Ryan Moir

The accused was charged with operation while impaired by a drug contrary to section 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failure or refusal to comply with a demand under section 320.15(1).

The Crown conceded the first count at trial.

On the second count, the court found that the Crown failed to prove a valid demand, which is an essential element of the failure to comply offence.

The evaluating officer required an affirmative statement from the accused that she would submit to the evaluation before proceeding, which constituted an additional unlawful demand not authorized by the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, the initial demand to "submit to an evaluation" was not unequivocal as it did not clearly communicate what the accused was compelled to do.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant, Ronita Lal, was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

She brought Charter applications (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), 11(d)) to exclude evidence, specifically the results of a roadside breath screening.

The court found that the police had an implied license and statutory authority to enter private property to investigate.

While a s. 8 Charter violation (unlawful search of the vehicle) and a minimal s. 10(b) Charter violation (brief delay in providing right to counsel post-arrest) occurred, the court applied the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

It concluded that the seriousness of the breaches was modest, the impact on the defendant's Charter interests was slight and momentary, and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and crucial evidence, outweighed the breaches.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown applied under sections 714.1 and 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for the complainant to testify by video link from New Brunswick in a criminal trial involving charges of assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing unfairness, diminished solemnity, potential hindrance to cross-examination, and insufficient evidence regarding the complainant's inconvenience or medical issues.

The court considered eight factors from R. v. Young, including the impact on cross-examination, the integrity of the examination site, witness travel distance, convenience, and cost.

The application was dismissed, as the court found that potential issues with cross-examination and the appearance of fairness, coupled with a lack of precise evidentiary basis for the complainant's inconvenience, tipped the balance against granting the order.

The defendant, Aditya Jaswal, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time for an excess blood alcohol concentration charge.

The total post-charge delay was 650 days (21 months and 20 days).

The court analyzed defence delay, including periods of inaction regarding disclosure and late notice of the s. 11(b) concern.

The court deducted 158 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 492 days (16 months and 6 days), which is below the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found the defendant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and the case did not take markedly longer than it should have.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a vehicle, raising grounds including the trial judge's failure to hear an 11(b) application, failure to consider Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9), wrongful admission of character evidence, and misapprehension of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds.

The appellant failed to file necessary materials for the 11(b) application, and the trial judge's findings regarding Charter compliance and evidence were upheld, with deference given to the trial judge's assessment of facts and credibility.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) right to a speedy trial.

The total delay from the information to the anticipated trial conclusion was 1,120 days.

The court deducted 349 days for defence-caused delay and 140 days for COVID-19 related exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay of 631 days (20.74 months) exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court matters.

The Crown failed to demonstrate sufficient mitigation efforts for the post-COVID reopening delay.

Consequently, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused, Gregory Chevalier, was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 80 mg.

He brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, and 9 rights.

The court conducted a blended trial and Charter application.

The defence conceded impairment but disputed the identity of the driver and the "as soon as practicable" requirement for breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand, that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and that the accused was proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be the driver, or alternatively, was in care or control of the vehicle under the presumption of operation.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty on both counts.