Justyna Waxman

The applicant sought interim spousal and child support from the respondent in a common law relationship that lasted approximately 16 years.

The respondent's parents and brother brought a summary judgment motion for possession of the matrimonial home.

The court granted the summary judgment motion for possession, finding that the applicant had no possessory rights as a common law spouse and no valid constructive trust claim.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on gifts and housing benefits provided by his parents and ordered that interim spousal support commence upon the applicant's vacation of the property.

The court deferred determination of the quantum of support and child support pending further submissions.

In a high-conflict parenting trial, the court awarded the applicant sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of the child, while preserving the respondent’s parenting time through a staged reintegration and reunification process supported by therapists and supervised video contact.

Applying the best interests factors under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the respondent’s social media conduct constituted family violence and materially affected the child’s safety, security, and well-being.

The court imputed income of $35,000 to the respondent and ordered ongoing child support, retroactive child support, and a fixed contribution toward current section 7 expenses.

It also imposed a coercive monetary penalty of $100 per day for continued non-compliance with repeated court orders requiring removal of social media posts, and allowed the applicant to pause the reintegration plan during any further breach.

The applicant mother brought two motions: to suspend the father's parenting time pending a psychiatric assessment and to find him in contempt of court.

The motions arose from an incident where the mother intervened to prevent the father from exercising his court-ordered parenting time at the child's school graduation event, leading to a verbal altercation.

The court found that the mother had breached a prior court order by denying the father parenting time and that her allegations of the father's unfitness, based on his political views and the incident, were unsubstantiated.

The court dismissed both of the mother's motions, maintained the existing parenting schedule, clarified summer parenting time, and ordered the mother to pay costs to the self-represented father.

The decision emphasized the importance of parental cooperation and the child's best interests over parental conflict.

This is a costs endorsement following a come-back motion concerning ex parte injunctions.

The applicant successfully continued a Family Law Act preservation order against her former spouse but failed to continue a Mareva order against his family members and corporate affiliates.

The court determined costs based on divided success, reasonableness of conduct, and settlement offers, ultimately awarding the applicant costs against the former spouse and the other respondents costs against the applicant, with deferred payment terms for the applicant.

The applicant brought a guardianship application regarding one of the respondents, which was dismissed.

The respondents sought costs.

The court found no reason to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents, fixing the costs at $56,224.11 for one respondent and $44,000 for the other, payable by the applicant in three instalments.

This was a costs ruling arising from a family law motion to change concerning parenting time, school choice, and decision-making for a young child.

Although the substantive dispute settled on consent shortly before trial, the court found the final resolution substantially favoured the applicant's litigation positions and that the respondent had taken unreasonable positions and unreasonably declined settlement offers.

Applying rr. 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court balanced success, proportionality, settlement incentives, litigation conduct, and the respondent's limited financial means.

Partial indemnity costs of $50,000 inclusive of HST were awarded, payable in monthly instalments of $250.

Two competing applications were brought by family members.

The applicant daughter applied for guardianship over her 90-year-old mother and challenged the validity of her mother's new will, powers of attorney, and the transfer of her home to her other daughter, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity.

The mother applied to remove the applicant daughter as a joint account holder on her investment account.

The applicant daughter moved to consolidate the applications into an action requiring a trial.

The court found that the mother's capacity was the controlling issue and could be decided on the application record without a trial.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence and the mother's own testimony, the court concluded that the mother had the requisite capacity to manage her property and personal care, grant powers of attorney, make a will, and make an inter vivos gift.

Because the mother had capacity and the impugned instruments were executory, the court declined to direct a trial on the issue of undue influence.

The applicant daughter's application was dismissed, and the mother's application to remove the applicant daughter from the joint account was granted.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay $15,000 in costs to the responding parties.

Following a five-day family law trial where the respondent was entirely successful, the respondent sought full recovery costs of $139,675.71.

The court found that the respondent beat her offers to settle and that the applicant acted in bad faith by hiding income, failing to make disclosure, and advancing spurious claims to drain the respondent's resources.

The court awarded the respondent her full claimed costs of $139,675.71, enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office as child and spousal support.

The parties separated after a 20-year marriage.

The applicant husband claimed he had no assets, lived on loans from friends, and sought an unequal division of net family property in his favour.

The respondent wife claimed a resulting trust in the matrimonial home, equalization, and support, alleging the husband hid assets and income.

The court found the husband failed to make full and frank disclosure, hid foreign assets, and received substantial undisclosed income and gifts.

The court granted the wife a resulting trust in the matrimonial home, imputed an annual income of $349,544 to the husband, awarded the wife a lump sum spousal support payment of $434,784, and ordered the net proceeds of the matrimonial home be paid to her in satisfaction of her claims.

The respondents brought a motion seeking a contempt order against the applicant for breaching a disclosure order, an order to set aside restraining orders against Wilfred Abraham, and an order to appoint an inspector for Scorpio Specialty Services Inc. The court dismissed the contempt claim, finding non-compliance but not intentional breach.

It terminated the restraining orders against Wilfred Abraham, concluding they were no longer necessary due to changed circumstances and the applicant's inconsistent positions regarding Abraham's status.

The court granted the request to appoint BDO as an inspector under s. 161(2) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, finding a prima facie case that the business affairs may have unfairly disregarded security holder interests, with the respondents initially bearing the investigation costs subject to re-apportionment at trial.

The applicant brought an urgent motion for the immediate return of the parties' four children, alleging the respondent withheld them contrary to an existing consent order.

The respondent sought to impose a condition prohibiting the children from having contact with the applicant's current partner's children due to COVID-19 health concerns.

The court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate an increased health risk and that the applicant's blended family, despite maintaining separate residences, could constitute a "household" for public health guideline purposes.

The motion was granted, enforcing the original parenting schedule without the additional condition sought by the respondent.

The applicant, a restaurant franchisor, moved for an injunction to prevent the respondent landlord from leasing premises in the same mall to a bingo hall, arguing it violated an exclusivity clause prohibiting leases to any 'restaurant, bar or other food service business'.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the bingo hall's ancillary snack bar did not make it a food service business within the meaning of the exclusivity clause.

The court held there was no serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The plaintiff moved to restore a long-delayed solicitor's negligence action to the trial process and to have three related actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident tried together.

Applying the restoration-to-trial-list framework, the court held that the responding defendants had participated in parts of the delay and that the blame did not rest solely with the plaintiff.

The court rejected claims of prejudice based on a clerk's fading memory, missing damages documentation, and the absence of a final expert opinion, finding the alleged prejudice hypothetical or remediable under the Rules.

The motion was granted and all three matters were directed back to assignment court for possible placement on the long trial list.

The vehicle owner brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing multiple civil actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by her 17‑year‑old son while impaired.

The central issue was whether the son had the owner's implied consent to possess and operate the vehicle, engaging owner liability principles.

The court held that the issue of implied consent could properly be determined on summary judgment where the evidentiary record was complete and no responding party adduced evidence.

Accepting the son's consistent discovery evidence that he did not believe he had permission and had taken the vehicle without consent, the court found no implied consent on a balance of probabilities.

The actions against the vehicle owner were dismissed.