4 total
The court refused to set aside a noting of default due to the defendants' shocking laxity and deliberate delay.
This motion concerned the defendants' application to set aside a noting of default in a simplified procedure action.
The court reviewed the defendants' extensive and unexplained delays in filing a defence, noting a pattern of missed deadlines and a two-month delay in retaining new counsel after terminating previous counsel.
Despite the general preference for resolving disputes on their merits, the court found the defendants' conduct demonstrated "shocking laxity" and deliberate delay.
The motion to set aside the noting of default was dismissed, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeal awarded $15,000 in costs to each respondent following the appellant's entirely unsuccessful guardianship appeal.
This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, Linda Palichuk, was entirely unsuccessful on all issues, including an application for leave to appeal a Superior Court costs order.
The appellant had persisted in seeking a guardianship order for Nina Palichuk despite an expert report confirming Nina's capacity.
The respondents were entirely successful.
The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs payable to each respondent.
The court affirmed that undue influence claims regarding the executory instruments of a living, capable person are premature and hypothetical.
Linda Palichuk appealed a Superior Court decision that found her mother, Nina, capable of managing her affairs and executing various instruments (will, powers of attorney, property transfer), refused a guardianship order, and dismissed Linda's undue influence claim as hypothetical.
The appeal also challenged an order removing Linda from Nina's bank account and a costs award against Linda.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of capacity, affirming that undue influence claims regarding a living, capable person's executory instruments are premature and hypothetical, and upholding the costs award.
The Court of Appeal held that leasing farmland constituted carrying on a farming business under the will, validating the appellant's option to purchase.
This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will clause granting an option to purchase "the farming business carried on by me." The testator had ceased active farming years prior to her death, instead leasing the land.
The application judge found the farming business had ceased, causing the option to lapse.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the application judge erred by not applying the presumption under s. 22 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which states a will speaks as if made immediately before death.
The Court found that the testator was still carrying on a farming business at the time of her death through leasing the land and declaring farm income, thus the option was valid.