Kathryn L. Hawke

The accused was charged with operation while impaired by a drug contrary to section 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failure or refusal to comply with a demand under section 320.15(1).

The Crown conceded the first count at trial.

On the second count, the court found that the Crown failed to prove a valid demand, which is an essential element of the failure to comply offence.

The evaluating officer required an affirmative statement from the accused that she would submit to the evaluation before proceeding, which constituted an additional unlawful demand not authorized by the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, the initial demand to "submit to an evaluation" was not unequivocal as it did not clearly communicate what the accused was compelled to do.

The accused was acquitted.

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Mario Takov of impaired driving charges under s. 320.14 of the Criminal Code.

The case centered on the interpretation and application of the "evaluation" conducted by a certified Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) under s. 320.28(2)(a).

The judge undertook a detailed statutory interpretation, concluding that the "evaluation" mandated by the Criminal Code is the 12-Step Drug Influence Evaluation (12-Step DIE) as defined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The court found significant reliability issues with the Evaluating Officer's administration of the 12-Step DIE, including deviations from standardized procedures and an opinion inconsistent with the expected indicators for impairment by a CNS stimulant.

The Crown failed to prove the required facts to trigger the presumptions under s. 320.31(6), and the evidence did not establish impairment by alcohol or drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendants brought applications seeking a stay of charges under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of section 11(b) Charter rights to trial within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial was 34.5 months.

After deducting defence-waived delay of 8 months and 5 days, the remaining delay was 26 months and 1 week, exceeding the ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found the Crown's conduct exemplified a "culture of complacency," particularly regarding delayed disclosure of the Information to Obtain.

The applications were granted and all charges were stayed.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 contrary to s. 254(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a roadside stop and breath demand.

All issues were conceded except for a s. 9 Charter application alleging arbitrary detention.

The court found that the defendant was arbitrarily detained and imprisoned for over six hours after the investigation was complete, as the officers in charge failed to release her despite having no reasonable grounds to continue detention.

The court excluded the breath readings as evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol content (Over 80).

Following her arrest and breath testing, which revealed readings of 145 mg/100 ml and 135 mg/100 ml, she was detained at the police station.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of Section 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court found that while the initial detention was lawful, the defendant was unlawfully held for approximately six hours beyond the point at which she should have been released.

The officers in charge failed to establish reasonable grounds under Section 498(1.1) of the Criminal Code to justify the continued detention.

The court found a Section 9 Charter breach and adjourned the matter for submissions on remedy.

The respondent, biological father of a child born in 2005, brought a motion to change a 2006 custody and access order that granted the applicant (mother) sole custody and the respondent no access.

The respondent sought to establish access with himself and his family.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet the threshold test under section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act, as he did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances affecting the child's best interests.

The court found the respondent's true motivation was to control and harass the applicant, not to establish a genuine relationship with the child.

The motion was dismissed and the original order was upheld.