Daniel Lerner

The accused was charged with child luring under s. 172.1(1) of the Criminal Code, specifically communicating electronically with a person he believed was under 18 for sexual services.

The Crown presented evidence of messages where the accused confirmed he was "okay" with the purported sex worker being 14 years old, and circumstantial evidence of his conduct leading up to a planned meeting.

The defence argued lack of specific intent, claiming the accused believed he was investigating a scam or robbery, and that his historical actions of reporting human trafficking should create reasonable doubt.

Applying the R. v. W.(D) test, the court found the accused's exculpatory evidence illogical, far-fetched, and inconsistent with the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The court concluded that the Crown had proven the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found guilty.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of "Textnow" messages as evidence in a child luring trial.

The messages were exchanged between a police detective and the accused's phone.

The court considered the authentication of electronic documents under the Canada Evidence Act, specifically sections 31.1, 31.2, and 31.3.

Based on direct testimony from the detective and compelling circumstantial evidence, the court found the messages to be relevant and authentic, satisfying the low threshold for admissibility.

The application was allowed, and the messages were deemed admissible for trial.

The accused moved for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused had fled to Nicaragua in September 2013, approximately one month after being charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering death threats.

He remained abroad for nearly 42 months until his arrest upon return to Canada in April 2017.

The court found that the accused deliberately misled police about his whereabouts, actively avoided detection, and chose to remain in Nicaragua knowing of the outstanding arrest warrant.

The court held that this period of delay was caused solely by the accused and must be deducted from the total delay calculation.

With the deduction, the net delay of approximately 11 months fell well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter s.11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay in trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drug, resisting arrest, and possession of cocaine.

The trial commenced on its third scheduled date after nearly three years of delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework to assess whether the delay breached the accused's right to trial within a reasonable time.

After deducting defence delay and accounting for discrete exceptional events, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the Crown had proven the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on delay.

The Information was sworn 15 months prior, and this was the third trial date.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the net delay of 15 months fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for the Ontario Court of Justice, the defence had demonstrated both a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The Crown failed to take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings, particularly when the assigned Crown was unavailable at the scheduled trial start time, resulting in the trial not being completed as scheduled.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol following a road rage incident.

The defendant claimed self-defence.

The Crown's evidence consisted of testimony from the two complainants and police officers.

The defendant testified that he was struck first and acted in self-defence.

The court found the complainants' evidence inconsistent and unreliable, particularly regarding who initiated the altercation and their departure from the scene.

The defendant's serious facial injuries supported his version of events.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's Charter rights under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, as police failed to provide meaningful advice to a non-native English speaker who was concussed and injured.

The blood test results were excluded as evidence.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol arising from events on May 7, 2013.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) motion alleging his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on March 9, 2015, and the accused renewed the 11(b) motion at the conclusion of trial on January 18, 2016.

The court found total delay of approximately 32 months from charge to trial completion, with 15 to 16 months of institutional delay.

Despite the seriousness of the charges and the substantial delay, the court initially dismissed the motion at the outset of trial.

Upon renewal, the court found the delay constituted a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed all charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded as a blended hearing addressing both Charter applications and the trial on the merits.

The defence raised four Charter issues: (1) whether the approved screening device (ASD) was administered forthwith and whether the right to counsel was violated; (2) whether there was a violation of s. 8 of the Charter based on an allegedly unreliable ASD; (3) whether the arrest constituted arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter; and (4) whether the breath demand under s. 254(3) was made as soon as practicable.

The court found that all Charter applications lacked merit and convicted the accused based on breath samples showing 124 mg and 122 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police entry onto her property.

The officer attended at the accused's residence in response to a dispatch report of a possible impaired driver.

The property was secured by a motorized metal gate at the end of a 200-metre driveway, with intercom and security camera systems.

The officer entered the property by following a security guard through the gate without explicit permission.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful entry onto the property in violation of section 8 rights, and an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court excluded all evidence obtained after the officer passed through the gate, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The Crown presented evidence from a York Regional Police officer and a breath technician regarding the investigation and breath testing procedures.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable, arguing that the officer completed the roadside sample at 02:28 and then delayed, and that the officer should have arrested for impaired driving without conducting an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout the investigation, that the total elapsed time of approximately 1 hour and 15 to 22 minutes was reasonable, and that the officer's decision to conduct an ASD was justified.

The court found the accused guilty based on the breath test readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test readings of 129 mg and 120 mg obtained at the police station.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on three grounds: (1) breach of Charter rights regarding residual mouth alcohol; (2) breach of s. 9 Charter rights due to unlawful detention; and (3) loss of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) due to failure to obtain samples as soon as practicable.

The court found that the police did not act promptly in obtaining the breath samples, with unexplained delays totaling approximately one hour from arrest to testing.

Without expert evidence to extrapolate the readings back to the time of driving, the presumption of identity could not be applied.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, assault with a weapon, dangerous driving, and assault following an incident on May 23, 2011.

The charges of assault with a weapon, assault, and dangerous driving were withdrawn.

Prior to trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 8 rights due to an unlawful strip search conducted at the police station.

The Crown opposed the application.

The trial proceeded on the impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample charges.

The court found that the strip search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights and stayed the proceedings.

On the merits, the court acquitted the accused of both remaining charges.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and held in police custody for approximately 16 hours, with the investigation completed prior to 6:30 pm.

Although the initial decision to delay her release was reasonable, the court found that the accused was not reassessed for release as the hours passed, resulting in an unlawful and arbitrary detention.

The accused was held in harsh conditions in a cold cell without adequate bedding or clothing, and was denied food and water for extended periods.

The court found a breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and imposed a remedy of pre-trial custody credit for time served plus a nominal $1 fine in satisfaction of the statutory minimum penalty, along with a mandatory one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in his body.

At trial, a dispute arose regarding whether the accused required a Tibetan interpreter.

The Crown challenged the necessity of an interpreter, arguing the accused spoke English.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the accused had a Charter right to interpreter assistance under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court examined the accused's proficiency in English through his testimony and video evidence of police interactions, ultimately finding that the accused spoke English sufficiently and did not meet the threshold for requiring an interpreter.