Emily Julia Dixon

The accused was charged with administering a noxious substance with intent to aggrieve or annoy, and two counts of breaching the peace.

The Crown alleged that the accused sprayed an aerosol substance (believed to be bug spray) at a complainant on a neighbourhood street.

The defence conceded that the accused directed the spray at the complainant and thereby assaulted her, and that he breached court-imposed peace bond and probation terms.

However, the defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the specific elements of administering a noxious substance.

The court found that while the accused administered a substance to the complainant, the substance was not noxious as required by the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted on the noxious substance charge but convicted on the breach of peace counts, staying one count pursuant to Kienapple principles.

The applicant, charged with multiple offences including attempted murder, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) during her arrest and the execution of search warrants.

She sought various remedies including setting aside a warrant, a stay of proceedings, and exclusion of evidence.

The court found a breach of the applicant's s. 8 rights due to a warrantless search of her cell phone and a minor informational breach of her s. 10(b) right to counsel.

However, the court found no breach of s. 7 (rejecting claims of an unlawful strip search or denial of dignity/child access) and no implementational breach of s. 10(b).

The court excluded the evidence obtained from the cell phone but dismissed the application to exclude other physical evidence seized under the Criminal Code warrant and denied a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge against sections 276(2), 278.92, 278.93, and 279.94 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Bill C-51.

These provisions govern the admissibility of a complainant's sexual history and private records in sexual assault cases, requiring defence disclosure of records in their possession and granting the complainant standing with counsel at admissibility hearings.

The accused argued these amendments violated his fair trial rights, right to make full answer and defence, and right to remain silent under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the amendments constitutional.

It held that the provisions appropriately balance the accused's fair trial rights with the privacy, security, and dignity interests of sexual assault complainants, and do not infringe on the right against self-incrimination or the right to surprise in cross-examination.

The defendant, C.C., charged with sexual assault, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity between them.

The defence sought to adduce evidence regarding the nature of their sexual relationship, shared use of the washroom, and the complainant's disclosures about past sexual assaults impacting her communication of consent.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 276(2) and (3), considering the relevance to an honest but mistaken belief in consent and the probative value versus prejudice.

The court permitted cross-examination on the existence of a sexual relationship, shared washroom history, and the complainant's communication about how past experiences affected her consent communication, finding these relevant to the defendant's understanding of consent and not unduly prejudicial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a s. 7 Charter application for disclosure of the complainant's unrelated police occurrence reports, arguing potential relevance to her credibility and motive to fabricate.

The Crown opposed, asserting that such records fall under the Mills regime (Criminal Code ss. 278.1-278.92) and lacked established relevance.

The court granted the complainant standing to make submissions on the disclosure application.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the accused's disclosure application, finding that the asserted basis for relevance was speculative and stereotypical, and did not establish a sufficient logical nexus between the requested information and the issues at trial, such as consent or motive to fabricate.

The accused, R.S., charged with sexual assault, brought an application to introduce text messages and an email between himself and the complainant, L.H., under ss. 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court partially granted the application, admitting the text messages.

These messages, exchanged proximate to and after the alleged assaults, were deemed relevant to L.H.'s credibility regarding consent and the narrative of events, possessing significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, and crucial for the defence's right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized a holistic consideration of factors under s. 278.92(3) and rejected stereotypical interpretations of victim behaviour.

However, the email, which described an erotic dream of L.H. involving R.S. and was sexual in nature, was found to fall under s. 276(4) as sexual activity.

As no s. 276 application was brought for its admission, and it would have been dismissed on the merits for relying on a proscribed inference about consent, the email was deemed inadmissible.

R.S., charged with sexual assault and choking, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of three prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant, L.H. The defence argued this evidence was relevant to establish an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and/or to challenge L.H.'s credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that R.S.'s belief was based on a mistake of law ("No" means "No") and not a mistake of fact.

The court emphasized that prior sexual activities, especially those where consent was vitiated by an expressed lack of agreement, could not form the basis of a defence of honest but mistaken belief, nor could they be used to infer consent or attack credibility without engaging in prohibited "twin myths." The evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice and the complainant's dignity and privacy.