Katie Hunter

The applicant, a former step-parent, sought a contact order with her former partner's child, who has Autism Spectrum Disorder.

The child's biological parents, who share equal parenting time and decision-making responsibility, opposed the contact and brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the application.

The court applied the principle of parental autonomy, finding that the parents' decision to end contact was reasonable and did not imperil the child's best interests.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, dismissing the application, and awarded costs to the parents.

The respondent mother brought an interim motion for retroactive and ongoing child support from the applicant father in a shared parenting arrangement.

Despite a significant income disparity and previous judicial concerns, the father had paid no child support for 4.5 years.

The court imputed income to the father from January 1, 2023, based on his pre-disability earnings, finding him intentionally underemployed after his disability benefits ceased.

The court declined to impute pre-tax corporate income at this interim stage due to incomplete financial statements.

Retroactive child support was ordered from September 2018, and ongoing set-off child support was ordered.

The court also ordered the father to secure child support payments by naming the mother as beneficiary on his life insurance policy.

The accused, Heath Johnston, pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and crystal methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime, following his arrest with significant quantities of drugs and cash.

A Gladue Report and Pre-Sentence Report were prepared, highlighting his Indigenous background, intergenerational trauma, and personal struggles with addiction exacerbated by pandemic-related job loss.

The Crown sought a 6-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed 3.5 years.

The court applied Gladue principles, emphasizing the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code to address the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in custody.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court found that a restorative approach through a conditional sentence was appropriate given the strong Gladue factors and the accused's rehabilitation efforts.

The applicant father brought a motion to vaccinate the parties' twelve-year-old daughter, who has high-functioning autism, against the respondent mother's opposition.

The mother argued against urgency and sought to enforce a mediation clause in their separation agreement.

The court found the matter urgent due to the pandemic and systemic delays, and exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to override the mediation clause.

Relying on judicial notice of public health guidance, the court determined that vaccination was in the child's best interests, dismissing the mother's objections based on personal research and natural immunity claims.

The father's motion was granted, and the mother was ordered to pay costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a come-back motion concerning ex parte injunctions.

The applicant successfully continued a Family Law Act preservation order against her former spouse but failed to continue a Mareva order against his family members and corporate affiliates.

The court determined costs based on divided success, reasonableness of conduct, and settlement offers, ultimately awarding the applicant costs against the former spouse and the other respondents costs against the applicant, with deferred payment terms for the applicant.

This appeal arose from a family law dispute concerning spousal support and costs.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's refusal to impute a higher income to the respondent, the quantum of spousal support awarded at the high-end of the guidelines, and the award of full recovery costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding income imputation or her legal conclusions on spousal support and costs.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion and the high threshold for appellate intervention on factual matters.

The Applicant, Ms. Diamond, sought full recovery of $348,624 in legal and expert fees following her success on key issues of spousal support, income for support, and pension division after an 11-day trial.

The Respondent, Mr. Berman, argued for divided success and sought $74,623 in costs.

The court addressed Mr. Berman's excessive costs submissions, affirming the importance of page limits.

It found Ms. Diamond entitled to costs due to her overall success and Mr. Berman's unreasonable litigation conduct, including his self-representation for much of the proceeding and rigid positions.

However, the court declined to award Mr. Berman costs and reduced Ms. Diamond's claim, finding her unreasonable in failing to accept a mid-trial severable offer regarding pension division.

The court also established a general principle against recovering costs for multiple counsel.

Ms. Diamond was ultimately awarded $180,800 in costs.

The case involved a high-conflict family law trial following a 27-year marriage.

Key issues included spousal support entitlement and quantum, imputation of income to the applicant, division of vehicles, and the division of a federal pension at source.

The court found the applicant entitled to high-range spousal support, declined to impute additional income to her, and determined the "normal retirement date" for pension valuation purposes to be age 60 for Group 1 members of the Public Service Superannuation Act.

The court also addressed equalization payments, pre-judgment interest, and post-separation adjustments.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and registered a fail on a roadside approved screening device.

Following arrest and transport to the OPP Detachment, breath samples were taken approximately 76 minutes after the alleged offence, registering 150 and 130 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the Crown's reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), arguing that cumulative police delays in transporting the accused and administering the breath tests rendered the samples not "taken as soon as practicable." The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout and that the presumption of identity applied.