Maria Speyer

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg/100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought to exclude breathalyzer test results on the basis that his Charter rights under s. 8 (right to privacy) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) were breached.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) as the accused failed to clearly invoke his right to counsel of choice and was not sufficiently diligent in exercising that right.

Although the court found a breach of s. 8 by videotaping the accused while using a urinal without informing him of a private washroom alternative, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of counterfeit marks (Canadian citizenship cards and social insurance number cards), one count of possession of property obtained by crime (licence plates), and four counts of fraud over $5,000.

The accused brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of his detention, the search of his vehicle, and a strip search conducted at the police station.

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the accused guilty on counts relating to possession of counterfeit marks, possession of property obtained by crime, and fraud in relation to certain bank accounts.

The accused was acquitted on one fraud count.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand made by a peace officer pursuant to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused refused to provide a breath sample at the roadside following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused raised two defences: first, that his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter was violated; and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had operated the motor vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the accused's proximity to the vehicle and conflicting statements from his wife.

The court also found that the demand was made promptly and that the refusal occurred within the "forthwith" timeframe, meaning the accused's Charter rights were not engaged.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, a pharmacist, pleaded guilty to defrauding the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan of $2.5 million over three years by knowingly overbilling for pharmaceuticals not purchased or dispensed.

The accused had repaid $2 million in restitution but $500,000 remained outstanding.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day in custody, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence despite evidence of the accused's depression, drug addiction, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court emphasized that general deterrence is the paramount sentencing principle in large-scale fraud cases involving breach of trust.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the police stop on private property and argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 were breached.

The court found that the police officer had authority under both the Highway Traffic Act and common law to conduct a random stop in the parking lot for highway safety purposes.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that he should have been given an opportunity to consult counsel before providing a breath sample, as the "forthwith" requirement in s. 254(2) is a constitutional prerequisite.

The court found the defendant guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample, as he clearly and repeatedly refused to comply with the lawful demand.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and accessing child pornography contrary to sections 163.1(4) and 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.

Between May and June 2013, the accused accessed and downloaded approximately 481 child pornography images depicting very young children aged 2 to 6 being sexually assaulted.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a sentence of 90 days in custody followed by three years of probation.

The court rejected the joint submission as unfit, finding that a minimum sentence would not adequately serve the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the accused's prior conviction for a similar offence and his criminal history.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months in custody followed by three years of probation, with credit for pre-trial custody, a DNA order, a prohibition on internet use for five years, and a lifetime SOIRA order.

The accused, an inmate at a detention centre, was charged with possessing marijuana after a correctional officer found the drug during a strip search.

The officer conducted the search without the superintendent's authorization, based only on a hunch after seeing another inmate blocking the cell door.

The court found the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and the search was not authorized by law.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of the unauthorized strip search and the need to uphold legislated safeguards for inmates.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with possessing 2 grams of marijuana contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, allegedly discovered during a strip search at a detention centre.

The accused challenged the legality of the search under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the strip search was unauthorized and based on insufficient grounds, constituting a serious breach of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on the basis that her section 8 Charter rights were violated when she was video and audio recorded using the toilet in a holding cell.

The court found a breach of section 8 rights but declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence.

On the merits, the court acquitted on the impaired driving charge but convicted on the over 80 charge based on the admissible breath test results.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm after forcibly removing apartment keys from the hands of his roommate and dragging her out of the apartment.

The accused claimed justification under section 35 of the Criminal Code (defence of property), arguing the complainant was a trespasser.

The court found that although the accused may have subjectively believed he had the right to eject the complainant, such belief was not objectively reasonable.

The complainant was a tenant with rights to the apartment, had paid rent, was not in arrears, and had not agreed to vacate by the date the accused demanded.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm, holding that his use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired based on observations of his manner of driving (weaving, collision with median, continued driving on flat tire) and physical symptoms (glassy eyes, slurred speech, odour of alcohol).

The court found that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code, notwithstanding delays caused by police procedures and a technician error.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with count 2 conditionally stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

Two young persons charged with assault causing bodily harm (one also charged with assault with a weapon) brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charges arose from an incident on July 30, 2011.

The first trial date was set for December 2012 but was adjourned when the Crown disclosed on the eve of trial that a surveillance videotape had been misplaced by police.

A second trial date was scheduled for November 2013.

The court found that the total delay of 27.5 months, with 17 months attributable to Crown disclosure failures and institutional resource limitations, constituted an unreasonable delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the minimal remedy for the section 11(b) breach.

The appellant, a numbered Ontario corporation, sought costs on an appeal from a conviction under the Liquor Licence Act of Ontario.

The appellant had been convicted in absentia after the prosecutor amended the Information to substitute the appellant as defendant without notice or service.

The court found jurisdiction to award costs under section 129 of the Provincial Offences Act and determined that exceptional circumstances existed warranting a costs award.

Although the prosecutor's conduct was careless rather than malicious, the court found that fairness required the appellant be relieved of the financial burden of the appeal, as it had been wrongly convicted without notice or opportunity to defend.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $4,520.00.

The Hamilton Spectator applied to unseal production orders and Informations to Obtain (ITOs) that had been sealed in connection with a fraud investigation involving allegations that the accused defrauded Citizenship and Immigration Canada of over four million dollars.

The court dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds, finding that because one accused was awaiting trial in Superior Court and the mode of trial for the other two accused had not been determined, the application should be brought before a Superior Court judge rather than the Ontario Court of Justice.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 2 years, 5 months and 15 days in custody with a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) for ten years.

The National Parole Board imposed conditions including a prohibition on entering establishments where the primary source of income is derived from the sale of alcohol, and a requirement to reside at an approved community-based residential facility.

The accused was charged with breaching both conditions by entering an off-track betting establishment in the basement of a tavern and by failing to abide by residence rules.

The court dismissed the first charge but found the accused guilty on the second charge, holding that the tavern must be considered as a single entity where the primary source of income is derived from alcohol sales.