Alireza Pazuki

The defendant, Aditya Jaswal, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time for an excess blood alcohol concentration charge.

The total post-charge delay was 650 days (21 months and 20 days).

The court analyzed defence delay, including periods of inaction regarding disclosure and late notice of the s. 11(b) concern.

The court deducted 158 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 492 days (16 months and 6 days), which is below the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found the defendant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and the case did not take markedly longer than it should have.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with impaired driving and "80 plus", sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 24 months and 21 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found no defence delay, as the defence diligently pursued core disclosure that was significantly delayed by the Crown and police.

A deduction of three months was made for pandemic-related systemic delay as an exceptional circumstance.

Even with this deduction, the remaining delay of 21 months and 21 days still exceeded the presumptive ceiling, leading the court to grant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.

The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.

The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found that while the "forthwith" requirement for field sobriety tests was met, the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make a breath demand under section 254(3) because the officer should not have relied on the failure of field sobriety tests given the accused's disclosed medical conditions affecting his ability to stand and his vision impairment.

The trial judge also found the accused was denied access to necessary medication during detention.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and carrying a weapon for the purpose of committing an offence.

The Crown's case was that the accused struck the complainant with a baseball bat during an altercation over payment for services.

The accused claimed self-defence, asserting that he was attacked by multiple men on the construction site and used the bat defensively.

The court found significant inconsistencies and frailties in the Crown's witnesses' testimony, particularly regarding the sequence of events and the injuries sustained by the accused.

The documented injuries on the accused were inconsistent with the Crown's version of events and raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused acted in self-defence.

The court acquitted the accused on all three counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments including arbitrary detention, improper ASD demand and testing procedures, and sought exclusion of evidence.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the Crown's evidence reliable and admissible.

The defence's bolus drinking evidence was found to be illogical, internally inconsistent, and not credible.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following an incident on August 25, 2015.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving behavior including crossing the centre line, driving on and off the road shoulder multiple times, and nearly striking another vehicle.

Police responded and observed the defendant with a smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, and slow movements.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 140 and 136 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only three beers and attributed his driving errors to construction confusion and texting, and his unsteady gait to tiredness.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol and exceeded the legal blood alcohol limit.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol on September 21, 2014.

His trial was scheduled for December 2, 2015, approximately 14.5 months later.

He brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court found that while the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines for the jurisdiction, it did not exceed them by much.

The applicant's claimed prejudice was limited and largely not credible, as he testified that adverse effects only began after the Crown's adjournment application on August 31, 2015.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The institutional delay of between 8 months 5 days and 10 months 11 days was found to be reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court found that the defendant declined multiple earlier trial dates offered by the Crown and failed to demonstrate genuine prejudice from the delay.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test readings of 129 mg and 120 mg obtained at the police station.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on three grounds: (1) breach of Charter rights regarding residual mouth alcohol; (2) breach of s. 9 Charter rights due to unlawful detention; and (3) loss of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) due to failure to obtain samples as soon as practicable.

The court found that the police did not act promptly in obtaining the breath samples, with unexplained delays totaling approximately one hour from arrest to testing.

Without expert evidence to extrapolate the readings back to the time of driving, the presumption of identity could not be applied.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on Highway 400.

The Crown's case established that the accused was speeding and changing lanes erratically.

After a roadside screening device failure, breath samples were obtained showing readings of 210 and 200 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court found the accused not guilty of impaired driving due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond the blood alcohol readings.

The court upheld the validity of the breath tests as taken as soon as practicable and found no Charter breach.

The accused was convicted of driving with excess alcohol under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.