Emily Julia Dixon

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He argued that his counsel failed to properly advise him on his right to a jury trial, his right not to testify, and his right to appear in person rather than virtually.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and found that while the failure to advise on the jury election was not established, trial counsel failed to provide competent advice regarding the appellant's right to testify and his right to appear in person.

These failures deprived the appellant of the ability to make fundamental decisions about his defence, undermining trial fairness and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The accused was charged with administering a noxious substance with intent to aggrieve or annoy, and two counts of breaching the peace.

The Crown alleged that the accused sprayed an aerosol substance (believed to be bug spray) at a complainant on a neighbourhood street.

The defence conceded that the accused directed the spray at the complainant and thereby assaulted her, and that he breached court-imposed peace bond and probation terms.

However, the defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the specific elements of administering a noxious substance.

The court found that while the accused administered a substance to the complainant, the substance was not noxious as required by the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted on the noxious substance charge but convicted on the breach of peace counts, staying one count pursuant to Kienapple principles.

The applicant, charged with multiple offences including attempted murder, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) during her arrest and the execution of search warrants.

She sought various remedies including setting aside a warrant, a stay of proceedings, and exclusion of evidence.

The court found a breach of the applicant's s. 8 rights due to a warrantless search of her cell phone and a minor informational breach of her s. 10(b) right to counsel.

However, the court found no breach of s. 7 (rejecting claims of an unlawful strip search or denial of dignity/child access) and no implementational breach of s. 10(b).

The court excluded the evidence obtained from the cell phone but dismissed the application to exclude other physical evidence seized under the Criminal Code warrant and denied a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, threatening, mischief, and forcible entry on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

She alleged her trial lawyer was unprepared, failed to provide proper advice, brought a meritless stay application, and sexually harassed her.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the appellant did not demonstrate the verdict would have been different, trial counsel's pervasive incompetence and sexual harassment of the appellant compromised the fairness of the trial, amounting to a constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge against sections 276(2), 278.92, 278.93, and 279.94 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Bill C-51.

These provisions govern the admissibility of a complainant's sexual history and private records in sexual assault cases, requiring defence disclosure of records in their possession and granting the complainant standing with counsel at admissibility hearings.

The accused argued these amendments violated his fair trial rights, right to make full answer and defence, and right to remain silent under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the amendments constitutional.

It held that the provisions appropriately balance the accused's fair trial rights with the privacy, security, and dignity interests of sexual assault complainants, and do not infringe on the right against self-incrimination or the right to surprise in cross-examination.

The applicant accused brought an application for certiorari following appearances in the Ontario Court of Justice, where he sought directions that the complainant had no standing in a pre-trial admissibility hearing based on a recent Superior Court decision declaring the relevant Criminal Code provisions unconstitutional.

The application judge declined to make the ruling without a proper evidentiary record or notice of constitutional question.

The Superior Court dismissed the certiorari application, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness, and noting that certiorari does not lie for an error of law.

The defendant, C.C., charged with sexual assault, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity between them.

The defence sought to adduce evidence regarding the nature of their sexual relationship, shared use of the washroom, and the complainant's disclosures about past sexual assaults impacting her communication of consent.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 276(2) and (3), considering the relevance to an honest but mistaken belief in consent and the probative value versus prejudice.

The court permitted cross-examination on the existence of a sexual relationship, shared washroom history, and the complainant's communication about how past experiences affected her consent communication, finding these relevant to the defendant's understanding of consent and not unduly prejudicial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a s. 7 Charter application for disclosure of the complainant's unrelated police occurrence reports, arguing potential relevance to her credibility and motive to fabricate.

The Crown opposed, asserting that such records fall under the Mills regime (Criminal Code ss. 278.1-278.92) and lacked established relevance.

The court granted the complainant standing to make submissions on the disclosure application.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the accused's disclosure application, finding that the asserted basis for relevance was speculative and stereotypical, and did not establish a sufficient logical nexus between the requested information and the issues at trial, such as consent or motive to fabricate.

The accused, R.S., charged with sexual assault, brought an application to introduce text messages and an email between himself and the complainant, L.H., under ss. 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court partially granted the application, admitting the text messages.

These messages, exchanged proximate to and after the alleged assaults, were deemed relevant to L.H.'s credibility regarding consent and the narrative of events, possessing significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, and crucial for the defence's right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized a holistic consideration of factors under s. 278.92(3) and rejected stereotypical interpretations of victim behaviour.

However, the email, which described an erotic dream of L.H. involving R.S. and was sexual in nature, was found to fall under s. 276(4) as sexual activity.

As no s. 276 application was brought for its admission, and it would have been dismissed on the merits for relying on a proscribed inference about consent, the email was deemed inadmissible.

During a trial for sexual assault, the accused brought a renewed application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant.

The application was renewed after the complainant testified in-chief.

The court partially granted the application, finding that the evidence was necessary to provide context to specific text messages and statements made by the complainant regarding their platonic relationship.

The court held that admitting the evidence for this limited purpose did not rely on twin-myth reasoning and its probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice.

R.S., charged with sexual assault and choking, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of three prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant, L.H. The defence argued this evidence was relevant to establish an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and/or to challenge L.H.'s credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that R.S.'s belief was based on a mistake of law ("No" means "No") and not a mistake of fact.

The court emphasized that prior sexual activities, especially those where consent was vitiated by an expressed lack of agreement, could not form the basis of a defence of honest but mistaken belief, nor could they be used to infer consent or attack credibility without engaging in prohibited "twin myths." The evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice and the complainant's dignity and privacy.

These applications concerned whether pay equity achieved through proxy pay equity plans in female-dominated long-term care workplaces must be maintained by continued reference to proxy establishments.

The Tribunal held that the Pay Equity Act imposes a maintenance obligation on proxy plans, but that maintenance does not require ongoing monitoring of changes in compensation or job value in the proxy employer’s establishment.

Instead, maintenance is to be carried out internally by monitoring the compensation/value relationship already established for the key and non-key female job classes.

The Tribunal also rejected the section 15 Charter challenge and held that workplace changes affecting job value made the existing $1.50 plans inappropriate absent a negotiated gender-neutral comparison system.

The matter was adjourned for nine months with directions to negotiate an amendment to the plans.