Julia Mary Elizabeth Chumak

This motion concerned the defendants' application to set aside a noting of default in a simplified procedure action.

The court reviewed the defendants' extensive and unexplained delays in filing a defence, noting a pattern of missed deadlines and a two-month delay in retaining new counsel after terminating previous counsel.

Despite the general preference for resolving disputes on their merits, the court found the defendants' conduct demonstrated "shocking laxity" and deliberate delay.

The motion to set aside the noting of default was dismissed, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, Linda Palichuk, was entirely unsuccessful on all issues, including an application for leave to appeal a Superior Court costs order.

The appellant had persisted in seeking a guardianship order for Nina Palichuk despite an expert report confirming Nina's capacity.

The respondents were entirely successful.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs payable to each respondent.

Linda Palichuk appealed a Superior Court decision that found her mother, Nina, capable of managing her affairs and executing various instruments (will, powers of attorney, property transfer), refused a guardianship order, and dismissed Linda's undue influence claim as hypothetical.

The appeal also challenged an order removing Linda from Nina's bank account and a costs award against Linda.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of capacity, affirming that undue influence claims regarding a living, capable person's executory instruments are premature and hypothetical, and upholding the costs award.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will clause granting an option to purchase "the farming business carried on by me." The testator had ceased active farming years prior to her death, instead leasing the land.

The application judge found the farming business had ceased, causing the option to lapse.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the application judge erred by not applying the presumption under s. 22 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which states a will speaks as if made immediately before death.

The Court found that the testator was still carrying on a farming business at the time of her death through leasing the land and declaring farm income, thus the option was valid.

Two competing applications were brought by family members.

The applicant daughter applied for guardianship over her 90-year-old mother and challenged the validity of her mother's new will, powers of attorney, and the transfer of her home to her other daughter, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity.

The mother applied to remove the applicant daughter as a joint account holder on her investment account.

The applicant daughter moved to consolidate the applications into an action requiring a trial.

The court found that the mother's capacity was the controlling issue and could be decided on the application record without a trial.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence and the mother's own testimony, the court concluded that the mother had the requisite capacity to manage her property and personal care, grant powers of attorney, make a will, and make an inter vivos gift.

Because the mother had capacity and the impugned instruments were executory, the court declined to direct a trial on the issue of undue influence.

The applicant daughter's application was dismissed, and the mother's application to remove the applicant daughter from the joint account was granted.