Margarita Dvorkina

This decision concerns the costs award following the dismissal of LivingArt Kitchens Inc.'s motion for extensive interlocutory injunctive relief against former employees and related corporations.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis, while LivingArt argued for no costs or significantly reduced partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found that while all parties contributed to procedural issues, LivingArt was the primary cause of the extraordinary legal expenses.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, reducing their aggregate claim to reflect some unreasonable claims and their own contributions to the litigation's complexity.

LivingArt Kitchens Inc. sought an interim and interlocutory injunction against three former employees/independent contractors and their associated corporations, alleging breaches of contract, fiduciary duties, and misappropriation of confidential information.

The extensive relief sought included prohibitions on competing, soliciting clients, using confidential information, and various accounting and asset freezing orders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that LivingArt failed to establish a strong prima facie case, demonstrate irreparable harm, or show that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

The court noted significant evidentiary issues and procedural irregularities, concluding that damages would be an adequate remedy if breaches were proven at trial.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction and a Norwich order against its former property manager and associated individuals and corporations.

The plaintiff discovered that the defendants had depleted its reserve account by over $900,000 through forged cheques and counterfeit bank statements.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and a real risk of asset dissipation, granting the Mareva injunction.

The court also granted a Norwich order to compel disclosure from the banks involved to trace the misappropriated funds.

Covenant Group Ltd., the defendant in a wrongful dismissal suit brought by Santina Calisto, moved for interim recovery of funds fraudulently diverted from one of its clients.

The funds, totaling $108,198.09, were sent to an unauthorized Royal Bank of Canada account after a fraudulent email, purportedly from Ms. Calisto's work address, directed the client to an alternate domain.

The court had previously issued a Norwich Order to identify the account holder (Onaopepo Shuaib) and a Mareva injunction to freeze the funds.

Covenant sought interim recovery of the remaining funds, which had been partially transferred to a second account also held by Shuaib.

The court granted the order, finding that Covenant satisfied the test for interim recovery of personal property under Rule 44.01, as the property was identifiable, Covenant was lawfully entitled to it, and it was unlawfully taken.

Onaopepo Shuaib did not respond to the motion.

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Bereavement Authority of Ontario (BAO) directing them to return administrative fees collected from charitable donations.

The BAO conceded it lacked jurisdiction to order refunds and requested the matter be remitted to a newly appointed registrar.

The applicants argued the BAO's conduct, including media statements, raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and asked the court to decide the matter.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions and remitted the matter in its entirety to the new registrar for reconsideration, finding that the new decision-maker and the BAO's concessions warranted a fresh hearing on a complete record.

The defendant, Covenant Group Ltd., brought a motion for interim recovery of personal property from a Royal Bank of Canada account and a Norwich order requiring RBC to provide banking records.

The underlying action was a wrongful dismissal claim by the plaintiff, Santina Calisto, against Covenant, with Covenant counterclaiming for fraud alleging funds were diverted to a fraudulently created account.

Neither the plaintiff nor RBC opposed the motion.

The court granted the Norwich order and an order freezing the account, but adjourned the motion for interim recovery of personal property.

The interim recovery was adjourned because the party who opened the account was not before the court, and the court required Covenant to first determine the account holder's identity and serve them before returning to argue the recovery motion.

This appeal concerned a failed residential property transaction due to substantial water damage occurring shortly before closing.

The purchasers (respondents) sued the vendors (appellants) for breach of the agreement of purchase and sale (APS), seeking return of their deposit and damages.

The vendors counterclaimed, alleging repudiation by the purchasers.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The motion judge found in favour of the purchasers, ruling that the damage was 'substantial' under s. 18 of the APS, entitling the purchasers to terminate, and that the vendors had not acted in good faith.

The vendors appealed, arguing procedural unfairness regarding the pleading of s. 18, errors in factual findings, and incorrect damages calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on s. 18 and good faith, but reduced the damages awarded by the cost of an engineering report.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an injunction, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $35,000, citing the plaintiff's uncooperative conduct and failure to produce affiants for cross-examination despite a court-ordered timetable.

The court awarded the defendants their costs on a substantial indemnity scale fixed at $35,000, finding the plaintiff's lack of cooperation glaring.

The court declined to order the plaintiff's principal personally liable for the costs, noting that the defendants' corporate remedies as minority shareholders remained to be decided.

The plaintiff brought an action to collect on a $50,000 loan to the corporate defendant and a personal guarantee allegedly signed by the individual defendant.

The defendants argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act and that the individual defendant's signature on the guarantee was forged.

The court found the loan was not a demand obligation, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

Although a handwriting expert confirmed the signature on the guarantee was likely forged, the court found the individual defendant had authorized or acquiesced to others signing on his behalf and had a settled intention to guarantee the loan.

Judgment was granted against both defendants.

Two competing applications were brought by family members.

The applicant daughter applied for guardianship over her 90-year-old mother and challenged the validity of her mother's new will, powers of attorney, and the transfer of her home to her other daughter, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity.

The mother applied to remove the applicant daughter as a joint account holder on her investment account.

The applicant daughter moved to consolidate the applications into an action requiring a trial.

The court found that the mother's capacity was the controlling issue and could be decided on the application record without a trial.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence and the mother's own testimony, the court concluded that the mother had the requisite capacity to manage her property and personal care, grant powers of attorney, make a will, and make an inter vivos gift.

Because the mother had capacity and the impugned instruments were executory, the court declined to direct a trial on the issue of undue influence.

The applicant daughter's application was dismissed, and the mother's application to remove the applicant daughter from the joint account was granted.

The applicant brought an application for payment of invoices.

At a case conference, the respondent corporation failed to appear despite being provided with the call-in details.

The court established a timetable for the application, including a deadline for the respondent to retain counsel in accordance with Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant brought an application for payment of outstanding invoices totaling approximately $53,000.

At a case conference, the court determined that the matter could proceed by way of application pursuant to Rule 14.05(3)(h) as there were unlikely to be material facts in dispute.

The application was scheduled for a three-hour hearing, and the case conference was adjourned to allow the respondent time to retain legal counsel.