant's sexual history and private records in sexual assault cases, requiring defence disclosure of records in their possession and granting the complainant standing with counsel at admissibility hearings.

The accused argued these amendments violated his fair trial rights, right to make full answer and defence, and right to remain silent under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the amendments constitutional.

It held that the provisions appropriately balance the accused's fair trial rights with the privacy, security, and dignity interests of sexual assault complainants, and do not infringe on the right against self-incrimination or the right to surprise in cross-examination.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a s. 7 Charter application for disclosure of the complainant's unrelated police occurrence reports, arguing potential relevance to her credibility and motive to fabricate.

The Crown opposed, asserting that such records fall under the Mills regime (Criminal Code ss. 278.1-278.92) and lacked established relevance.

The court granted the complainant standing to make submissions on the disclosure application.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the accused's disclosure application, finding that the asserted basis for relevance was speculative and stereotypical, and did not establish a sufficient logical nexus between the requested information and the issues at trial, such as consent or motive to fabricate.

The accused Ashley Perry and Christian Walters were charged with unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm, two over-capacity magazines, and cocaine following a police search warrant executed at their apartment.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The court found that while the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Perry had knowledge and control of the contraband items, it could establish that Walters had such knowledge, either because he placed the items himself or was informed of their location by his brother or an associate.

Perry was acquitted on all counts; Walters was convicted.

The offender pleaded guilty to five child pornography-related charges and one count of sexual assault of his five-year-old daughter.

The offender had engaged in online communications with a UK offender discussing the sexual abuse of their own children and exchanging child sexual abuse material.

Police discovered 212 child sexual abuse images and 2 videos on the offender's devices, including images of his own daughter.

The offender had a prior 2010 conviction for possessing and importing child pornography.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years less 983 days of pretrial custody, with 5 years concurrent on the child pornography charges and 3 years consecutive on the sexual assault charge.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives given the severity of crimes against children.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple impaired driving and related offences occurring on two separate occasions: November 27, 2017 and September 15, 2018.

On the first occasion, the accused was observed driving erratically on Highway 401 with a blood alcohol concentration of 340 mg/100ml while subject to a lifetime driving prohibition.

On the second occasion, he was involved in a collision on Highway 401 with a blood alcohol concentration of 210-220 mg/100ml while on bail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 24 months incarceration less pretrial custody, with consecutive sentences on the impaired driving charges and lifetime driving prohibitions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample test results, alleging breaches of Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b), specifically regarding the timing of the roadside screening demand, the timing of breath samples, and the adequacy of rights to counsel advisement in a language he understood.

The court found that the roadside demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the police took reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his rights to counsel in Mandarin.

The court admitted the evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The young person accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with a heavily intoxicated complainant in a parking lot.

The complainant had limited memory of the events but recalled being held down and repeatedly saying no.

DNA evidence confirmed the presence of the accused's bodily fluids on the complainant.

The court found that the complainant's advanced state of intoxication rendered her incapable of consenting, and that she had also expressed her lack of consent.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

A young person was charged with sexual assault of a 19-year-old complainant following an incident in a wooded area behind apartment buildings in Scarborough in the early morning hours of July 30, 2016.

The complainant was heavily intoxicated at the time.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant neither had the capacity to consent nor did she express any consent to the sexual activity.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused moved for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused had fled to Nicaragua in September 2013, approximately one month after being charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering death threats.

He remained abroad for nearly 42 months until his arrest upon return to Canada in April 2017.

The court found that the accused deliberately misled police about his whereabouts, actively avoided detection, and chose to remain in Nicaragua knowing of the outstanding arrest warrant.

The court held that this period of delay was caused solely by the accused and must be deducted from the total delay calculation.

With the deduction, the net delay of approximately 11 months fell well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 8 or 9 rights, as the initial police conversation was lawful and the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as police made diligent efforts to facilitate the accused's right to counsel of choice and provided adequate information regarding legal rights.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography, possessing child pornography, making child pornography, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter between 2014 and 2017.

The offences involved the systematic grooming and sexual abuse of the victim from age 13 to 17, the creation and distribution of hundreds of sexually explicit images of the victim, and the possession of numerous child abuse images of other children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment, with specific counts running concurrently and consecutively as required by statute, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives given the serious nature of crimes against children.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis from an approved instrument.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9 regarding the roadside screening demand, the reliability of the screening device results, the detention in the police cruiser, and the timing of the breath samples.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the evidence, finding the accused guilty as charged.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit two accused to stand trial for second degree murder in the death of Trey Theriault, who sustained eight stab wounds during an altercation.

The accused admitted presence and participation in a physical fight but argued insufficient evidence of intent to kill.

The court applied the Sheppard/Arcuri test for committal, examining whether a reasonable jury could infer guilt from the evidence.

The court found sufficient evidence on all essential elements of second degree murder: causation (stab wounds to vital organs), unlawful act (armed assault without justification), and intent (inferred from the nature and number of wounds).

Both accused were committed to stand trial.